

ΧΑΡΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΕΙΡΗΝΗ,

OR

of Buchanan
A *Pacifick* Discourse of Gods
GRACE and DECREES:-

In a Letter, of full Accordance, written to the Reverend, and most learned, Dr. Robert Sanderfon,

By Henry Hammond. D.D.

To which are annexed the Extracts of three Letters concerning Gods *Prescience* reconciled with *Liberty* and *Contingency*,

Together with two Sermons preached before these evil times, the one to the Clergy, the other to the Citizens of *London*.

LONDON.

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TO
All our BRETHREN
Of the
Church of ENGLAND.

§. 1. **I**N relation to the Controversies concerning Gods Grace and Decrees, nothing was ever Superior, in my thoughts, to the feare that the great Interests of Religion, Christian practise, and particularly that of Charity, might be obstructed by them.

§. 2. It hath long been the Complaint of pious and learned men, (of the justice whereof, if formerly we had, we cannot now reasonably retain any doubt,) that the crude and unwary treating of these, and (from thence derived,) an hasty premature perswasion of their being in Christ, (assisted by a beliefe of irrespsective Decrees, and Grace irresistibile, and no possibility of interrupting their justified estate,) was apt to contribute to the presumptions, and securities, and finall impenitences of some men,

A 3 who

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who having most loudly renounced the power, choose yet not to quit the forme of Godliness.

§. 3. And for the heaies, and uncharitable distempers, which the managing of these controversies particularly have been guilty of, we need not look abroad among the Dominicans and Jesuites, Jantenists and Molinists, for proofes. Our own Region hath not of a long time failed of evidences. The old weapon of *St* xard-pale, crying down for carnall men and hereticks, Pelagians and Semipelagians, Papists, Socinians, and what not? (even rifling the Poets Hell to fetch out Titles for their adversaries,) hath never been more nimbly taken up, and vigorously handled, then in these dayes.

§. 4. And as if fewell to dissentions were still wanting, it hath been the endeavour of some to suggest this jealousy, and clancularly to infuse it into the minds of men, that they which oppose unconditionate Decrees, &c. (and pretend to think they effectually serve the ends of Christianity thereby,) have entertained such vehement dislikes, and averfations to all that Scheme of doctrines, that they retain no charity to the maintainers of them, though they be in other things as constant, obedient soons of the Church of England, as any; and when opportunity shall assist their designe, will take care rigorously to fence their communion from them, and whatever the

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the accord be in other doctrines, (wherein our Church is eminently concerned against the common Adversaries,) will proceed finally to exterminate and exclude them.

¶ 5. The Consequences of this perswasion, once imbibed, be it never so causelesse and unprovoked, how noxious and inauspicious they may prove to all that are on either side concerned in them, what leven of bitter zeale and animosities it may cause to ferment in the minds of some, what blasts and improsperities it may bring on the endeavours of others; and, betwixt both, what detriment to the true and solid ends, whether of Religion, or Reformation, (the squaring of our lives according to that other, more sublime, patterne in the mount, Mat. v. the inhaunsed, transcendent, indispensable Lawes of Purity and Peaceableness,) I shall not here need to set forth, every man's sagacity serving him competently to make this discovery.

¶ 6. Yet was it not a rationall hope, that the bare disclaiming and renouncing so great a guilt, would be admitted to the purgation of those, against whom it had been suggested and believed. It therefore seemed to me more seasonable to tender an ocular demonstration of the contrary, by bringing my Lamb, or Turtle, (my offering to the Temple of Peace,) and really exemplifying the charity and accordance, that may readily be attained between dissenters, when

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when minds prepared with meekness, and love of the Truth, wheresoever they meet with it, can take courage to deny themselves, and so to deposit prejudices, and instead of names and shadows, to give themselves up to the entire guidance of that light which shines in Scripture.

S. 7. *In order to this end, it seemed not improper, to offer at this time to publick view the present Sentiments of the Judicious Dr. Sander-son, the Regius Professor of the University of Oxford, (and the rather, because some manuscript Tables of his former thoughts, and some passages from his Sermons, long since preached, and now republished, have been made use of, to gain authority to those Doctrines which he is now far from owning,) and briefly and perspicuously to annex unto, and compare with them, those Amicable and Pacifick Reflexions, which may hope to gain the unanimous consent of all true Sons of our Venerable Mother, the Church of England, whose chiefe aime it hath alwayes been to discountenance divisions and factions, and occasions and fomenters of those, especially singular Doctrines and Novell Articles of Faith, and in a Catholick harmonious charity, to plant Primitive belief, and zeale of good workes, and so instead of the empty Forme, the full power of Godlinessse.*

§. 8. What

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¶ 8. *What is so largely added on that one head of Prescience, had some appearance of necessity, to repell a shaft borrowed of late from the Socinian's quiver, who having resolved it impossible for God himself to foresee future Contingents, have given disputers their choice, whether they like best, bluntly to deny God's Prescience, and so, at his cost, maintain their own Liberty, or more piously to maintain Prescience, and then give it the same force of evacuating all Liberty and Contingency, which Predetermination of all events was justly accused to draw after it; The mistake very dangerous on either side, and the temptation equally fitted for both, if it were not timely obviated.*

¶ 9. *That these ensuing Discourses may be effectually successfull to the designed end, of advancing the threefold interest of Truth, and Peace, and Uniforme Christian obedience, that it may supplant the Vineger by the Oyle, the Nitre by the Ballome, and procure, by consent of Litigants, a solemne Supersedeas, if not Conclusion to debates, (an aversion to these heathen Agones, which afford nothing, but to the combatant blowes, and leaves to the conquerour,) above all, that it may provide us, by this truce, a greater vacancy for the continued exercises of reall Piety, and engage us to make diligent use of it, (to adde, as to our Faith vertue, (or courage,) so to our Godlinesse brotherly-kindnesse, and to that the yet higher ascent and accomplishment of charity,)*

2^d p^{er}ty, 2.
Ta. 1.5.

The Preface.

charity,) that it may compact us all into that union that most successfully contributes to our growth, and so possess us of that qualification, to which inmarceffible joyes are awarded by our Righteous Judge, shall be continually the prayer, as in the following sheetes it hath been the sincere single endeavour, of.

**Festo Omnium
Sanctorum.**

**Your-fellow Labourer
H. HAMMOND.**

A Letter of full Accordance,

Written to

D. ROBERT SANDERSON,

CONCERNING

Gods Grace and Decrees.

Dear Sir,

HAVING had a sight of the Letter which S. 1.
you sent M.— about the Antiremon-
strant Controversies dated *Mar. 26.*
and observing one of the reasons, which
you render of your having avoided to appear on
that theme, [*A loathness to engage in a quarrell
whereof you should never hope to see an end*] I
thought my self in some degree qualified to an-
swer this reason of yours, and thereby to do ac-
ceptable service to many, who do not think fit
that any considerations, which have not real and
weighty truth in them, should obstruct that which
may be so much to the common good, I mean,
your writing and declaring your mind on any
profitable subject.

§. 2. That which qualifies me more then some
others, to evacuate the force of this one reason of
yours, and makes me willing to attempt it, though
not to appear in opposition to any other passage,
that ever you have written, is the true friendship
that hath passed between us, and the sweet con-
versation that for sometime we enjoyed, with-

B out

A Letter to D. Sanderson

out any allay or unequableness, sharp word, or unkind, or jealous thought. The remembrance whereof assures me unquestionably, that you and I may engage in this question, as far as either of us shall think profitable, without any the least beginning of a *quarrel*, and then that will competently be removed from such, as of which *you cannot hope to see an end.*

§. 3. And before I go any farther, I appeal to your own judgement, whether herein I do not at least speak probably, and then whether it were not a misprision, which you are in all reason to deposite, to apprehend such insuperable difficulties or impossibilities at a distance, which when they are prudently approached, and examined, so presently vanish before you. If this one reflection do not convince you, it remains, that the speculation be brought to practice, and exemplified to your senses.

Five Posi-
tions agreed on
by all.

§ 4. You set out with a mention of some positions, wherein, you say, Divines, though of contrary judgements, do yet all agree. And then it is not credible that you and I should be so singular, as to differ in them endlessly; of this number you propose five, 1. *That the will of man is free in all his actions.* 2. *That very many things in the world happen contingently.* 3. *That God from all eternity foreseeth all, even the most free and contingent events.* 4. *That whatsoever God foreseeth shall infallibly come to pass.* 5. *That sinners are converted by the effectual working of Gods grace.* Of each of these you say we have from Scripture, Reason and Experience, as good and full assurance, as can be desired for the *truth*, or *truth* of them, that they are so. And I who fully sub-
scribe

concerning Gods Grace and Decrees.

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scribe to the undoubted truth of each of the Propositions, and do it also upon the very same three grounds (of Scripture, Reason, and Experience) which you mention, need not the intercession of our friendship to render it impossible to give you any the least trouble of so much as explaining your sence in any of these.

§. 5. Next, when you resolve, that *all the difficulty is about the nos* (referring that to no more then three heads) 1. *How to reconcile the certain futuration of what God foreseeth, with the liberty of the rational creature, and the contingency of casual effects, as they proceed from inferiour causes.* 2. *In what manner or measure the effectual Grace of God cooperateth and concurrerth with the free will of man, in the conversion of a sinner.* 3. *How to cut so even a thread, as to take the whole of what we do amiss to our selves, and leave the whole glory of what we do well to his grace.*] You are again as secure as any amulet can make you, that this resolution of abbreviating the Controversies, and confining them to these few heads, shall never engage you in the least degree of Debate: And then I shall challenge you to feign, how it can remain possible, without contradicting ones self (which still is not quarrelling with you) to engage you in any uneasie contention, unless it be on one of these three heads, and when I have by promise obliged my self, which now I do, not to raise any Dispute, or attempt to ensnare or intangle you in any of these three, you have then nothing to retract but your fears, to which if I tell you, you cannot adhere, discerning a sure and near period to that which you apprehended *endless*, this is all the victory I shall project, or be capable of in this matter.

Three heads
of difficulty.

B 2

§. 6.

of reconciling
Præscience with Li-
berty of Con-
tingency.

§. 6. Of the first of these three Difficulties, *the reconciling the certain futuration of what God foresees, with the liberty of the rational creature, and the contingency and casual effects*, It falls out, that you have in your shorter Letter, dated *Ap. 8.* given that account, which evidenceth it to be, in your opinion, no invincible difficulty, your words are these, [*That Gods præscience layeth no necessity at all upon any event, but that yet all events, as they are foreseen of God, so shall they certainly and infallibly come to pass, in such sort as they are foreseen, else the knowledge of God should be fallible, which certainty of the event may in some sort be called necessity, to wit, consequentis or ex hypothesi, according as all the most contingent things are necessary, when they actually exist, which is a necessity infinitely distant from that which prædetermination importeth.*] This I take to be so clear an explication of that difficulty, and so solid a determining of the τὸ πῶς, the manner of reconciling præscience with contingency, that as I fully consent to it in every part of your period, so I doubt not but the last part alone hath made it as intelligible to any ordinary understanding, as whole books of Philosophers have attempted to do.

§. 7. For Gods præscience from all eternity being but the seeing every thing that ever exists, as it is, contingents, as contingents, necessary, as necessary, can neither work any change in the object, by thus seeing it, (convert a contingent into a necessary) nor it self be deceived in what it sees, which it must be, if any thing in process of time should be otherwise, then from all eternity God saw it to be.

§. 8. I was lately advised with by a Divine, to
me

me unknown, but one that seems to be a man of good learning, about the distinction frequently made in this matter, betwixt inevitably and infallibly, and my answer and replies to his severall objections, (because I would demonstrate the perfect accordance betwixt you and me in this, which, within this year or two is put into a very grave attire, and revered as a great difficulty) I will give you at large by way of Appendage at the end of this Letter, having by hap a copy retained by me, and though it cost you some minutes to survey them, yet I know your patience of all such exercises so well, that I doubt not of your willingness to be thus detained by me, which yet here you shall not, *loco non suo*.

§. 9. Then for the second, *In what manner and measure the effectuall Grace of God cooperateth, or concurrereth with the free will of man in his conversion*] you seem to me to have given a punctuall account of each part of that also, in the said second Letter, in these words, *That God worketh not by his Grace irresistibly, but yet so effectually on those whom he hath ex beneplacito appointed to salvation, in ordering the means, occasions and opportunities with such congruity to that end, as that de facto it is not finally resisted*] Here it is evident your resolution comes home to each terme in the difficulty, For if effectuall Grace worke not irresistibly, then we see in what manner it cooperates with the free will of man, viz. so as it still remains possible for him to resist it. And if the effectualness of his working consist in ordering the means, occasions, and opportunities with such congruity, &c. then as that stateth the measure of the cooperation (the onely second part of the difficulty)

Of the manner and measure of the cooperation of Effectuall Grace with the free will of man.

ficulty) and doth it expressly in Bishop *Overals* way, so this supposeth Grace sufficient to conversion and salvation to be given to those, who are not converted, and saved, quite contrary to the three grand prætenensions of Doctor *Twisse*, the *Supralapsarians*, and *Sublapsarians*, and whether it be true or no, is presently freed from all the odious consequences charged on the several Schemes of the Antiremonstrants, and so may safely be granted, or not opposed by them, who yet want evidence of Scripture to establish it, and so this is not likely to bring any uneasie engagement upon you.

How to attribute all good to God, and evil to ourselves.

§. 10. And then as there remains no more difficulties, but the third, so, if you mark it, the grounds are already laid, whereby that is unquestionably resolved, for having granted that God gives *sufficient* Grace, and yet, when he cooperates most *effectually*, he doth it *not irresistibly*, this is the very *thred* you seek to cut by, so as to devolve the whole blame of all our miscarriages on our selves, and the entire glory and praise of all our καλὰ ἔργα, good performances, or good successes on his Grace. Were any of us to left or past by, as to be denied *sufficient* grace, and yet destined to perish, meerly through want of necessities, the whole blame could not rationally fall on our selves, it could not be said of Christs yoke, that it were * *easy*, or his † *Commandment* not far from us, the fault that was found with the Mosai-cal œconomy, *Heb. viii. 8.* and which made another (the Evangelical) necessary, would still lye against this, viz. that men were not enabled to perform what was required, and yet the non-performance eternally revenged on many of them.

* Matth. xi.
† Rom. x.

But

But *sufficient Grace* being tendred by God, and by no default, but their own, proving ineffectuall, the entire blame falls unavoidably on those, who do not thus *open* to him that *knocks*, so receive, as to make use of it, but *resist*, or *grieve*, or *quench* what was so mercifully designed, and might have been improved by the humble and diligent receivers unto their greatest advantages.

§. 11. On the other side, if our nature being universally corrupted by *Adam's* fall, all possibility of rising out of that grave of sin be the effect and benefit of the *Grace*, as that is of the death of Christ, if it be *God that worketh in us both to will and to do*, of his good pleasure, the first by his preventing, the second by his assisting Grace, and both those bottom'd meerly in his *evangelical* good pleasure, nothing in us any way meriting the first act, or purpose of Giving Grace, any farther then our wants and miseries rendered us the proper objects of his compassions and reliefs; and the subsequent aids in like manner challengeable, onely from his promise, and the purport of the parable of the Talents, of *Giving to him that bath*, rewarding the use of the lower, with the gift of an higher degree of Grace, then still is this, the attributing nothing to our selves, but demerits, and provocations, and giving the whole glory to God.

§. 12. Having gone thus far without any considerable disagreement, about the τὸ πᾶς, how to reconcile these three seeming repugnancies, wherein you apprehended the greatest difficulty to lye, and being hereby, as by so many *postulata* accorded between us, competently provided and furnished of a standard, and umpire, (in

*Saint Pauls
O the Depth.*

case any light difference should arise) what objection can *S. Pauls* Ω *Bold*®, Rom. xi. 33. (belonging expressly to another matter, the cutting off the obdurate, and gathering all perswasible believing Jews and Gentiles, and no way applicable to this) interpose, why we should not proceed together to the consideration of the Doctrine of Decrees, as it hath been variously debated by others, and by you perspicuously recapitulated in the process of your papers?

*An History
of Doctor
Sanderfons
thoughts in
these points.*

§. 13. To this therefore I presume of your good leave that we now proceed, and whereas you have prudently chosen to begin with an history of your own thoughts on this subject, which you have laid down with great particularity, I shall set out with a bare transcript of that, which will need no comment of mine, to render it usefull to the Reader, in discovering to him the true and sole originall of the thriving (for some time) of those Doctrines among us, and how so many of our Church came to be seasoned with them, and in giving him a but necessary caution for the laying the grounds of the study of Divinity in the writings of the antient Church, rather then in our modern systemes and Institutions. Your words are these,

§. 14. *When I began to set my self to the Study of Divinity as my proper business, (which was after I had the degree of Master of Arts, being then newly xxi. years of age) the first thing I thought fit for me to do, was to consider well of the Articles of the Church of England, which I had formerly read over twice, or thrice, and whereunto I had subscribed. And because I had then met with some Puritanicall Pamphlets Written against the Liturgy,*

concerning Gods Grace and Decrees.

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Liturgie, and Ceremonies; although most of the Arguments therein were such as needed no great skill to give satisfactory answers unto, yet for my fuller satisfaction (the questions being de rebus agendis, and so the more suitable to my proper inclination) I read over with great diligence and no less delight that excellent piece of Learned Hooker's Ecclesiasticall Politie. And I have great cause to bless God for it that so I did, not onely for that it much both cleared and sealed my judgement for ever after in very many weighty points (as of Scandall, Christian Liberty, Obligation of Laws, Obedience, &c.) but that it also proved (by his good providence) a good preparative to me (that I say not, Antidote) for the reading of Calvin's Institutions with more caution then perhaps (otherwise) I should have done. For that Book was commended to me, as it was generally to all young Scholars in those times, as the best and perfectest systeme of Divinity, and fittest to be laid as a ground work in the study of that profession. And indeed being so prepared as is said, my expectation was not at all deceived, in the reading of those Institutions. I found, so far as I was then able to judge, the method exact, the expressions clear, the style grave, equall and unaffected: his Doctrine for the most part conform to S. Augustines, in a word, the whole worke very elaborate, and usefull to the Churches of God in a good measure; and might have been (I verily believe) much more usefull, if the honour of his name had not given so much reputation to his very errors. I must acknowledge my self to have reaped great benefit by the reading thereof. But as for the questions of Election, Reprobation, Effectuall Grace, Perseverance, &c. I

took

took as little notice of the two firſt, as of any other thing contained in the book; both becauſe I was alwayes affraid to pry much into thoſe ſecrets, and becauſe I could not certainly inform my ſelf from his own writings, whether he were a Supralapſarian (as moſt ſpeak him, and he ſeemeth often to incline much that way) or a Sublapſarian, as ſundry paſſages in the book ſeem to import. But giving my ſelf moſtly ſtill to the ſtudy of Moral Divinity, (and taking moſt other things upon truſt, as they were in a manner generally taught both in the Schools and Pulpits in both Univerſities) I did for many years together acquieſce without troubling my ſelf any farther about them, in the more commonly received opinions concerning both theſe two, and the other points depending thereupon. Yet in the Sublapſarian way ever, which ſeemed to me of the two, the more moderate, rationally and agreeable to the goodneſs, and juſtice of God: for the rigid Supralapſarian doctrine could never find any entertainment in my thoughts from firſt to laſt. But MDCXXV. a Parliament being called, wherein I was choſen one of the Clerks of the Convocation for the Dioceſſe of Lincoln, during the continuance of that Parliament (which was about four moneths, as I remember) there was ſome expectation that theſe Arminian points (the onely queſtions almoſt in agitation at that time) ſhould have been debated by the Clergy, in that CONVOCATION. Which occaſioned me (as it did ſundry others) being then at ſome leaſure, to endeavour by ſtudy and conference to inform my ſelf, as thoroughly and exactly in the ſtate of thoſe Controverſies, as I could have opportunity, and as my Wit would ſerve me for it. In order whereunto, I made it my firſt buſineſs

finest to take a survey of the severall different opinions concerning the ordering of Gods Decrees, as to the salvation or damnation of men; not as they are supposed to be really in *Mente Divina* (for all his Decrees are eternall and therefore coeternall, and so no priority or posteriority among them :) but quoad nostrum intelligendi modum, because we cannot conceive or speak of the things of God, but in a way suitable to our own finite condition, and understanding: Even as God himself hath been pleased to reveal himself to us in the holy Scriptures by the like suitable condescensions and accommodations. Which opinions, the better to represent their differences to the eye, uno quasi intuitu, for their more easie conveying to the understanding by that means, and the avoiding of confusion and tedious discoursgs, I reduced into five Schemes or Tables, much after the manner as I had used to draw Pedigrees (a thing which I think you know I have very much fancied, as to me of all others the most delightful recreation) of which Schemes, some speciall friends, to whom I shewed them, desired copies: who, as it seemeth, valuing them more then I did (for divers men have copies of them, as I hear, but I do not know that I have any such my self) communicated them farther, and so they are come into many hands. Those are they which Doctor Reynolds, in his Epistle prefixed to Master Barlees Corroptory Correction, had taken notice of. Having all these Schemes before my eyes at once, so as I might with ease compare them one with another, and having considered of the conveniences and inconveniences of each, as well as I could, I soon discerned a necessity of quitting the Sublapsarian way of which I had a better liking before, as well

as the Supralapsarian, which I could never fancy.]

§. 15. Thus far your history, which, I verily believe to have perfect truth in every step of it, without any disguise or varnish, and so I pass from it without any farther Reflections.

§. 16. Next then follows your distincter view of the severall wayes, which have been embraced by those of the Antiremonitnant perswasion, and the motives on which you were forced to dissent and depart from each of them, and to this I am obliged to attend you *ναὶ αὖ πόδα*. And the wayes being especially three, the method of greatest advantage will be to begin with a transient view of those, each of which you with great reason reject, and to set Doctor *Twisses* first (though it came last into the world and adorn'd it self with the spoiles of the other two) because that sets the object of Election higher, then the other do, *homo creabilis*, man considered before he is created. His design and scheme you have perspicuously drawn, thus, [*That God making his own Glory the only end of all other his Decrees, all these decrees of creating man, of permitting sin, of sending Christ, of preaching the Gospel, of Electing some, of Reprobating others, and the rest, make up one entire coordinate Medium, conducing to that one End, and so the whole subordinate to it, but not any one part, or joynt thereof subordinate to any other of the same.*] Against this, your objection I profess to be very convincing, taken from his own beloved axiome, so oft repeated by him, (and borrowed from him, and built upon by others) that *whatsoever is first in the intention, is last in the execution*. For as it is most evident, that

D. Twiss his way.

Causes of rejecting it.

that of these his supposed coordinate decrees some are after others in execution (the fall after the creation, the coming of Christ after both, and so of the rest) so if he will stand to his principle, he must, as you say, grant, that those that were thus after any other in the execution, were in Gods intention before them, which will necessarily bring in a subordination among them, and so quite overthrow this (as you call it) new crochet of coordination.

§. 17. Your other causes of dislike to His way are equally rational, 1. the falseness of that his *Logick Maxime*, which he builds so much upon, which yet hath no certain truth, or other then casual, but when it is applyed to final causes, and the means used for the attaining any end. 2. The prodigiousness of his other doctrine, that there are more degrees of bonity in damnato quam annihilato, (because the *bonitas entis*) and so that it is better for the Creature to be in eternall misery, then simply not to be; when Christ expressly pronounceth the contrary of wicked men, that it had been better for them never to have been born, to have a milstone about the neck, and to be cast into the sea, (a figure to represent annihilation) then to be involved in those dangers that attend their sins. 3. His resolving Gods Election of a man to life eternall to be * no act of his mercy, and likewise his † reprobating and ordaining to damnation to be no act of his Justice, but of his pleasure.] A few such Propositions as these are competent to blast and defame any cause, which requires such aids, stands in need of such supporters, and therefore you will be confident I concur with you in rejection of that, though I think neither of us likely to undertake the travel of refuting of his whole work.

§. 18.

* L. 1. dig.

9.

† Ibid. dig.

10.

The Supra-
lapsarians
ways.
The Subla-
psarians.

§. 18. Next then for the Supralapsarians, with whom the object of the decree is *homo conditus*, man created, not yet fallen, and the Sublapsarians, with whom it is Man fall'n, or the corrupt Mass, your rejections and reasons thereof are twined together, and are especially two, which you justly call very weighty, and so I suppose they will be deem'd by any man, that shall consider the force of them, without prejudice, I shall therefore set them down from your letter in your own words.

Reasons a-
gainst both.

§. 19. The first reason is, because though it might perhaps be defensible, as to the justice of God, in regard of his absolute power over his own creature, yet it seems very hardly reconcileable with the goodness of God, and his exceeding great love to mankind, as they are plentifully and passionately set forth in his holy word, to decree the eternall damnation of the greater part of mankind, for that sin, and for that sin onely which was utterly and naturally impossible for him to avoid, for the Decree of Reprobation according to the Sublapsarian Doctrine, being nothing else but a meer preterition or non-election of some persons whom God left, as he found them, involved in the guilt of the first Adams transgression, without any actuall personall sin of their own, when he withdrew some others, as guilty as they, without any respect to Christ the second Adam, it must needs follow that the persons so left are destin'd to eternall misery, for no other cause, but this onely, that Adam some thousand years since did eat the forbidden fruit, and they being yet unborn could not help it.

§. 20. The other reason was, because the Scripture not onely saith expressly, that God hath chosen us in Christ before the foundation of the world, Eph.

concerning Gods Grace and Decrees. 15

Eph. 1. 4, 5. and consequently the decree of sending Christ must be precedaneous to that of Election, but also doth every where, and upon all occasions hold forth the death of Christ, as intended by God for the benefit of mankind, in the utmost extent, [the world, the whole world, mankind, every man, &c.] and not for the benefit of some few onely, the rest by an antecedent peremptory decree excluded. To which it would be consequent, that according to the tenure of (the more moderate of these) the Sublapsarians doctrine, Jesus Christ the Judge at the last day, when he should proceed to pronounce sentence upon the damned, should bespeak them to this effect, *Ita maledicti, voluit enim Pater meus pro beneplacito, ut Adam peccato suo vos perderet, noluit ut ego sanguine meo vos redimerem, Go ye cursed, for my Father of his meer pleasure will'd that Adam by his sin should destroy you, will'd not that I by my blood should redeem you, the very thought whereof (you say) your soul so much abhorr'd, that you were forced to forsake that opinion of the Sublapsarians, (having, as you profess, never phansied the Superlapsarians) and conclude it unsafe to place the decree of Election before that of sending Christ.*

S. 21. These two reasons of changing your judgement, are, I confess, so worthy of a considering man, who makes Gods revealed will his Cynosure, and doth not first espouse doctrines of men, and then catch at some few obscure places of Scripture, to countenance them, nor makes his retreat to the abyss of Gods unfathomable Counsels, as the reason of (that which is its contradictory) his attempting to fathome and define them, that I doubt not but the tendering of them to all dispassionate seekers of truth, that have not some interests

interests to serve by adhering peremptorily and obstinately to their prepossessions, will be of the same force to disabuse and extort from them the same confessions, which they have from you, causing them fairly to deposite these two Schemes, and either not to define at all, or to seek out other solidier Methods, and more Catholick Grounds of defining; and if the wise heathen were in the right

*Virtus est vitium fugere, & sapientia prima
Stultitia caruisse—*

this will be some degree of proficiency, which they that shall with unspeakable joy have transcribed from you, will also have temptation to accuse your fears, or waryness, that they received not this lesson sooner from you, especially when they are told, what here you express, that *these have been your thoughts, ever since the year 1625. i. e. 34. years since, which is an age or generation in the Scripture-use of the word.*

§. 22. That none may be any longer deprived of this means of their conviction, or permitted to think or teach securely and confidently, and as in accord with you, what you profess your *soul* thus long to have *abhorred the very thought of*, I desire you will at length communicate your thoughts your self, or else allow this letter of mine to be your *ὑποφῆτις* and do it for you, under some testimony of your full approbation of this your sence.

§. 23. But all this, thus far advanced, is but the rejection of the severall erroneous wayes, and onely the negative part of your thoughts, which
yet

yet, by the way let me tell you, is fully sufficient both to the peace of Churches, and of particular souls; If the erroneous wayes be rejected, from whence all the misapprehensions of God, and ill consequences thereof flow, the Church is competently secured from tares, and then what need expresse articles, and positive definitions come in to her rescue?

The negative part sufficient to Peace &c.

§. 24. This I suppose the reason both of our Churches Moderation in framing the *Article of Predestination*, and of our *late Kings Declaration*, in silencing the debate of the questions. For if by these methods the Church could but have prevailed to have the definitions of the several pretenders forgotten, all men contenting themselves, as our Article prescribes, with the *promises of God*, as they are declared in *Scripture*, (which sure are *Universal* and *conditionate*, not absolute and particular) the turmoil and heat, and impertinence of Disputes had been prevented, which now goes for an engagement in Gods cause, the bare fervour and zeal in which is taken in commutation for much other piety; by many the most eager contenders. The doctrines being deemed doctrines of God, are counted evidences of sanctified men, and affix the censure of carnality on opposers, and from hence come *bitter envyings, railings*, and at the least *evil surmisings*, and these are most contrary to the outward peace of a Church or Nation.

Our Churches moderation. The Kings Declaration in order to Peace.

§. 25. And for particular mens souls, if the rigid doctrines be found apt to cool all those mens love of God, who have not the confidence to believe themselves of the number of the few chosen vessels, and to beget security and presumption in others, who have conquered those difficulties, and

Gods life.

resolved that they are of that number, and to obstruct industry and vigorous endeavours, and fear of falling, and so to have malignant influences on practise, yet seeing it is the believing the Antiremonstrant Schemes (one or other of them) to be the truth of God, which lyes under these ill consequences, the bare laying them aside, leaves every man indispensably under the force of Christs *commands* to disciples, *terrors* to the unreformed, and *conditional* (most expressly *conditional*) *promises* to all; and those being substantially backed with the firm belief of all the Articles of the Creed, particularly of the judgement to come, are by the grace of God abundantly sufficient to secure Evangelical obedience, the true foundation of peace to every Christian soul, and therefore I say, *est aliquid pro-
dire tenns*, your *negative* part, if there were no more behind, will be of sovereign use to all that have been seduced into any liking of those errors, which are by a man of your moderation and judgement, in despite of contrary prepossessions, on reasons so convincing and perspicuous, rejected.

§. 26. But in the space of thirty four years, though you have permitted your genius to lead you to other studies (which if your rejections be granted, I shall willingly confess to be more universally profitable, then any minuter searches into the decrees) those of *moral or practical Divinity*, yet it seems you have not liv'd such an obstinate Recluse from the disputes and transactions of men, but that occasions you have met with to excite your faculties, to wade a little farther into the Positive part of these Doctrines: and indeed it is hard to conceive how a man can have spent so many hours, as the Survey of Doctor Twisses *Vindicia Gratie*,
were

were it never so slight and desultory, must have cost you, without some other reflections, besides those of bare averſation to his Hypotheſes.

§. 27. To theſe you at length proceed, propoſing them with difference, owning ſome of them, as your *preſent thoughts*, and *opinion*, whiſt in others you profeſs to be purely *ſceptick*, and to propoſe them *onely as conjectures*, that ſeem to you in the mean time not improbable, untill you meet with ſome other more ſatisfactory. And in making this difference I fully accord with you, diſcerning that undeniable evidence of grounds in the former, which is not ſo readily diſcoverable in the latter. I ſhall therefore follow your direction herein, and rank theſe ſeverally, ſetting down thoſe which you own as your *opinion* firſt, and afterward, with that note of difference, proceed to your *Conjectures*.

Differences between Opinions and Conjectures.

§. 28. Concerning the *Decrees of Election and Reprobation*, your *preſent opinion* is contained in theſe three propoſitions (prefaced with two more, which are but the diſavowing the three wayes of *Maſſa nondum condita*, *condita ante lapſum*, & *corrupta*.)

Three Propoſitions concerning Gods Decrees,

§. 29. I. That man being made upright, and ſo left *in manu conſilii fui* (God permitting him to act according to that freedom of will wherewith as a reaſonable creature he had endowed him) did by his own voluntary diſobedience, through the cunning of Satan, tempting him thereunto, fall away from God, caſt himſelf into a ſtate of ſin and miſery, under the bondage of Satan, without any power, poſſibility, or ſo much as deſire to recover himſelf out of that wretched condition; All which God did decree not to hinder, as purpoſing to make uſe thereof, as a

Man's Fall,

fit occasion for the greater manifestation of his power, wisdom, goodness, mercy, justice, &c. Of this my opinion is, that it is, in every branch of it, so undeniably founded in the express affirmations of holy Writ, that there can be no doubt of it to any Christian.

The giving of
Christ for
Mankind.

§. 30. II. *That man being thus fallen, God out of his infinite compassion to his creature, made after his own image (and that Satan might not finally triumph in so rich a conquest, if the whole mass of mankind should perish) decreed to send his only begotten Son Jesus Christ into the world, to undertake the great work of our Redemption, and to satisfy his justice for sin, that so notwithstanding the same, the whole mass of mankind lost by the fall of the first Adam, might be restored to a capability of salvation, through the mercy of God, and the merits of Jesus Christ, the second Adam.*

In this, compared with what you before said, and afterwards add, I discern your full agreement to the words of our Church-Catechism, as those are exactly consonant to the manifold testimonies of sacred Writ, that Christ dyed for, and thereby redeemed all mankind; your words being not (to my apprehension) capable of any of those evasions, that others are willing to reserve themselves in this business, as of his dying sufficiently, but not intentionally for all, for that *χενόφύετον* is superseded by your words of Gods sending Christ &c. that so mankind &c.] which must needs import his unfeigned intention, that mankind should be restored to a reall capability of salvation, which is not with truth affirmable, if any one individuall of that whole kind be absolutely passed by, or left, or excluded from his part in this restauration, and capability

capability of salvation, which yet we must resolve many millions to be, if that which is perfectly necessary to the recovery of those which were so totally lost, as your former proposition truly supposed, be not really and effectively made up to them by Christ. And as in this full latitude I am obliged to understand you, so I wish not any more pregnant words to expresse it, then those which you have chosen.

§. 31. III. *That man having by his fall rendred* The new Co-
venant, *himself incapable of receiving any benefit from the Covenant made with him in his first Creation, God was graciously pleased to enter into a new Covenant with mankind, founded in his Son Jesus Christ, consisting of Evangelical but conditional promises, of granting remission of sins, and everlasting life, upon the condition of faith in Christ, repentance from dead works, and new obedience: and gave commandment that the said Covenant by the preaching of the Gospel should be published throughout the world.* this, you say, you conceive to be that which the Arminians call the generall decrees of Predestination, but is rejected by the Calvinists,] And that all these Decrees are (according to our weak manner of understanding the way of Gods counsells, salva coexistentiâ & præsentialitate rerum omnium in mente divinâ ab æterno) antecedent to the decrees of Election and Reprobation.]

To this also I fully assent, both as to the truth, and fulness of the expression in every part, especially in that of Gods entring with mankind (without any restraint) the new Covenant, founded in Christ: of the conditionateness of the promises of that new Evangelical Covenant: of repentance and new obedience, together with faith in Christ, making

up that compleat condition: of the antecedency of this Covenant in Christ. (and the command of publishing it throughout the world) to the decrees of Election and Reprobation: which seems to me to be expressly set down from Christs words *Mar. xvi. 15, 16. And he said unto them, Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to every creature, he that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved, he that believeth not, shall be damned.*] which evidently founds those two decrees in the precedaneous preaching, and mens receiving or rejecting of the Gospel.

The Decree of
publishing the
Gospel to all
the world,

§. 32. And when the Gospels are all so express in setting down that command of Christ to his Apostles of *preaching the Gospel to all the world, to the whole Creation, i. e. the whole Gentile, as well as Jewish world, (and the travels of the Apostles witness their obedience to it)* and when the command of Christ is equivalent with a decree, and his giving of that in time an evidence of its being by him predestin'd from all eternity, it is very strange that this should be denied or questioned by the Calvinists, or the Arminians rejected by them, when in effect they do but repeat Christs own words, who if he gave command to publish the Gospel to all, then must the publishing of the Gospel be matter of a general decree, there being no other so sure a way of discerning what was *ab æterno* predestined by God in his secret counsel, as the Scriptures telling us what was by the Father, or Christ in time actually commanded.

§. 33. Thus far and no farther reach those which you own to be your *present opinions*, and pronounce of them, that you are so far convinced from the phrases and expressions frequent in Scripture, that you cannot but own them as such, And then let me

me tell you, it were very happy that all men would agree in these, and yet more happy, if instead of more curious enquiries, they would sit down, and betake themselves uniformly and vigorously to that task, which these *data* bind indispensably upon them, and which is of that weight, that it may well imploy the remainder of their lives to perform it to purpose, I mean the work of *Evangelical obedience*, the condition of the new Covenant, without which the capability of pardon and salvation, which was purchased for mankind in general and for every man, shall never be actuated to any.

Evangelical Obedience

§. 34. Beyond these therefore what you add, you acknowledge to be but *conjectures*, which though to you they seem *not improbable*, yet you profess to maintain your *εποχή* or *Scepticisme* in them. And if in any of these I should, on the same terms of *conjecture*, or *seeming probability*, differ from you, this still were fully to accord with you in the *general*, viz. the *suspension of belief*, and proceeding *no farther then conjectures* in these things.

Matters of Conjecture.

What the issue will be, shall now be speedily experimented, by proceeding to a view of them, remembering still that you propose them but as *conjectures*.

§. 35. The first is, *That the object of the decrees of Election and Reprobation, as they are set forth in the Scripture, seemeth to you to be man preached unto, Those being elected to eternal life, who receive Christ, as he is offer'd to them in the Gospel, viz. as their Lord and Saviour, and those reprobated, who do not so receive him.* Herein I not onely perfectly agree with you, but more then so, I do think it an unquestionable truth, which carries it's evidence

The first

The object of
Scripture E-
lection.

along with it, and so will be acknowledged by any that observes the limitation by you affixt to the subject of the proposition, the object of the decrees [as they are set forth in the Scripture] For he that shall but consider, that the holy Scripture is a donative afforded us by God, and designed for our eternal advantages, not to enable us to judge of others, but our selves, not to discover all the unsearchable recesses of his closet, or secret counsels (*abs condita Domino Deo nostro*) but to reveal to men those truths, which themselves are concern'd in, would make no difficulty to conclude, that the Scripture speaks onely of those, to whom it speaks, and as the Apostle saith, 1 Cor. v. 12. *What hath he to do to judge them that are without?* leaving them wholly to Gods judgement, so doth the Scripture declare Gods dealing onely with those, to whom the Scripture comes, to whom some way or other (whether by writing or preaching it matters not) the Gospel of Christ is revealed.

§. 36. This as it appears by innumerable evidences in the Scripture, so it is put beyond all dispute by that even now recited text, at Christs farewell, *Mar. xvi.* his commission to his Apostles, and declaration of the fixed determin'd consequences of it, an express transcript of Gods eternal destinations or decrees in that matter, *Go into all the world, and preach the Gospel to every creature, He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be damned*] In which words what can be the meaning of [*shall be saved, and shall be damned*] but this, that *God hath decreed salvation and damnation to such?* Those therefore are the object of those divine decrees, who are the subject of that proposition, and those are evidently men
preached

preached to, of which some believe, and are baptized, and those have their parts in the first decree, that of *election* to salvation, some reject the Gospel, and believe not, and those fall under the second branch, that of rejection to Damnation.

§. 37. Against the evidence of this, no opposition can be made, and to this it is undeniably consequent, that all the Decrees whereof Scripture treateth, are *conditionate*, receiving Christ as the Gospel offers him, as *Lord*, and *Saviour*, the former as well as the latter being the condition of Scripture-election, and the rejecting or not receiving him thus, the condition of the Scripture-reprobation.

All Scripture decrees conditionate,

§. 38. As for any other which can be phansied distant from this (and so all absolute Election or inconditionate Reprobation) it must needs be resolved to be the meer invention and fabrick of mens brains, without the duct of Gods Spirit in Scripture, which if at least it hold not a strict analogy with that which the Scripture hath thus revealed to us, will never be excused from great temerity, and the sin of dogmatizing, the rising Gods secrets, and setting up our own imaginations, if not prejudices, for the oracles of God. If this were well thought of, it would infallibly set a period to all further disputes, on this subject. And the Proposition, which I have last set down from you, is so irrefragably convincing, that I hope it may be successful to so good an end, and all men that read it, resolve it their duty to preach no other Decrees of God from Scripture, but this, that all *that receive the Gospel preached, and live according to the prescript rule thereof, (for that is to receive Christ as there he is offered to them, as a Lord and Saviour)*

Temerity of introducing absolute Decrees.

Saviour) shall be saved, and all they that reject it, when it is thus revealed, or live in contradiction to the terms whereon it is established, shall be damned. This would probably change curiosity into industry, unprofitable disquisitions into the search and trying of our own wayes, and working out our own salvation.

§. 39. To this proposition, if it shall be granted, you annex two *Corollaries*, and I that have not onely yielded but challenged the undoubted truth of the Proposition, can make no question of the *Corollaries*, The first is this,

§. 40. That it will be impossible to maintain the Doctrine of Universal Grace in that manner as the Remonstrants are said to assert it, against the objection which is usually made by their adversaries, how evangelical Grace can be offer'd to such nations or persons, as never had the Gospel preached unto them.]

whether the
heathens have
Evangelical
Grace.

§. 41. The truth of this Corollary (as of all other) must be judged of by the dependence from the Principle, the connexion it hath with the former proposition; That spake of the Decrees, as they are set forth in Scripture, and of the condition required of them that are elected to salvation, receiving Christ preached, as he is offered in the Gospel, and accordingly it is most evident, that they that will found their Doctrine on Scripture, must find not onely difficulty, but impossibility to maintain the gift of evangelicall Grace (which I suppose to be a supernaturall power to believe and obey the Gospel) to those, to whom the Gospel hath never been revealed. What the Remonstrants are said to assert in this matter, I shall forbear to examine, because I design not to engage in any controversie at this

this time with any; onely as on one side it is evident, that their adversaries can receive no benefit by the objection, the salvability of all to whom the Gospel is preached, being as contrary to their Doctrine of *onely the Elect*, as it would be, if extended to the heathens also, all Christians being not with them in the number of the Elect; so on the other side, I should think it strange, that in our present notion of *Evangelical grace*, for a strength from God to receive and obey the Gospel preached; it should, by the Remonstrants, or any other, be affirmed from Scripture, that it is given, or offered to those to whom the Gospel hath not been revealed: S. Paul stile the Gospel, the power of God unto salvation, and the preaching of it the διοικησις πνεύματος administration of the spirit, and indeed the spirit is in Scripture promised onely to them who believe in Christ, and therefore speaking of what may be maintained by Scripture, and confining the speech to *evangelical Grace*, the Universality of it can no farther be by that maintained to extend, then to those to whom the Gospel is preached, for if Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word, i. e. preaching the Gospel, it must follow, they cannot believe, and so have not Evangelical Grace, or strength to believe, without a Preacher.

§. 42. And therefore I remember the Learned Bishop of Sarisbury, Doctor Davenant in his Lent Sermon (I think the last he preached before the King) declared his opinion to be (as for Universal Redemption, so) for Universal Grace within the Church; and as for this he was, I think, by none accounted an Arminian, so I never heard any that was of the Remonstrant persuasions, unsatisfied

fied with the scantness of that declaration, but thought it as much, as, speaking of Grace in the Scripture notion of it, *evangelical Grace*, could with any reason be required of him.

§. 43. As for the state and condition of heathens, to whom the Gospel is not revealed, and yet it is no fault of theirs that it is not, as all those that lived before Christ and many since, as it is evident the Scripture was not delivered to them, nor consequently gave to us Christians rules for the judging of them, so it is most reasonable which you add in your second Corollary, which is this,

Of the condition of those to whom the Gospel is not revealed,

§. 44. That into the consideration of Gods Decrees such nations or persons are not at all to be taken, as never heard of the Gospel, but they are to be left wholly to the judgement of God, since he hath not thought fit to reveal to us any certainty concerning their condition, but reserved it to himself, amongst his other secret counsels, the reasons of his wonderful and unsearchable dispensations in that kind.] To which I most willingly subscribe in every tittle, and challenge it as the just debt to the force of that reason, that shines in it, that no man pass fatall decretory sentences on so great a part of mankind, by force of those rules, which they never heard of, nor without hearing could possibly know that they were to be sentenced by them. And this the rather upon four considerations which Scripture assures us of. First, that as all men were dead in Adam, so Christ died for all, that were thus dead, for every man, even for those that deny him, and finally perish: which as it must needs extend and be intended by him, that thus tasted death for them, to the benefit of those that knew him not (for if he died for them

Four Considerations concerning them. The first,

them that deny him, why not for them that are less guilty, as having never heard of him, especially when 'tis not the *Revelation* of Christ, to which the *Redemption* is affixt, but his *Death*) so the certain truth of this is most expressly revealed and frequently inculcated in the Scripture (though nothing be there found of Gods decrees concerning them) upon this ground especially, that no person of what nation soever should have any prejudice to Christian Religion, when it should be first revealed to him, when he finds his interest so expressly provided for by so gracious a Redeemer, who if he had not dyed for every man, 'twere impossible for any Preacher to assure an Infidel, that he dyed for him, or propose any constringent reason to him, why he should believe on him for salvation. To this it is consequent, that whatsoever Gods unrevealed wayes are, to deal with any heathen, what degree of *repentance from Dead works*, obedience, or performance soever he accept from them, this must needs be founded in the Covenant made with mankind in Christ, which you most truly have established, there being *no other name under heaven*, no salvation possible to lapsed man by any other Covenant; Which, being set in opposition to the first Covenant of perfect unfinning obedience, and therefore called a second and Evangelical Covenant, on condition onely of sincere obedience, of doing what by Gods gift, purchased by Christ, men are enabled to do, it follows still, that whatsoever acceptation or mercy they, who never heard of Christ, can be imagined to have afforded them by God, must be conformable to the tenure of the Evangelicall Covenant, and so to the praise of the *Glory of that Grace*, whereby whosoever is accepted

cepted by God, is accepted in the beloved.

The second,

§. 45. The second Consideration is the analogy, which, in one respect, is observable between those to whom the Gospel is not revealed, and all children and Idiots within the pale of the Church, for although believing in Christ were supposed equally by the law of Scripture to be exacted of all, and so of both those sorts (nay by the intervention of the vow of Baptism to be more expressly the obligation of those that are baptized, then those that are not) yet there is no reason producible to free the Christian children and idiots from the blame of not believing, which will not with equal force be producible for those heathens, to whom the Gospel was never revealed, it being as impossible to see without the presence of the *object*, as without the *faculty* of sight, without the *Sun*, as without eyes, without the revelation of Christ, as without the intellective faculty; which if it be not part of the importance of that decree of heaven, *Go and preach, and then he that believeth not shall be damned*, yet it is fully accordant to it, and shews that that Text was not designed to give suffrage to the damnation of all but Christians, which is all that your Corollary, or my observations have aspired unto; to which it is yet farther necessarily consequent, that these *Scripture Decrees* which you speak of (and whosoever speaks of any other must be resolved to speak from some other dictate, then that of Scripture) comprize not all men, no nor all baptized Christians under them, being terminated onely in those to whom the Gospel is revealed, and those certainly are not all that are brought into the world, or even to *Baptismal* new birth.

The third,

§. 46. The third consideration is, that seeing the

the Scripture assures us, that they which have received more, of them more shall be required, and that he that knoweth and doeth not, shall be beaten with many stripes, this must needs advertise us, that whatever priviledges Christians may have beyond heathens, this is not one, that a smaller degree of obedience and performances shall be accepted of them, then of heathens would be, but the contrary, that to whom *less is given, less will be required*, according to that of S. Augustine, *Ex eo quod non accepit, nullus reus est, No man is guilty from that which he hath not received.*

De lib. Arbit. 3. c. 16.

§. 47. The fourth Consideration is, that God rewards those that have made use of the single talent, that lowest proportion of Grace, which he is pleased to give; and the method of his rewarding is by giving them more grace, which as it is in some degree applicable to heathens, who have certainly the talent of naturall knowledge, and are strictly responsible for it, so if they use not that, but retain the truth in unrighteousness, Rom. 1. 18. that makes their condition but the same with ours, (who are finally lost also, and at the present have our talent taken away from us) if we make not the due use of it.

The fourth.

§. 48. This, 'tis visible, hath befallen those Nations who once had the Gospel preach't to them, and after the knowledge of the truth, return'd to their heathen sins, and so had their candlestick taken from them (to which and not to Gods primary denying them Evangelical Grace, their present Barbarity is to be imputed) And the onely conclusion which we can hence duely make, is the acknowledgement of Gods just judgements on them, and reasonable fear lest he deal in like manner with us,

if we transcribe their copy, imitate them in their demerits. Should God molt justly thus punish this nation at this time, could it either now or in future ages be reasonable hence to argue against the Doctrine of *Universal Grace*, in case there were a concurrence of all other evidences for the truth of the Doctrine? Certainly it could not. In like manner then it cannot be reasonable to argue thus from the like fate, and effects on other Nations.

§. 49. To which I may add, that Christ being, we know, in Gods decree and promise, *the Lamb slain from the beginning of the world*, if this argument be now of force against the heathens, it must equally hold against all that understood no more of the *Predictions* of Christ, then the Pagans do now of the *History*.

§. 50. And then it must, should it have force, follow, not onely that the Sacrifice of Christ was intended to be of avail to none but the Jews, to whom onely the Oracles of God were committed, (which yet you acknowledge ~~was~~ intended to all) but also that as far as we have wayes of judging, a very small part of those Jews received the salvifick Grace of Christ, if it were confined and annext to the revelation and belief of him; For if we may judge of other ages by that wherein Christ appeared, the Prophecies of the Crucified Messias were very little understood by that people. All this makes it more prudent, and rati-
onall, and pious to search our own wayes, then to pass sentence on other men, which is the onely thing I have aimed at in these four Considerations.

§. 51. Your second Proposition, which you
render

tender as a *Conjecture*, I cannot but own under an higher style of an evident truth of Scripture, It is this, *That there is to the outward tender of Grace in the ministry of the Gospel annexed an inward offer also of the same to the heart, by the spirit of God going along with his word, which some of the Schoolmen call auxilium Gratiae generale, sufficient in itself to convert the soul of the hearer, if he do not resist the Holy Ghost, and reject the Grace offered: which as it is grounded upon these words, Behold I stand at the door and knock, and upon very many other passages of Scripture beside, so it standeth with reason, that the offer, if it were accepted, should be sufficient ex parte sui to do the work, which if not accepted, is sufficient to leave the person, not accepting the same, unexcusable.*] This I say I am obliged to assent to in the terms, and upon the double ground both of *Scripture* and *reason*, whereon you induce it. If there were but one text of *Scripture* so convincingly inferring it, that sure would advance it above a barely probable *Conjecture*. But I think the whole tenure of the new Testament inforceth the same, and though you name but one, you say there are many other passages of *Scripture*, on which 'tis founded. I shall mention but two, 1. that of the Apostle who calls preaching the word, διακονίαν πνεύματος & the administration of the Spirit, which the Father expresses by *verbum vehiculum Spiritus*, the word is the chariot in which the Spirit descends to us, 2. that description of resisting the holy spirit, which S. Stephen gives us, *Act. vii. 51.* by their being like the Jews, which persecuted the Prophets which spake unto them, which concludes the holy spirit to be given with the preaching of the Gospel, else how

The second Conjecture an undoubted truth

Inward grace annexed to the Ministry of the Gospel

could the rejecting and persecuting the one be the *resisting* of the other? So likewise though you mention but one *reason*, yet that is as constringent as many, nothing but sufficiency of supernaturall Grace being competent to render him, that is acknowledged naturally impotent, *unexcusable*. And therefore deeming that abundantly confirmed to advance it above a disputable probleme, I proceed to the next Proposition, the third, which you rank under the style of Conjectures, It is this,

The third
Conjecture of
effectuall
Grace and
Scripture-E-
lection and
Reprobation.

§ 52. That because the sufficiency of this General Grace notwithstanding, through the strength of naturall corruption it might happen to prove uneffectuall to all persons, God vouchsafed out of the superfluency of his goodness, yet ex mero beneplacito, without anything on their part to deserve it, to confer upon such persons as it pleased him to fix upon, (without inquiring into under what qualifications, preparations or dispositions considered,) a more speciall measure of Grace which should effectually work in them faith and perseverance unto salvation] This (you say) you take to be the election especially spoken of in the Scriptures, and if so, then the Decree of Reprobation must be nothing els but the dereliction or preterition of the rest, as to that special favour of conferring upon them this higher degree of effectuall Grace. Against this, you say, you know enough may be objected, and much more then you esteeme yourself able to answer, yet to your apprehension somewhat lesse then may be objected against either of the extreme opinions.]

Animadver-
sions on this
Conjecture.

The first.

§. 53. Of this Proposition, as being the first by you produced, to which your caution seems to be due, some things may in passing be fitly noted.

First, that for the stating of that community which

which is here set down as the object of Election and reprobation, and exprest by a generall style [*all persons*] this Caution is necessarily to be taken in, that the proposition is not to be interpreted in the utmost latitude, that the style [*all persons*] is capable of, but as analogy with your former doctrine strictly requires, for the generality of men preach'd to: and so neither belongs to heathens, nor to the Infants or Idiots, or uninstructed among Christians, but to those that having the Gospel revealed to them, and sufficient grace to enable them to receive it, are yet left in the hand of their own counsell, whether they will actually receive it, or no.

§. 54. Now of these (which is the second thing to be observed in your proposition) it is manifest, that if (as you suppose both in the former, and in this Proposition,) they have grace truly sufficient afforded them, then they want nothing necessary to a saln weak sinful creature, to conversion, perseverance and salvation, and if so, then by the strength of this Grace, without addition of any more, they may effectually convert, persevere and be saved; and then though what may be, may also not be, and so it be also possible that of all that are thus preach'd to, and made partakers of this Grace, no one shall make use of it to these effects, yet this is but barely possible, and not rendred so much as probable, either upon any grounds of Scripture or Reason. In the Scripture there is no word revealed to that sense, or, that I ever heard of, produced or applyed to it, but on the contrary, in the Parable of the Talents (which seems to respect this matter particularly) they that received the Talents to negotiate with, did all of them, except one, make profit of them, and bring in that account to their

The second
from Scrip-
ture.

Master, which received a reward, which is utterly unreconcilable with the hypothesis of Gods foreseeing that the talent of sufficient Grace would be made use of by none that received no more then so. As for that one that made not use of it, all that is intimated concerning him, is, that if his share comparatively was mean, yet by the Lord he is charged as guilty for not *putting it into the bank, that at his coming he might receive his own with usury*, which certainly evinces, that that lazy servant is there considered as one that might have managed his stock as well as the rest, and that that stock was improvable no less then the other, according to their severall proportions, and so herein there is no difference taken notice of in favour to your Conjecture.

And Reason.

And in *Reason* it hath no sound of probability, that of so great a number of Christians, sufficiently furnished by God, no one should make use of it to their souls health; 'tis evident in the Apostles preaching at Jerusalem and elsewhere, that at the first proposal of the truth of Christ to them, and the Doctrine of Repentance, whole multitudes received the Faith, and came in, and no doubt many of them proved true, and constant Christians, and it is not amiss to observe of the heads of Doctrine, which the Apostles agreed to publish in all their peregrinations, that they are of such force (and were on that account pitcht on by them) as might reasonably and probably, with the supposed concurrence of Gods Grace, beget repentance, and new life in all, to whom they were preach'd over the whole world, (and then what the Apostles deemed a rationall and probable means to that end, there is no reason or probability to think should never

never in any produce this effect) according to that of *Athanasius*, that the Faith confest by the Fathers of Nice, according to holy Writ, is *αὐτάρκτως* *πρὸς ἀποτροπὴν πᾶσης ἀσεβείας, οὐσασι δ' εὐσεβείας ἐν Χριστῷ*, sufficient for the averting of all impiety, and the establishment of all piety in Christ. To which may be applyed that of *S. Augustine* of the Creed, *Qua pauca verba fidelibus nota sunt, ut credendo subjugentur Deo, ut subjugati recte vivant, recte vivendo, cor mundent, corde mundo, quod credant, intelligent.* These few words are known to believers, that by believing, they may be subjugated to God, that by being subjugated, they may live well, that by living well they may cleanse their hearts, that by cleansing their hearts they may understand what they believe. And herein the all-wise providence and infinite mercy of God seems to be engaged, who in the Parable of his dealing with his Vineyard, *Isa. v.* not onely expostulates, *What could I have done more to my vineyard which I have not done*] but also affirmeth that he looked it should bring forth grapes, and as a farther evidence of that, *built a wine-press*, in expectation of its bearing fruit by strength of what he had done to it, which could not well be affirmed by, or of God, if it were not probable and rational, that in some it should have the desired effect.

§. 55. And if what, on account both of Scripture and reason (the onely wayes left us to judge by in this matter) is thus far removed from improbable, may be supposed to have any truth in it, i.e. if the sufficient Grace annexed to the authorized sufficient means, have without farther addition, ever converted any, it then follows necessarily in the third place, that the Election and Dereliction

In Ep. ad Epictet.

In libel. de fide & Symbolo, in Tom. iii.

And the reconcileableness of this conjecture wth making man preach'd to, the object of the Decrees.

now proposed by you must have for its object not indefinitely (as before you set it) *man preach'd unto*, or all that part of mankind to whom the Gospel is offered, and that Grace annexed thereto, but onely that portion of such, as are not wrought upon, or who God in his infinite prescience discerns would not be wrought upon effectually, and converted by that measure of sufficient Grace, which he hath annexed to the word preach'd. For without enquiring what proportion of the number of men preach'd unto may probably be placed in that rank (or without assuming any more, then that it is neither impossible nor improbable that there should be such a rank) of men converted, and persevering by the strength of that foresaid *sufficient Grace*, annexed to the word, the inference is undeniable, that all, whether few or many, that are of this rank (it being no way probable there should be none) shall certainly be saved by force of the *second Covenant*, which decreed eternall life to all that should believe on him and receive him, as the Gospel tenders him, as their Lord and Saviour, and so cannot be comprised in the number of them to whom this *supereffluence* of goodness is supposed to be vouchsafed, in the granting of which *ex mero beneplacito* your conjecture makes the *Scripture-Election* to consist, and in the *Dereliction and Preterition* of the rest (in respect of that speciall favour) the Decree of Reprobation.

§. 56. The plain issue whereof is but this, that if this conjecture, thus explicated, be adhered to, then many not onely of Children, Idiots, heathen (formerly reserved to Gods secret judgements) but of adult baptized Christians also, either are or may be saved, who are not of the number of the
Scripture-

Scripture-Elect. Which whether it be reconcileable with the purport of those places, which in Scripture seem to you to respect Election, or to favour this opinion, I must leave to farther consideration, being as yet incompetent to interpose any judgement of it, because I know not what those places are which most seem to favour it.

§. 57. As for the Doctrine it self, of *superflu-
ence of Grace* to some, (abstracted from making
it any account of Gods *Decrees of Election and
Reprobation*) It is such as I can no way question, for
certainly God being granted to give sufficient
Grace to all, there is no objection imaginable a-
gainst this *superabounding to some ex mero benepla-
cito*; Nothing more agreeable to an infinite abyss
and unexhaustible fountain of goodness, then such
supereffluence, and he that hath not his part in it,
yet having his portion, and that supposed sufficient,
ought not to have *an evil eye*, to complain and mur-
mure at this partiality, and inequality of distribu-
tion of Gods *goodness*, or if he do, the words of
the parable of the Labourers in the Vineyard must
here have place, *Friend, I do thee no wrong, did not
I agree with thee for a penny, take that is thine, and
go thy way, is it not lawful for me to do what I will
with my own?* Mat. xx. 13, 14, 15. And it is there
observable, that all the occasion of murmuring a-
rose from the order there observed in accounting
with, and paying the Labourers, *beginning with
them that came last into the vineyard*, for by that
means they being allowed a dayes wages for an
hours labour, the others expectation was raised
to an higher pitch, then probably it would, if they
had been paid, and discharged first, for then not
seeing the liberality that others talked of, they

The Doctrine
of superflu-
ence of Grace
to some, ac-
knowledge.

would in all probability have expected no more; then the hire for which they agreed; And then why should so casual a circumstance, as the being paid last or first, have any influence on their minds, or tempt them to murmur at Gods goodness, who from the nature of the thing had no least temptation to it?

But this of
superflu-
ence no part
of the Cove-
nant of grace.

§. 58. Onely by the way it must be yielded to the force of that parable, that that *superfluence* of which some are there supposed to tast, was no part of the *Covenant of Grace*, (his agreement with them being but in these words, *Go into the vineyard, and what is right you shall receive*, v. 7.) but, above what his bargain or covenant obligeth, of his good pleasure, though, on the other side, it be observable, 1. That an allowable account is there given by those men of their not coming sooner into the Vineyard, and consequently of their not bearing the heat of the day, in which all the disproportion between them and others, all the seeming superfluence is founded, viz. they were no sooner called, or hired by any man, and 2. that by the application of the parable to the ἑταῖοι and πρῶτοι, to those that came first, and those that came later into the Apostleship, to Peter, and Paul, there might still be place for more abundant labouring in those that came last, and so for reward, in proportion (though through mercy) to that more abundant labouring, according to the way of setting down the same parable among the Jews, in * *Gemara Hierosol.* where the Kings answer to the murmurers is, *He in those two hours hath laboured as much as you have done all the day.*

* *Ord. Eccl.*
Ord.

§. 59. But without examining the Acts of Gods munificence, according to any rules but those of

munifi-

concerning Gods Grace and Decrees.

41

munificence, and again without insisting on the method which God himself seems to direct us to in this matter, in the parable of the Talents, where the Rule is generall, that *to him that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance*, i. e. that the supereffluence of Grace is ordinarily proportioned to the faithful discharge of former truits, making use of the foregoing *sufficient Grace*, there will be little reason to doubt, but that God out of *his meer good pleasure*, without any desert on our part, doth thus dispense his favours to one, more then to another, to *one servant five talents, to another ten*, but to *all some*, onely the difficulties will be, 1. whether it be not as possible, though not as probable, that the *supereffluence of Grace* may be resisted, as the lower, but sufficient degree, and then, whether the condemnation be not the greater, there will be no doubt; *Paul* that is the most pregnant example of the supereffluence, is still, under a woe, obliged to *preach the Gospel*, and *whilest he preacheth to others*, supposes it possible, that himself, if he do not *bring his body in subjection*, may become a *castaway*, and till he hath *fought his good fight*, and *finish'd his course*, and constantly kept the faith, we never find him confident of *receiving his crown*, which then he challenges from *Gods righteousness*, or fidelity; 2. whether the extraordinary favour of God, which some men receive, and by virtue of which, over and above the sufficient Grace, they may be thought to be wrought on effectually, may not rather be imputed to *Gods special providence*, then his *special Grace*? so in Bishop Overals way it seems affirmable, for in his Scheme the effectualness seems to be attributed to the giving what is given, *tempore congruo*, at a time when (whether by

Difficulties concerning supereffluence.

I. ✓
Whether it be not Resistible.

II.
Whether it belong not rather to providence then Grace.

by sickness, or by any other circumstance of their state) they are foreseen by God to be so qualified and disposed, that they shall infallibly accept Christ offered, on his own conditions, and so convert, and receive *the seed into good ground*, and so persevere and be saved, when the same man, out of those circumstances, would not have been wrought on by the same means. And if this be it which you mean (as I doubt not but it is, and that herein you perfectly agree with Bishop Overall) then I say the question is, whether the seasonable application or timing be not rather to be imputed to *speciall Providence*, the mercy of Gods wise and gracious disposal to those men that are thus favoured, then to *special Grace*, as that signifies an higher degree of Gods grace, then is that *sufficient measure*, which is afforded to others; it being possible that an equall, nay a lower degree of Grace, being congruously timed and tendred, may prove effectual, when the like, nay an higher, at another time, proves uneffectual. And though all acts of Gods good *providence* may in some sense be styled acts of his *Grace*, and so extraordinary providences may be styled special Graces, in which sense, the striking *Paul* in his journey to *Damascus*, and calling to him out of heaven with grace proportionable to that call, may fitly be called a work of Gods *special Grace*; and so is every sickness or other judgement, that is sent to melt any, supposeable to have a proportionable, and that is an extraordinary and special Grace annex to it; and the providence, and so the grace is the greater, if it be applyed *tempore congruo*, when there is no potent obstacle or principle for resistance; yet still the question is seasonable, whether this
be

be all that is meant by this special measure of Grace, which shall work effectually, or if more be meant, what ground there is for it in the Scripture.

§. 60. To this second question your advertisement by letter hath given the satisfaction I expected, that you were not curious to consider the distinction between the Grace and the Providence of God, there being no necessity for so doing, as to your purpose, which was onely to express your sense, that it must be the work of God (whether of Grace or Providence it matters not) that must do the deed, and make the sufficient Grace effectual. This answer I accept, and make no farther return to it, onely from the uncertainty of the former, as to any establishment from Scripture-grounds, and so likewise of this latter, till it shall appear by any sure word of promise to have any reall influence on the matter in hand, there is way made for a third question,

§. 61. Whether granting the truth of all that is pretended for the superfluency of Gods goodness to some, this can fitly be defined the thing, whereto Election is determined, and whether all that have not their part in this, are in Scripture-style said to be *Reprobated*. This I say, not to propose any new matter of dispute, or to require answer to all that may be objected against this notion of Decrees, which you (and other very Learned and sober men) have proposed by way of conjecture onely, but rather to demonstrate my concurrence with you, that this can amount no higher at most, then to a matter of conjecture.

III.
Whether this
be it to which
Election is
determined.

§. 62. And having said this, I shall propose it to your impartial consideration, I. Whether the Scripture ought not to be our guide in all even opining

Considerations from
Scripture opposed to the
former conjecture.

pining and conjecturing in such matters, which
 are so much above our reason? II. Whether the
 Scripture do not furnish us with these express
 grounds, 1. that there are some sort of auditors
 that come to Christ, become his Profelytes, em-
 brace the Gospel, when 'tis preach'd unto them,
 that are *ἐυθετοὶ εἰς βασιλείαν τῆς Θεοῦ*, fit, or pre-
 pared, or disposed for the kingdom of God, obe-
 dience to the Gospel, *τεταγμένοι*, disposed for
 eternall life, on file for it (in opposition to others
 who are *ἐν ἀξίῳ ζωῆς* v. 46. not worthy of, meet,
 or qualified for the Evangelical state) 2. that pro-
 bity of mind is specified to be this temper, a wil-
 lingness to do Gods will, that (in the parable) of
 the good ground, and the honest heart meant by
 it. 3. that the Evangelical dispensations are go-
 verned by the maxime of *habenti dabitur*, to
 the humble he gives more grace, the poor are Evan-
 gelized, the children, and poor in spirit, of such,
 and of them is the kingdom of heaven; and lastly,
 that God hath chosen the foolish things of the world,
 the weak, the degenerous, the vilified, those that
 are not, in opposition to the mighty, powerful, no-
 ble and wise. III. Whether on these and many o-
 ther the like fundamentall Truths of the Gospel,
 it be not more reasonable to fetch the ground of
 the effectualness of that sufficient Grace to one,
 which is not effectual to another, from the tem-
 per and disposition of the heart, to which the Go-
 spel is preached, then from any other circumstance
 (especially when this doth not deny, or exclude
 the proper efficacy of those circumstances, what-
 soever they or it shall any way appear to be) God
 having made the Baptist the forerunner to Christ,
 repentance to Faith, the * *breaking up our fallow*
 grounds,

Luk. ix. 62.

Act. xiii.
48.

Fr. vii. 17.

Mat. xiii.
8.

Luk. viii.
15.

Mat. xiii.
13.

Fam. iv. 6.

Mat. xi. 5.

Mat. xix.

14. and v. 3.

Luk. xvi. 22.

1 Cor. i. 27.

The ground

of Effectual-

ness of grace

more probably

deduced from

probity of

heart.

Jer. iv. 3.

grounds, to his not sowing among thorns, and the very nature of the Gospel being such, that all that are truly sensible of their sins, the odiousness and danger of them, and heartily desirous to get out of that state, the weary and heavy laden, the humble, docile, tractable, honest heart, willing to take Christs yoke upon them, are constantly wrought on, and converted, when the promulgate mercies, or promises of the Gospel, and the Grace annext to it, are addrest to them, whereas the very same, nay perhaps a greater degree of light and Grace, meeting with a proud, refractory, pleasurable, or any way hypocritical, and deceitful heart, either is not at all heeded and received, or takes no firm root in it.

§. 63. And if now (the onely objection I can foresee) it be demanded, whether this of *probity*, *humility*, &c. the *subactum solum*, soyl mellow'd, and prepared for this effectuall work of Grace, be not some natural quality, of the man, for if so, then the efficacy of grace will be imputed to these natural, or moral preparations, which is grossly prejudicial to the grace of God, and to the owing of all our good to his supernatural operations, the answer is obvious and unquestionable, that this (I shall call it Evangelical) temper is far from being natural to any corrupt child of Adam, where ever 'tis met with, 'tis a special plant of Gods planting, a work of his preparing, softning, preventing Grace, and as much imputable to the operation of his holy Spirit, as any effect of his subsequent or cooperating Grace is, which I challenge to be the meaning of those words of Christ, *Joh. vi. 37. All that my Father giveth me, shall come to me; where such as these, are first fitted by God, and then by*

*This probity
no natural
preparation,
but of Gods
planting by
preventing
grace.*

him

him are said to be *given to Christ*, works of his finger, his spirit, and then by the authour of them presented to Christ, as the persons rightly disposed for his discipleship, and his kingdome in mens hearts, and this work of Gods in fitting them, is there called his *drawing* of them to *Christ*, v.44. and as there it is said that *none but such can come to Christ*, so vers. 37. *all such shall come to him*, which is an evidence that the *coming*, wherein the effectualness of the grace consists, is imputable to this temper wrought in them by God. And if still it be demanded why this is not wrought in all Christians hearts, I answer finally, that the onely reason the Scripture teaches us is, because some *resist* that *spirit*, that is graciously-given by God, and purposely designed to work it in them.

The one objection against this satisfied

§. 64. And if it still be suggested, that some are *naturally* more proud and refractory, and voluptuously disposed then others, (an effect of their temper, owing oft to their immediate parents, who may transfuse their depravations and corruptions immediately to their children, as well as *Adam* hath done to us all mediately) and so a greater degree of grace will be necessary to the humbling and mollifying them, and a lower, which might be sufficient for meeker tempers, will be insufficient for them, and so still these are as *infallibly* excluded, and barred out, as if it were by a fatal decree passing them by in *Massa*, this will be also satisfied, by resolving, that God in his wise disposals and abundant mercies, proportioned according to mens wants, gives a greater degree of preventing Grace to such as he sees to be naturally in greatest need of it, or els applies it so advantageously by congruous timing, as he knows is sufficient

even

even to them, to remove these naturall obstacles, but all this (to them, as to others) *resistibly* still, and so, as though it succeed sometimes, yet is frequently resisted.

§. 65. By this means he that is proud and obstinate, and continues, and holds out such against all the softning preparations of heaven, (sufficient to have wrought a kindlier temper in him) being so ill qualified for the *holy spirit of discipline*, is not converted, but hardened by the same or equall means of the word and grace, by which the humble is converted, and then replenished with higher degrees; And when the Scripture is so favourable to this notion, saying expressly that *God chooseth one* and not the other, *gives more grace* to one, and from the other *takes away that which he hath, resists the proud* (when they refuse discipline) ** speaks to them onely in parables, because seeing* ** Mat. xiii.* *they see not*, i. e. resist and frustrate Gods preventing graces, and infinite the like, why may not this rather be the Scripture-election, then that other which seems not to have any, at least not so visible grounds in it?

§. 66. Should this be but a *Conjecture* too, it is not the less fit for this place, where our discourse hath been of such, and the onely seasonable inquiry is, either 1. which is of probables the most, or of improbables the least such, (and that I suppose is competently shew'd already) or 2. which may be most safe, and least noxious, in case it should fail of exact truth.

§. 67. On which occasion I shall add but this, *The safety of this scheme.* that the onely consequence naturally arising from this Scheme is, that we make our *elections* after the *pattern of God*, choose *humility* and *probity*, and
avert

avert *pride* and *hypocrisie*, that before all things in the world, every man think himself highly concerned 1. not to resist or frustrate Gods preventing Graces, but chearfully to receive, cooperate, and improve them, to pray, and labour, and attend and watch all opportunities of Grace and Providence, to work humility and probity in his heart, impatience of sin, and *hungering and thirsting after righteousness*, as the onely soyle, wherein the Gospel will ever thrive, to begin his discipleship with *repentance from dead works*, and not with assurance of his election and salvation, to set out early, and resolutely, without procrastinating, or * *looking back*, Luk. ix. 62. and 2. if he hath overslipt such opportunities, to bewail and retrieve them besides, lest he be hardened by the deceitfulness of sin. and 3. whatsoever good he shall ever advance to, by the strength of Gods sanctifying and assisting grace, to remember with the utmost gratitude, how nothing hath been imputable to himself in the whole work, but from the beginning to the end, all due to supernatural Grace, the foundation particularly (that which if it be the most imperfect, is yet the most necessary part of the building, and the sure laying of which tends extremely to the stability of the whole) laid in Gods preventions, cultivating our nature, and fitting us with capacities of his higher donatives; And what can less prejudice, nay more tend to the glory of his grace, then this?

* Μελλόντων
 ὁ ἀναβολῆς
 περιστάς,
 Tit. Boftr.

Compared
 with the o-
 ther.

§. 68. Whereas the other Scheme, as it takes special care to attribute all the work of conversion to Grace, and withall not so to limit that communicative spring, as to leave any destitute of a sufficient portion of it (in which respect I have

nothing really to object against it, if it could but approve it self by Gods word to be the Truth) so when it bears not any such impress of Divine Character upon it, it may not be amiss to consider, Whether he that is perswaded that the sufficient Grace is such as may, and (as some set it) God sees will never do any man good, without the addition of his supererfluence, which he affords to few, (and that if that come, it will infallibly do the work, if it come not, he is so past by, as to be reprobated by God) may not have some temptations to despair on one side, and not do his utmost to cooperate with that sufficient Grace, which is allowed him, and so with the foolish Ecclesiastes * *fold his hands together till he comes to eat his own flesh*, or els to presume on the other side, and expect securely till the coming of the congruous good time of Gods choice, which shall give the effectualness to his Grace, and so be slothfull and perish by that presumption ?

§. 69. Whether the Scheme, as it is set by learned men, (abstracting now from the truth of it) be in any considerable degree lyable to this danger, I leave those, that are favourable to it, to consider, presuming that if it be, it will not be thought fit to be pitcht upon, as the most commodious, without either the authority of Scripture, or some other preponderating advantages tendred by it, which to me are yet invisible. And thus much may serve for the doctrine of Gods Decrees, which if I mistake not, leaves them in relation to man, in this posture, (as far as the Scripture-light leads us)

§. 70. 1. That God decreed to create man after his own image, a free and rationall agent, to

An Anacrophorosis of the Doctrine of Gods Decrees

E

give

give him a Law of perfect unfinning obedience, and conferr on him grace and faculties to perform it, and to reward that obedience with eternal blifs, and proportionably to punish disobedience.

Of Election.

2. That foreseeing the willfull fall of the first Man, with whom, and with all mankind, in him, this Covenant was made, and consequent to that, the depravation of that image, and that Grace, (the image of Satan, corruption of the will, and all the faculties, taking the place of it) he decreed to give his Son to *seek and to save that which was lost*, making in him, and sealing in his blood a new Covenant, consisting of a promise of pardon and sufficient Grace, and requiring of all the condition of uniform sincere obedience.

3. That he decreed to commisionate messengers to preach this Covenant to all mankind, promised to accompany the preaching of it to all hearts with his inward sufficient grace, enabling men to perform it in such a degree, as he in this second covenant had promised to accept of.

4. That the method which he hath decreed to use in dispensing this sufficient Grace, is, 1. to prevent and prepare mens hearts by giving them the grace of humility, repentance and probity of heart, i. e. by awaking and convincing men of sin, and giving them (in answer to their diligent prayers) grace sufficient to produce this in their hearts, and then upon their making use of this Grace to the designed end, to add more powerfull assistances and excitations, enabling them both to will and to do, and upon their constant right use of these, still to advance them to an higher degree of sanctification, and perseverance, till at length he accomplish and reward them with a crown of Glory.

§. 71. On the other side, to forsake them in justice, that obstinately resist and frustrate all these wise and gracious methods of his, and having most affectionately set *life and death* before them, and conjured them to *choose* one, and avoid the other, still to leave unto them, as to free and rationall Agents, a liberty to refuse all his calls, to let his talents lye by them unprofitably; which if out of their own perverse choices they continue to do, he decrees to punish the contumacy finally, by assigning them their own options, to take their talents from them, and *cast them into outer darkness, where shall be weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth.*

§. 72. How clearly every part of this Scheme is agreeable to the several parables, whereby Christ was pleased to adumbrate the kingdome of heaven, and innumerable other passages in the Gospel, and the whole purport of the new Covenant, I leave to every man to consider, and then to judge for himself, whether it be not safer and more Christian to content our selves with this portion, which Christ hath thought fit to reveal to us, then to permit our curiosities to deeper and more pragmatick searches, especially if those shall either directly, or but consequentially undo, or but darken what is thus explicitly settled.

§. 73. I proceed now to your second head of Discourse, (which also I suppose, is, by what hath been already considered, competently established) concerning the efficacy of Grace, &c. where your Proposition is thus set down.

§. 74. That in the conversion of a sinner, and the begetting of Faith in the heart of man, the Grace of God hath the main stroke, chiefest operation, yet so, that the free will of man doth in some sort cooperate

therewith (for no man is converted or believeth without his own consent) all parties pretend to agree. The point of difference is, how to state the manner and degree of the cooperation, as well of the one, as of the other, so as neither the glory of Gods Grace be eclipsed, nor the freedome of mans will destroyed. In which difficult point, you say, you think it fitter to acquiesce in those aforesaid acknowledged truths, in which both sides agree, then to hold close to either opinion]

The Power of
Grace in con-
version, &c

§. 75. In this proposition, it being by you in the Conclusion most undeniably and Christianly resolved, that the one care ought to be, that neither the glory of Gods Grace be eclipsed, nor the freedome of man's will destroyed, It would not be amiss a little to reflect on the former part, and demand whether your expression were not a little too cautious, in saying, *the grace of God hath the main stroke and chiefest operation*] did I not discern the ground of that caution, because you were to express that whereunto all parties must be supposed to consent. This being abundantly sufficient to account for your caution, I shall not doubt of your concurrence with me, that it may with truth be said, and I suppose also by the agreement, if not of all Christians, yet of both parties in this debate, particularly of the Remonstrants, that the Grace of God is in lapsed man the one sole principle of spirituall life, Conversion, Regeneration, Repentance, Faith and all other Evangelical vertues, and that all that can justly be attributed to our will in any of these, is the obeying the motions, and making use of the powers, which are thus bestowed upon us, by that supernatural principle; To work and work out our own salvation, upon the strength of
Gods

Gods giving us to will and to do ; by [giving us to will and to do] meaning his giving us power to each, as *δυναμις κατ'εξουσίαν*, Luke 1. is giving us power to serve him in holiness and righteousness all the dayes of our lives, every initiall and more perfect act of holiness, especially persevering in it all our dayes, being wholly imputable to that power, which is given by Gods Spirit. For indeed when it is considered, what the state of our corrupt will is, being naturally averted from God, and strongly inclined to evil, it seems to me scarce proper to call this, in relation to supernatural virtues, a *free will*, till God by his preventing Grace hath in some degree manumitted it, till Christ hath made it free; Being then what it is, i. e. in some degree emancipated by Gods Grace, and by Grace onely, (this act of Christs love, and Grace being reached out to enemies, to men in their corrupt state of averision and opposition to God) the will is then enabled (still by the same principle of Grace) to *choose life*, when it is proposed, and the wayes and means to it, and though it be left free to act or not to act, to choose or not to choose, yet when it doth act and choose life, it doth it no otherwise (to my understanding) then the body doth perform all the actions of life, meerly by the strength of the soul, and that continuall animation it hath, it receives from it; which makes the parallel compleat, and gave ground to the expression and comparison betwixt giving of natural life, and regeneration.

*What the
freedom of
will now is.*

§. 76. What freedom the will naturally (under this corrupt state) hath to other things, of all sorts, I do not now consider any farther, then that it is fully furnished with ability to sin, and

*Ability to
sin.*

so to refuse and contemn, and to receive in vain the Grace of God, and Grace it self doth not deprive it of that part of its corrupt patrimony: As for an uniform constant choice of those things that belong to our peace and spiritual end, for the beginning of that, and every step of motion through, and perseverance in it, Its freedom, and strength, and every degree of life, or action, is wholly and entirely from Grace, and then he that without him *can do nothing, can do all things through Christ that strengthens him.* And so the onely remaining question is (which to me, I confess, is a posing one) What exception can possibly be started against this stating, and consequently what farther doubt there can be in this matter.

*All good due
to Grace,*

§. 77. I have of my self by my natural Generation, (but this is also from God) power for natural, nay sinful actings, for this I need no farther principle, and the supervenience of a supernatural takes it not from me; Our experience assures us, what the Scripture so oft mentions, that we often *resist the Holy Ghost*, which we could not do, if at least it were not tendred to us: But for all degrees of good, from the first good motion toward conversion, to the enstating us in glory, it is wholly received from the Spirit of God, and the glory of it cannot in any degree, without the utmost far-etchedge, be arrogated or assumed to our selves, as the work of our free will; and seeing it is one act of superabundant grace to enable us to do any thing, and another to reward us for doing it in so imperfect a manner, (and with such mixtures of manifold pollutions) and a third to exercise us in, and reward us for those things, which are so agreeable and gratefull to our reasonable nature,

Com-

Commandments far from grievous, a gracious yoke, as well as a light burthen, Not unto us, O Lord, not unto us, but to thy Name, give me the praise. Praise the Lord, O my soul, and all that is within me, praise his holy Name.

§. 78. What you add on this theme, is by way of reflexion, on the inconvenient opinions of the opposite parties in this matter.

I. *That on the Calvinists part these two things, viz. the physical predetermination, and (which must necessarily follow thereupon) the Irresistibility of the work of Grace, seem to you to be so inconsistent with the natural liberty of the will, and so impossible to be reconciled therewith, that you can not yet by any means fully assent thereto*]. The stile wherein this concludes [*cannot yet fully*] signifies to me, that you have, with great impartiality (if not with favour and prepossession of kindness to the Antiremonstrant side) endeavoured your utmost to reconcile these two Doctrines of *Predetermination and Irresistibility*, with the common notions of Morality and Christianity, and you cannot find any means to do it; and I fully consent to you in it, and cannot but add, that the very being of all future judgment, and so of heaven and hell, considered as rewards of what is here done in our bodies, whether good or bad, nay the whole œconomy of the Gospel, of giving, and giving more, and withholding and withdrawing Grace, and the difference betwixt the Grace of *Conversion* and *Perseverance*, and the force of exhortations, promises, threats, commands (and what not?) depends immediately and unavoidably on the truth of the Catholick Doctrine of all ages, as in these points of *Predetermination and Irresistibility*, it stands in opposi-

Predetermination, and irresistibility,

How un-reconcilable with Christian principles.

tion to the Calvinists. The shewing this diffusedly, according to the merit of the matter, through the severall steps, were the work of a volume, of which I shall hope there can be no need, after so many have been written on the subject.

§. 79. Your next reflexion is on the Arminians, of whom you say,

*Of Armini-
ans attribut-
ing too little
to Grace.*

On the other side, me thinks, the Arminians ascribe less to the grace of God, and more to the free will of man, then they ought, in this, That according to their Doctrine, why of two persons (as Peter and Judas) supposed to have all outward means of conversion equally applyed, yet one should be effectually converted, the other not, the discriminating power is by them placed in the will of man, which (you say) you should rather ascribe to the work of Grace] If this be the right stating of the case between the Arminians and their opposites, I am then without consulting the Authors, assured by you that I am no Arminian, for I deem it impossible (I say not for any man, not knowing what miracles the magick of some mens passions may enable them to work, but) for you that have written what I have now set down from you, to imagine you ascribe more to the Grace of God, and less to the will of man, then I have thought my self obliged to do, making it my challenge and interest, and requiring it to be granted me (and not my concession onely) that all that any man is enabled to do, is by *Christs strengthening him,*

§. 80. But not to question what others do, or to accuse or apologize for any, let us consider the case you set, and allow the truth to be judged of, in this whole question, by what this particular case shall exact,

§. 81,

§. 81. But 1. In the setting of it, I cannot but mark two things, 1. That the persons made use of to set the case in, are *Judas* and *Peter*. 2. That to the word [*converted*] is prefixed [*effectually*.] This would make it probable that you think a man may be converted, and yet not *effectually converted*, or however that *Judas* was not effectually converted. That *Judas* was converted, and, as far as concerned the present state, abstracted from perseverance, effectually converted, I offer but this one testimony, the words of Christ to his Father, * [*Of those whom thou gavest me I have lost none, save onely the son of perdition*] That whosoever is by the Father given to Christ, is converted, and that effectually, is concluded from Christs universal proposition, *All that my Father giveth me, shall come to me*, *Joh. vi. 37.* and here it is expressly said that *Judas* (though by his apostacy now become the son of perdition) was by God given to Christ, and therefore he came to Christ, i. e. was converted, which also his being lost, his very *Apostacy* testifies, for how could he Apostatize from Christ, that was never come to him? From hence it seems to me necessary either to interpret your speech of final perseverance, as if none were *effectually converted*, but such who persevere, (which as it belongs to another question, that of perseverance, to which you after proceed, and not to this of reconciling *irresistibility* and *free will*, so it would seem to state it otherwise, then I perceive you afterwards do) or, to avoid that, to understand no more by *Judas* and *Peter* then any other two names, suppose *Robert* and *Richard*, *John at Noke* and *John at Stile*, (as you since tell me your meaning was) the one converted effectually, i. e. really,

of Judas
whether he
were not con-
verted.

* Joh. xvii.
12.

really, the other not, when both are supposed to have the same outward means of conversion equally applied to them.

Whence discrimination comes.

From mans liberty to resist.

§. 82. Now to the question thus set of any two, and supposing what hath been granted between you and me, that the outward means are accompanied to both with a sufficient measure of inward Grace, My answer you discern already, that the Discrimination comes immediately from one mans resisting sufficient Grace, which the other doth not resist, but makes use of : In this should I add no more, there could be no difficulty, because as it is from corruption, and liberty to do evil, (that meeting with the resistibility of this sufficient grace) that one resists it, so it is wholly from the work of Grace upon an obedient heart, that the other is converted ; And so this stating ascribes all the good to the work of Grace, i. e. to that power, which by supernatural Grace is given him, and all the ill to man and his liberty, or ability to resist.

From Gods Preventions.

§. 83. But from what hath been said, there is yet more to be added, viz. that the obedience of the one to the call of Grace, when the other, supposed to have sufficient, if not an equal measure, obeys not, may reasonably be imputed to the humble, malleable, melting temper, (which the other wanted) and that again owing to the preventing Graces of God, and not to the naturall probity, or free will of Man, whereas the other, having resisted those preparing Graces, or not made use of them, lyeth under some degree of obduration, pride, sloth, voluptuousness, &c. and that makes the discrimination on his side, i. e. renders him unqualified and incapable to be wrought on by sufficient Grace, and so still, if it be attentively

eively weighed, this attributes nothing to free will, considered by it self, but the power of resisting and frustrating Gods methods (which I should think, they that are such assertors of the corruption of our nature, should make no difficulty to yield him, but that they also assert the irresistibility of Grace, and that is not reconcileable with it) yielding the glory of all the work of conversion, and all the first preparations to it, to his sole Grace, by which the will is first set free, then fitted and cultivated, and then the seed of eternal life successfully sowed in it.

Nothing imputed to man but power of resisting.

The whole work of conversion to Grace.

§. 84. If the Remonstrants yield not this, you see my profession of dissent from them, if they do, as for ought I ever heard or read (which indeed hath been but little in their works, that I might reserve my self to judge of these things, without prepossession) they doubt not to do, you see you have had them misrepresented to you. But this either way is extrinsecall and unconcernant to the merit of the cause, which is not to be defended or patronized by names (but arguments) much less to be prejudged or blatted by them.

§. 85. You now add, as a reason to inforce your last proposition, *That although the Grace of God*

of the congruous manner &c. making Grace effectually.

work not by any physical determination of the will, but by way of moral suasion only, and therefore in what degree soever supposed, must needs be granted ex natura rei possible to be resisted, yet God by his infinite wisdom can so sweetly order and attemper the outward means in such a congruous manner, and make such gracious inward applications and insinuations, by the secret imperceptible operation of his holy Spirit, into the hearts of his chosen, as that de facto the will shall not finally resist. That (you say)

of

of the son of Syrach, Fortiter & Suaviter, is an excellent Motto, and fit to be affixed, as to all the wayes of Gods providence in generall, so to this of the effectuall working of his Grace in particular.]

This a member of the former Conjecture.

Fortiter & Suaviter.

§. 86. This for the substance falls in with the last of those which you so cautiously set down for meer conjectures, seeming to you not improbable. And so here you continue to propose it, 1, as that, *which God can do*, (and thus no Christian can doubt of it) 2. by the one testimony which you tender for the proof of it, the words of *Ecclesiasticus* [*strongly but sweetly*;] which though it be there most probably interpreted of the works of Gods providence, not particularly of his Grace, so if it were, most fully expresses their thoughts, who building on the promise of sufficient Grace, and the way of the working of that by moral suasion, will apply the *fortiter* to the sufficiency, and the *suaviter* to the suasion, and yet resolve (what frequent experience tells us) that those that are thus wrought on, *strongly and sweetly* too, and as *strongly and sweetly* (if not sometimes more so) as they that are converted by it, are yet very (very) many times, not converted.

What is the only question here.

§. 87. Here therefore the point lyes, not whether God *can* thus effectually work upon all that he tenders sufficient grace unto, nor again, whether sometimes (and whensoever he pleaseth) he doth thus work, (for as this is the most that you demand, so this is most evident, and readily granted) but 1. whether all are effectually converted and persevere, and so are finally saved, on whom God doth work thus sweetly and powerfully, attempering the outward and inward means, applications and insinuations, by the secret imperceptible operations

rations of his spirit, and that in a congruous manner (I add time also) 2. Whether his doing thus is such an act of his Election , as that all to whom this is not done, shall be said in Scripture to be left, past by, and reprobated.

§. 88. If thus it is, (not onely can be) and if it may be convincingly testified by any text of Scripture, that this really is the *Scripture Election*, it shall be most willingly and gladly yielded to: But till this be done, 1. that other Scheme, which I so lately set down, may be allowed to maintain it's competition against this, and 2. it is to be remembered from the premises, that the glory of Gods Grace in every one's conversion is abundantly taken care of, and secured, without the assistance of this: 3. that the ground of the Antiremonstrants exception to the Arminian occurs in this way of stating too, for since 'tis here affirmed, that Grace even thus applyed is possible to be resisted, why may not the accepting this higher degree be as imputable to mans wil, as of the other barely sufficient Grace the objecter supposes it to be?

§. 89. Lastly, the saying of our Saviour *Mat.* xi. 21. is of no small moment in the case, and yields a substantial prejudice to this way. For 1. it is expressly affirmed vers. 20. of those Cities wherein were wrought *αἱ πλεῖστοι τὰ δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ* his most abundant powers or miracles, that *οὐ μετενόησαν* they repented not; His miracles I suppose had his grace annexed to them, and it is hard to believe that where his most numerous miracles were afforded, they should all want the advantage of the *congruous* timings to give them their due weight of efficacy: However there is no pretence of

*Mat. xi. 21.
a special pre-
judice to the
Conjecture.*

of believing it here, where it is said, Christ ἤρξατο
 ὁμιλᾶν *began to reprove and upbraid them*, that
 the miracles had been so successles among them,
 which he could with no propriety do, if any cir-
 cumstance needfull to their efficacy had been want-
 ing to them: and v. 22. the more intolerable mea-
 sure of damnation, which is denounced against
 them, puts this beyond question, that these want-
 ed not the more *superabundant* advantages of
 Grace. Secondly, it is also as explicitly pronoun-
 ced by Christ, that those miracles and that Grace
 which were not effectuell to the conversion of
 those Jewish cities, *Chorazin and Bethsaida*, would
 have been successful to the conversion of others, and
 made them Profelytes and penitents of the severest
 Kind, *in sackcloth and ashes*. Whereupon I demand,
 Had those means, those *miracles* (the instruments
 and vehicles of Grace, that were then used to *Cho-
 razin and Bethsaida*) the timings and other advan-
 tageous circumstances, which the opinion, now
 under consideration, pretends to be the infallible
 means of the salvation of the elect, or had they
 not? If they had, then it seems these may fail of
 converting, and so have not that speciall *efficacy*,
 which is pretended, it being expressly affirmed,
 that here they succeeded not to conversion. But
 if they had not the timings &c. then it remains as
 undeniable, as the affirmation of Christ can render
 it, that those means, that Grace, which hath not
 those advantageous circumstances, may be, nay,
 if granted to *Tyre and Sidon*, heathen cities, would
 actually have been successfull to them. And what
 can be more effectuell to the prejudice of a con-
 jecture, then this double force of the words of
 Christ confronted expressly to both branches of it?

And

And then I hope I may with modesty conclude, that there remains no visible advantage of this way, to recommend it, in case the Scripture be not found to own, and more then favour it in some other passages.

§. 90. Your last Proposition on this Theme is, that *Sith the Consistence of Grace and free will is a Mystery so transcending our weak understandings, that it hath for many years exercised and puzzled the Wits of the acutest Schoolmen to find it out, in-
somuch as hundreds of volumes have been written and daily are de concursu Gratia & liberi arbitrii, and yet no accord hath hitherto followed, you say, you have ever held, and still do hold it the more pious and safe way, to place the Grace of God in the throne, where we think it should stand, and so to leave the will of man to shift for the maintenance of its own freedom, as well as it can, then to establish the power and liberty of free will at the height, and then to be at a loss how to maintain the power and efficacy of Gods Grace,*

§. 91. But if what hath been clearly laid down, for the attributing all our spirituall good to the work of Grace, and assuming nothing of this kind to the innate power of free will, but a liberty to resist Grace, the rest being humbly acknowledged to be due to a supernaturally conferred freedom, or emancipation, whereby we are enabled to make use of Grace, and by the power thereof to cooperate with it; Then 1. the *consistence of grace and free will* in this sense, is no such transcending Mystery, and I think there is no text in Scripture that sounds any thing towards the making it so. 2. 'Tis evident, that the difficulties that have exercised the *Schools* in this matter arise from their

*Consistence of
Grace and
free will.*

The difficulties
in the
Schoolmens
way whence.

How easily
superfeded.

their endeavouring to state it otherwise, some by maintaining *Predetermination and irresistibility*, which all the powers of nature cannot reconcile with *Man's free wil ad oppositum*; And some few that go another milder way, are yet afraid of departing too far from the former, and instead of *irresistibility* substitute *efficacy*, as that signifies *insalubility* of the event to the Elect, and so find difficulty to extricate themselves; whereas *Grace sufficient*, but *resistible*, given together with the word to all, to whom Christ is revealed, hath 1. it self nothing of difficulty in the conception, and 2. being understood, utterly removes all farther difficulty in this matter. For hereby we place the *Grace of God in the throne*, to rule and reign in the whole work of conversion, perseverance, and salvation, (and what can be more demanded, that we have not asserted? certainly nothing by you, who in setting down the consent of all parties, exprest it by no more then its having the main stroke and chiefest operation) and need not put the *will of man to shift for the maintenance of its own freedom*, as long as we can do it with much more safety and temper, then either by setting it at the height with the *Pelagians*, or endangering to convert it into a meer trunk, or leaving men to the duct of their own humours, either to advance it above its due, and grow insolent, or depresse it below what is meet, and so give up themselves to sloth, and indifferency.

§. 92. On the third or last head concerning *Grace and perseverance*, your propositions are three, the two former I shall set down together, because the first is but a preparative to, or one way of proof of the second, which onely concerns our purpose.

1. That

I. That Faith and all holy Graces inherent in us, Love, Patience, and Humility, &c. are the gifts of God wrought in us by his Grace and holy Spirit, none will deny; But that they are wrought in us by infusion and in instanti (as Philosophers teach forms to be introduced into the matter by naturall generation in instanti,) at least that they are alwayes or ordinarily so infused, you see no necessity of believing, or why it may not be said of these χάριτες (spirituall Graces) notwithstanding they be acknowledged the gifts of God, as well as of those χάρισμα (spirituall gifts, as we translate them) which are certainly the gifts of God as well as the other, and so acknowledged; that they are (after the manner of other habits) ordinarily acquirable by industry and frequented acts, and the blessing of God upon our prayers and endeavours. To what purpose els were it for Ministers in their Sermons usually to press motives to stir up men to labour to get Faith, Love, &c. and to propose means for their better direction, how to get them?

II. Whence (you say) it seemeth to you further probable, that Faith and all other inherent Graces, as they may be with Gods blessing attain'd, may be also lost again by sloth, negligence, and carnall security, and therefore you cannot but doubt of the truth of that assertion which the Contra-remonstrants do yet averre with great confidence, That Faith once had, cannot be lost, and other the like. The distinction that they use, as a salvo in this Question, of a true and temporary Faith, signifieth (say you) little or nothing, for it at once both begetteth and yieldeth the whole Question: It 1. begetteth the question, when it denyeth that Faith that may be lost, to be true Faith, and will hall 2. yieldeth the question, when it granteth

a temporary Faith, which term is capable of no other construction, then of such a Faith, as being once had is afterwards lost. It is one of the Articles of our Church, that after we have received the holy Ghost, we may depart from Grace given.]

Our Article.

Grounds of
it in Scri-
pture.
In the old
Testament.

§. 93. In these two there is nothing for me to question, and as little to add to them, unless I annex, what I suppose you did not think needfull, the expresse consent of Scriptures and Fathers, whereon our Churches Article must be resolved to have been founded. In the old Testament the examples of the *Angels* in Heaven, of *Adam* in Paradise, and in a remarkable manner of two to whom God had given eminent testimony, 1. *David*, in the matter of *Uriah*, an odious murder added to adultery, and continued in impenitently, till after the birth of the child, the blemish whereof still sticks to him, and remains upon record, as an allay to all his excellencies, now that he is in heaven. 2. *Solomon*, whose heart was by his multitude of wives and concubines taken off from God, and debauched to Idols, no way being left us to discern whether ever he returned or no, unless his *Ecclesiastes* be a declaration and fruit of his Repentance; And as these and many other examples, even of that whole Old-Testament-church, the *Jews*, make this evident, so the words of *Ezekiel* are expresse both for totall and finall falling away. *If the righteous turn from his righteousness, in his unrighteousness shall he die.*

Ch. iii. 20. &
xviii. 24.

In th. Jew.

§. 94. The new also is parallel, in the example of *Peter*, thrice, with time of deliberation between, and after expresse warning from Christ, and his resolute promise to the contrary, denying and abjuring of Christ, whose return from this fall with
bitter

bitter tears, is called by Christ *Conversion*, and the Luk. xxii. 32
 sin upbraided to him thrice after his resurrection,
Simon, son of Jonas lovest thou me more then these? Joh. xxi. 25.
 in reference to his confident undertaking, *though all*
men should deny thee, or be offended, yet will not I. Mat. xiv. 29, 31.
 And if the argument from Christs expresse words,
 formerly produced, be of force, then is Judas (one
 of those that was *by God given to Christ, and came* Joh. xvii. 12.
unto, and believed on him) an example of the & vi. 37.
 blackest sort, testifying to this sad truth, That a
 believer and Disciple of Christ may betray him to
 his Crucifixion, and die in desperation,

§. 95. To these two instances, the former great-
 ly aggravated with circumstances, the latter *small*,
 and of the highest degree imaginable, It is not need-
 full to add more, els it is obvious to increase the
 catalogue with those that were polluted by the
 Gnosticks, by name, *Hymenaeus and Alexander*, 1 Tim. i. 20,
who putting away a good conscience, concerning Faith
made shipwrack, and again *Hymenaeus and Phile-* 2 Tim. ii. 17.
tus, who fell off so far, as to the denyall of any fu-
 ture *Resurrection*, of whom the Apostle there speak-
 ing, saith, *if God peradventure will give them re-*
pentance, and they may recover themselves out of the
snare of the Devil] looking on their estate as that
 of lapsed believers, and though not utterly hope-
 less, yet extremely dangerous, And this exemplified
 in whole Churches, *Apoc. ii. and iii.* which are
 therefore threatned present destruction, if they do
 not speedily return.

§. 96. To which purpose the Texts in the sixth
 and tenth to the *Hebrews* are unanswerable, In the
 sixth, that it is *impossible*, i. e. extremely difficult,
 for those that were *once enlightened, &c. if they fall*
away, to renew them again unto repentance, adding

the similitude of the reprobate earth, whose end is to be burned. From which how distant is the Doctrine of those, that either imagine it impossible for such to fall away totally, or if they are fallen away, not to be renewed again to repentance? In the tenth also, twere vain to make so severe interminations against those who sin willfully after receiving the knowledge of the truth, (as we read v. 26.) if there were no possibility of so sinning, but especially the 38. verie is remarkable, *The just shall live by faith*, καὶ ἐὼν ὑποσέκνται, *And if he (the just) shall draw back, my soul hath no pleasure in him*] explicating v. 39. what drawing back he speaks of, even drawing back unto perdition, and that is finall, as well as totall, and both, it seems, very possible, as every where appears by the exhortations to him that thinketh he standeth, to take heed lest he fall, when if he do, *It had been better never to have known the way of righteousness, then after he hath known it, to turn from the holy Commandment*, and this in such a degree, as is exprest by returning to the vomit, and wallowing in the mire, the acts and habits of the foulest sins, in forsaking of which their conversion consisted.

1 Cor. x. 12.

2 Pet. ii. 21.

§. 97. The Testimonies of the Fathers are too long to be set down, and indeed unnecessary to the confirmation of that, to which the Scripture hath testified so plentifully, especially since it is not (it cannot be) denied by the contrary-minded, that Saint Augustine, the onely fautor of their cause, in the point of decrees, and effectuall Grace, granteth possibility of falling, both totally and finally, from a justified estate, and useth it as a means to prove his absolute Decrees.

S. Augustin.

I now proceed to your third and last proposition in these words,

Tet

concerning Gods Grace and Decrees. 69

§. 98. Yet I believe wee may securely admit the doctrine of perseverance of Gods elect, and the certainty thereof, so as it be understood. 1. Of their finall perseverance onely, leaving roome for great (perhaps totall) interruptions and intercessions in the meane time. 2. Of the certainty of the thing, (certitudo objecti,) in regard of the knowledge, and purpose of God, but, not of any undoubted assurance, that the elect themselves have thereof, (certitudo subiecti, as wee use to distinguish them,) there being a great deale of difference between these two propositions, it is certain that the elect shall not fall away finally, and the elect are certain that they shall not fall away finally.]

§. 99. In this proposition I can fully yeild my concurrence, if by rendering my reasons for my consent, I may be allowed to expresse what I mean by it. This I shall do through the severall branches of it.

1. I believe not onely that securely we may, but that of necessity (and under the pain of contradiction in adjecto,) we must admit the doctrine of Perseverance of Gods Elect, and the certainty, (most unquestionable certainty) thereof, Gods Election of any person to the reward of the covenant, being undoubtedly founded in the perseverance of that person in the faith, this perseverance being the expresse condition of the covenant, *He that endureth to the end, the same shall be saved*, he and none but he, but if he draw back, Gods soule hath no pleasure in him. Mat. 24. 30. Heb. 10. 30.

§. 100. Which that it is nothing available toward concluding that they which can fall totally from their justified state, may not yet fall finally also, I infer to be your sence from your great

Temporary
faith may be
true.

dislike to the Calvinists *Salvo*, taken from the distinction of a true and temporary faith, which assures me, you take that faith for true, which yet is but temporary, then which nothing is more contrary to the establishing the perseverance of all the faithfull, unlesse there be some promise that all temporaries shall so recover again before their death, as finally to persevere, (which as I think, 'twill not be pretended, so if it be, they are no longer temporaries,) or unlesse it cease to be in their power to continue in their sins, into which they are fallen, which sure it cannot, unlesse the grace of perseverance be irresistible, which if it were, there is no reason, why that of conversion, to all that are converted, should not be irresistible also,

The elect sub-
ject to inter-
missions.

§. 101. 2. For their great, (perhaps totall) interruptions and intermissions in the meane time, I can no way doubt, but those are subject to them, who yet upon Gods foresight of their returne, and persevering constancy at length, are elected to salvation. It is certain, which the *Article* of our Church saith, that as they which have received the holy Ghost may depart from grace given and fall away, so by the same grace of God they may returne again, and then returning they may no doubt persevere, and then 'tis certain they are elected to salvation, the mercy and pardon in Christ extending not onely to the sins of an unregenerate state, and the infirmities and frailties of the regenerate; but also to all the willfull sins and falls of those that do timely returne again by repentance, as *David* and *Peter* did (but *Judas* certainly; *Solomon* possibly did not,) and then continue stedfast unto the end. And so 'tis onely the finall perseverance that

that is required indispensably of the elect, which is reconcileable with their great, perhaps totall intercessions.

§. 102. But 'tis not amiss here to advert, that this doth no more suppose or include the reconciliation or favour of God, to those that have been once regenerate, when they are fallen into grosse sins, then to the unregenerate remaining in the same or greater sinns, it being as possible in respect of us, (perhaps more probable in respect of God,) that the unregenerate may convert and persevere, (and then they are approved to be the elect,) as that they that were once regenerate, but now fallen, may return again. It is as certain from before *Paul's* birth, and from all eternity, that he was elected, as that *David* or *Peter* was, and then either his blasphemous persecuting the name of Christ must have been at the time when he was guilty of that, reconcileable with Gods favour, viz. before his conversion, (and then for the gaining of Gods favour what needed his conversion?) or else *Peter's* denying and abjuring of Christ, *David's* adultery and murther must not be reconcileable, notwithstanding their supposed Election. For as to the sonship of *their* former life, that will no more excuse their contrary wasting sins, then the future sonship of the other, nay it will set the advantage on the other side, the unconverted *Saul* obtains mercy, because he did it ignorantly, in unbelief, Whilst their sins have the aggravation of being sins against grace, and forsaking, and departing from God, which respect makes the state of Apostates as the most unexcusable, so the most desperately dangerous state.

The falls of those that have been once regenerate no more reconcileable with Gods favour then of the unregenerate.

Nay the advantage is on the unregenerate part.
1 Tim. 1. 13.

*Certainty of
the object.*

§. 103. 3. That there is a *Certitudo Objecti* to all the *Elect*, cannot be doubted, for if they be elected to salvation, they will finally persevere, if they persevere not, they were not elected. Again this certainty of the object, is a certainty in regard of the knowledge and purpose of God. 1. Of his knowledge that either they will not fall, or if they do, that they will rise again, and then finally persevere. 2. Of his purpose or decree of election, that every such, finally persevering, though formerly lapsed Christian, shall be saved.

*Certainty of
the subject.*

§. 104. 4. For the *Certitudo subjecti*; as I consent to you fully in disclaiming any necessity of that, so I suppose it is wholly extrinsecall to this subject, devolving to this other question, not whether every one that is elect, be sure he shall not fall away, but whether every believer be or ought to be sure of his election? Of which if he were sure, I could not resist his being obliged to believe himself certain of his finall *Perseverance*; Election and finall failing being incompetent.

§. 105. Having given you this interpretation of my sence, and to consent to each branch of your proposition, I have no more to add, but that if you mean it in a farther sence, proportionable to your former conjecture on the head of decrees, or Bishop *Overall's* opinion, I shall no otherwise debate or question it, then I did that, and so the fate of this and that, are folded up the one in the other, and if the Scripture shall be found favourable to the one, it shall be yeilded, and then there will be no controversy of the other.

*The great
part of conti-
ngent in hand-
ling this sub-
ject of perse-
verance*

§. 106. Onely I desire to add, that it will deserve our speciall care and warinesse, so to deliver our thoughts in this matter, that we leave no man any ground

ground of hope, that in case he depart from his duty, and so fall from Grace, or into any willful act or habit of sin, he shall yet be so preserved, whether by Gods Grace, or by his power, and providence, that he shall not finally dye without repentance: for as there is no promise of God to found that hope, so in time of temptation to any pleasurable, transporting sin, &c. it will be in danger to betray and ruine him, that hath a good opinion of himself, especially if he hath been taught, that faith is a *full assurance* of his *Election*.

§. 107. The same I say of *Grace*, as it signifies the paternall favour of God to his Elect children, which is thought by some to be onely clouded, and, as to their sense and present experience and comfort, darkned by their most willfull sins, so as God may be highly displeased with them, as *David* with his son *Absolom*, and yet continue his paternall Love and favour to them, as *David* did his to that ungracious son, in the height of his Rebellion.

of Gods favour to rebellious children

§. 108. 'Tis possible this Example of *David* may have some Rhetoricall Energy in it, to perswade and deceive some. If it have, then 1. I may not unfitly ask this question, whether they think God had then that kindness to *Absolom* that *David* had? If he had not, how can it be drawn into example to God? If he had, how then can it agree with it, to cut him off in the midst of his Rebellion, which 'tis manifest *David* would not have done. But omitting that, I answer 2. that 'tis visible, that this in *David* was passionate indulgence, such as men (as *Joab* tells him) disliked, and to this kind of humane passionate, I oppose that other kind of Divine dispassionate love, producing in God bowels of pity, frequent admonitions and warnings, powerfull

erfull Messages, strong and earnest calls, and proposition of all rationall motives to repentance. But if those prevail not, the just still continuing to *draw back*, Gods soul hath no pleasure in him, and the greater obligations of Love and Grace they are, against which he hath sinn'd, the greater the provocations are in the sight of God, and nothing consequently but the greater degree of punishment to be expected. How God is affected toward *rebellious* sons is set down *Is. 1. 2, 10, 11, 12, &c.*

No comfort
for such from
2 Tim. ii. 19.

§. 109. And then to put any man in hope, that what is not ordinarily revealed in the Gospel, may yet be laid up for him in the cabinet of Gods secret counsels with this seal upon it, *The Lord knoweth those that are his*, as if they might be his still in Gods acceptation, which walk most contrarily to him, this may prove a most dangerous snare of souls, and it is strange it should seek shelter in that Text *2. Tim. 2. 19.* which was most expressly designed to the contrary, as is evident both by the notation of the *Θεμέλιον* in the beginning of the verse, which in all probability signifies the Covenant of God, the *βεβαιότης* stability whereof, there prest, must assure us that there is no salvation to be expected, but according to the contents of that great indenture, once for all sealed in the blood of Christ, of which as that indeed is one part, which is inscribed on one side of the seal [*The Lord knoweth those that are his*] i. e. he will never fail to own those that continue faithfull to him, so the other, on the other side, is most emphatical, [*Let every man that nameth the name of Christ, depart from iniquity*] which if he do not, he hath forfeited all the Priviledges of his Christianity.

§. 110. The *Gnostick* heresie, one branch of it especially,

concerning Gods Grace and Decrees. 75

especially, noted in *Marcus's* Scholars, in *Irenaeus*, is a seasonable warning to all sober Christians in this matter, He told them of an ἀπολύτρωσις, a redemption, or kind of Baptism, which rendered them φύσιν πνευματικὴν, naturally and immutably spiritnall, no more to be polluted by sin, then gold by lying in the mire, or the Sun beams by lighting on a dunghill, and that whatever they did, they should (as with the helmet of the mother of the Gods) be rendred ἀόρατοι τῷ κριτῇ, invisible to the Judge, The effects whereof, as to all carnality, &c. were so detestable, that it becomes every man most solicitously to guard and secure his Schemes of Election and Doctrine of Perseverance of the Elect, from all probability, if not possibility, of ministring to the like, and that cannot well be by any other method of resolution, but this, that those that persevere unto the end shall be saved, and none els; our tenure in all the Priviledges of Election, 1. Gods favour, 2. the continuall assistance of his Grace, and 3. the inheritance of sons, being inseparably relative and annex to the constant filiall obedience, which he indispenfably requires of us, under the Gospel of conditionall promises.

§. 111. Thus have I past through all your Letter and given my self the liberty of these strictures, by way of reflexion on all and every passage therein, which belonged to this subject of God's Decrees and his Grace; And without the addition of any unnecessary recapitulation of the severalls, it is already evident, how perfect the agreement is between us in all that you in any degree positively assert, or own as your opinion: And if in one particular which you are so carefull to propose, as a bare conjecture, and not allow it your favour in any other quality,

The Marcians heresie in this point, a good warning.

The Conclusion.

A Letter to D. Sanderson

quality, it should happen that we finally dissent (though in propriety of speech *conjectures* are not *sentiments*) yet it were strange the dispute betwixt us should be of any length. And so you discern the utmost of uneasiness, which is likely to be given you by this address of

Dear Sir

Your most affectionate
brother and servant

H. HAMMOND.

A second

A Second LETTER,

BEING

A View of two Emergent Difficultyes:

Deare Sir,

THE very freindly reception which my larger trouble found from you, is my full encouragement to proceed to the conclusion of my importunity and your exercise, which cannot now be far off, if I may judge by your Letter.

§. 2. Two difficultyes, you say, you have sprung by farther entring into the consideration of this matter, *the first occasioned by my distinction betwixt the worke of Grace and of Providence, the second arising from the Concessions of Scripture of Gods withdrawing his grace from those that reject it.* Two difficultyes.

§. 3. To those I shall make these returnes; which I doubt not will prove satisfactory. The first seemeth to favour an ἐποχή or suspence, and to avert all defining in these points: For, say you, *since the efficacy of Divine grace followeth the acts of his Providence, so as it may seem in a manner to depend chiefly thereupon, and the wayes of his providence are abyssus multa, deep and unfathomable, it seemeth to you to conclude strongly that the manner how God effectually worketh by his grace to the conversion of a sinner is also to our understandings incomprehensible.* An argument from the unfathomableness of Gods providence. To this you cannot but foresee my reply, that the proposall of that distinction was The distinction between providence and grace. by

by me designed as a prejudice to Bishop *Overall's* way, which you had then mentioned as your *conjecture*. And if it shall have indeed that influence upon you or any man, as you speake of, to encrease the difficulty, and to conclude strongly, that *the manner of Gods working, &c. is incomprehensible*; yet you know this cannot in justice be applyed farther then to that particular Scheme, against which peculiarly this disadvantage was proposed, and then the onely regular conclusion is, that this which you proposed but as a *conjecture*, should now grow lower in your esteem, and scarce be thought worthy to be own'd as such.

The force
whereof a-
gainst the
forementioned
conjecture.

Other con-
siderations to
prejudice it.

§. 4. And the more force there is in this one consideration, thus to incline you, the lesse shall I despair, that two more considerations, which then encompassed this, and the superadded tender of another way, that the Scripture-grounds, especially *Christ's parables* in the Gospel, suggested, will in some degree prevaile with you, to deposite this conjecture, which (beside other prejudices against it,) hath no grounds of Scripture to pretend to, in exchange for that other, that hath, and pretends no further, then it shall approve it selfe to be thus founded.

§. 5. This is all that I may say to an objection which I was to cherish and strengthen, (rather then answer.) But I shall not think that needfull, onely I leave it to have that force with you, which you shall see fit to give it, remembring onely that it ought not to have force with him, that accepts not that Scheme, that alone is concerned in it.

§. 6. Which Scheme having been proposed by you with perfect warinesse, and profession of allowing

allowing it to be no more then a *conjecture*, one such difficulty as this, is, I acknowledge, sufficient to remove you from it, and in that case it will not be unseasonable again to tender that which you may finde better qualified for your acceptance, having without question an advantage, from the *parable of the sower*, to recommend it. I shall endeavour to make this cleare to you. Your supposed intricacy, or unfathomable question, is, what it is that makes *sufficient grace* to be *effectuall* to any? I say the *parable of the sower* was intended by Christ on purpose to answer that question, which it hath competently performed, for here wee see, the *seed* being the same, (whether that were the *word*, or *grace*, it matters not, as long as 'tis remembred that *the word is the vehicle of grace*, and the instrument of conveighing it to the heart,) all the difference taken notice of, is onely in the soyle, *viz*: some *trod down*, and crufted; some *stony*; some *thorny*; some *good*, and mellow. Proportionably to this four-fold difference of the ground, the severall fates of the seed are described, and your one question divided into four, and answer exactly accommodated to each.

The order way confirmed from the parable of the sower.

The question what makes sufficient grace effectuall.

Punctually answered by Christ.

The four fold difference of soyle.

§. 7. The first question is this, what is it that makes *sufficient grace*, *uneffectuall*, to some men, so that though it be on Gods part freely afforded them, and as freely as to any other, yet it hath not the least effect upon them? And the answer is evident in the explanation of that parable, *Mat. XIII. 19.* because he is ἀκούων τὸν λόγον καὶ μὴ συνίησιν, *one that heares the word*, to which that grace is annexed, but either *understands it not*, or *minds it not*; and so the *Devil comes and catcheth away that which was sown*, (and in that case there is

The one question divided into foure. The first.

no great need of that *Divil* towards the obstructing effectuallness, let the seed ly there never so long, if it be not *mindes*, it can signifie nothing toward an harvest.)

The second.

§. 8. The *second* question is, what is it that makes sufficient Grace, after it is *received*, and that *with joy*, (great forwardness and alacrity at the first) to become so uneffectuall to the supporting a man in time of *temptation*, that rather then endure any smart for piety, he falls into any the grossest sins? And the answer follows v. 21. because such a man is of a temper that yields not Grace any *depth* to root in, he hath some *stonyness* at the bottome, some pleasure, or passion, or other remains of resistance rooted in him, which he hath not divested himself of, and when duty begins any way to check that, he is impatient, and throws off Piety, of which he made very fair professions, and such as had, as far as his trialls formerly went, reality in them, till this last signall tryall was made of him, for which, it seems by the effect, he was not qualified.

The third.

§. 9. The *third* question is, what is the reason that sufficient Grace, once received and bringing forth fruits, though it come not to combat with any sharp tryalls, doth yet many times decay and perish *after a while*? And the answer is v. 22. that there remained in the heart of such some piece of ill temper unreformed, which in time prolifered, and sent out great and wasting sins (though not so generally decayed in the world) viz. *worldly sollicitudes*, and such as the wealth of the world is apt to beget in men that have or seek it, and these being permitted to thrive in the soul, 'tis regular that Grace, which cannot consist with such (*you cannot serve*

serve God and Mammon) should be overrun, and choaked, and at length destroyed by that means, which had it not been for this cause of abortion, as it was sufficient, and effectually for a while, so it would have prosper'd to perseverance.

§. 10. And this introduceth the *fourth* and last *The fourth,* question, What then is it that renders sufficient

Grace Effectually both to Conversion and Perseverance? And the Answer is v. 23. the *goodness* of the soile, *probity* of the heart, wherein that sufficient Grace is received, and what that is, is best discerned by the opposition to all the former three,

1. it is a sincerely pliable, ductile temper, that neglects not to make use of any grain of Grace, 2. it hath an uniform Courage to combat with difficulties, and is not enslaved to pleasures. 3. it utterly despises the world, the allurements and the terrors of it, and uses it, as if it used it not. The former part of this temper renders it effectually to conversion, the two latter to perseverance also. And considering that parable is set down by Christ to give account of the various successes of the *word of the kingdom*, i. e. of the Gospel among all those to whom it is made known, who with you are the adequate object of the *Scripture-election*, and *reprobation*, what can be farther required to the clear satisfaction of your whole difficulty?

§. 11. And then remembring that the onely remaining question, viz. *whence is this probity?* hath been fully answered in the former papers, I appeal to no other then your self, whether this be not both a perspicuous, and authorized stating, having so weighty a passage of Gospel to found it, and therefore in all justice preferable to your bare Conjecture, which, besides that it is pressed with

The Character of the honest heart.

The Conjecture compared with this other way.

difficulties (as your self acknowledge) which to you seem unanswerable, is not provided of any pretense of a foundation, hath no authority from holy Scripture to recommend it.

One pretension for the Conjecture, From the finding the hidden treasure.

§. 12. If it have any, it is most probably that other short parable in the same Chapter, v. 44. where the *kingdome of God is compared to a treasure hid in the field, the which when a man hath found, he hideth, &c.* There the man, which found the

treasure, is not supposed to seek it (for that makes another parable v. 45.) but by the meer providence of God (which the heathen philosophers were wont to stile chance, and commonly give this very instance of it *the treasure found in the field,*) happily to fall upon it, when he passeth by on some other errand; And this indeed is matter

The conversion of Augustine. Of Saul.

of frequent observation, *Augustine* is converted by *S. Ambrose's* Sermon, when he came to it. on no such design, *Saul* is called to from heaven, and converted to Christianity, when he was going to *Damascus* on the most distant design of persecuting it.

And to omit the many more examples of those of whom it hath been literally true, that they have found God, *when they sought him not, asked not after him,* one eminent story our books give us, of

The distant fate of two children.

two young children brought to a city to be sold, at a time when a devout Nun had vowed to take some young child, and bestow her whole life, and utmost industry to bring it up in strict piety, and accordingly came and bought one of them, and as soon as she had bought her, a bawd came in her presence and bought the other, by which means these two, which were so lately in the very same indifferent condition, by this act of Divine providence (to which this was to be attributed) were

strangely

strangely discriminated, the one brought up and early engaged, and so persevering to the lives end in all piety, and the other by the contrary discipline debauched, and educated to the trade of harlotry, wherein she lived and persevered. In which it is visible how signal an influence this one act of Divine Providence had on so distant eternall fates of these two, and how eminent an ingredient it was in the saving the one and damning the other.

§. 13. But from all these and innumerable the like, (which are freely granted, and allowed to be competent to confirm your main conclusion, that the Providence of God is *Abyssus multa*) you will soon discern, that there comes in no least advantage to that *Learned Bishops Scheme*, which is the matter of your Conjecture, and our onely present enquiry. The whole weight of that (as far as I, or any man questions it) being laid, not on the superabundance afforded to one above the other, (which is willingly granted) but on the foreseen universall inefficaciousness of the barely sufficient Grace, acknowledged to be given to all, till that superadded advantage administered by Gods providence in the choice of the congruous timing, come in, as the work of Gods Election, to make the discrimination.

The point of the difficulty. Whether the barely sufficient Grace be universally inefficacious.

§. 14. Now seeing in all these examples, and in that parable, nothing like this is to be found, no evidence, or intimation of Gods foreseeing, 1. that that man that found the treasure, would never have been wrought on by that measure of sufficient Grace, which that opinion allows God formerly to have afforded him, unless by that seasonable act of Providence he had thus fallen on the treasure in the parable, or 2. that *Augustine* would never have

No pretence for this.

been converted, if he had not been surprized by *S. Ambrose's* Sermon, or 3. that *Saul* would not have been converted at another time, without, or even with that vision, and voice from heaven, or lastly that that fortunate child, that fell into the *Nun's*, instead of the *band's* hands, would never have been brought to heaven any other way, and could not have miscarried under this method: Through all these instances, I say, it is still apparent, that nothing is gained toward the approving the Conjecture, these advantageous turns of providence afforded one man and not another, and the signall efficacy of such, being most freely granted by those who deem the *Conjecture* improbable.

Providence
allowed to
assist Grace.

§. 15. And indeed, if it be well considered, all that these, and a myriad of the like instances infer, is no more then this, the great and admirable variety of *Gods* providentiall acts, not as those are all one with, but as in his hands they are instrumentall and subservient to his *Grace*, whereby in diverse manners *grace* is advantageously assisted by *providence*, to one in this wise, and admirable manner, to another in that; No man, who is allowed the *sufficient Grace*, being denied some benefit or other of *Providence* to assist *Grace*, and make it more then probable to become effectually to him, if he doth not betray and frustrate the *opportunities* of the one, as well as the *power* and efficacy of the other.

But is of no
force to the
Question.

§. 16. So that still acknowledging most willingly, and admiring the *abyss* of *Providence*, this no way obstructs the comprehending the manner (or perplexes the doctrine) of the *cooperation* of the *Grace of God* with the *will of man*, but leaves it where

where the Parable of the Sower set it, that the *efficacy* of *Grace*, and successfulness, whether to *conversion*, or *perseverance* proceeds from the mellowness, and preparedness of the soile, from the advantages which it meets with in the *honest heart*, as that again is wholly due to Gods preventing Graces, which have thus fitted the soile for the kindly seeds-time, planted pliability, humility in the heart, where Grace may be deeply and durably rooted, but this still *resistibly* in both parts, as hath formerly been expreit.

§. 17. One phanſie I know there is, which hath pleased some men in this matter, that God gives *sufficient Grace* to those who do not make use of it, but resist it, and yet more then so, the power of using, or accepting, or not resisting it, but gives to the Elect and onely to the *Elect*, *ipsam non resistantiam*, the very not resisting, and this they will have to be the signal *discriminating Grace*.

*A Phanſie of
Gods giving
the Elect
ipsam non-
resistentiam*

§. 18. Of these I shall demand 1. whether in those which have not this *ipsam non-resistantiam* given them, this be an effect of God's Decree, which hath determined the certain infallible giving it to some peculiar persons, and so the not giving it to all others? If it be not, then this is no foundation of *discriminating Grace*, or consequently fruit of *Election* and *Reprobation*, and so is still impertinent to the matter for which it is brought.

*Examined,
and found
wrong.*

§. 19. But if it be the effect of Gods Decree, determining the giving it to some, and denying it to others, I then 2. demand, whether all they to whom it is not given, do therefore infallibly receive the grace of God in vain, because they have not this *ipsa non-resistantia* (which is more then the power of not resisting) given them?

§. 20. If this be not affirmed, then, as before, this comes not home to *discriminating Grace*, nor consequently to the business of *Election* and *Reprobation*, which it was meant to assist. But if it shall be said, that they therefore infallibly resist, or receive in vain, because this *ipsa non-resistentia* is not given them, then it seems this gift of *ipsa non-resistentia* is such, as that they who have it not, want somewhat which is necessary to their effectually receiving, or not-resisting Grace, and if this be the condition of the far greatest part of the world, then how can it with any sincerity be affirmed (as by those that make use of this expedient, it is profest) that God hath to all mankind given *Christ*, and in him all things, and particularly *Grace sufficient*, and the power of not-resisting Grace, which according to this phansie, none can choose but resist, who have not the *ipsam non-resistentiam* given them, which yet they affirm to be given but to a few, i.e. to none but the *elect*?

§. 21. This were (by interpretation, and in effect) for God to give to all men a power to an act, which yet the greatest part of those which have it given them, can never make use of to that act, for want of somewhat else which is not given them, which to all them which have not that somewhat else given (and those the far greatest number of men for whom *Christ dyed*) is not a power to that act, viz. of not-resisting; which what is it other then a direct *contradiction*, a power and not a power to the same act? and withall so far from being a favour to them, that it is in event infallibly and inevitably the greatest curse, that could have befallen them, viz. the heightening and extremely aggravating of their guilt and punishment, proportionably

tionably to their sin of resisting such sufficient grace, of standing out against Christ, which as it is the height of guilt, (and awarded the dregs of Gods wrath,) now under the Gospel, and makes their condition in the world to come, much worse, then it would have been, if Christ had never been borne, or preached to them, so it had never been thus direfully charged upon them, if they had not had the power of *not resisting* given them by Christ.

§. 22. This is a competent prejudice and discouragement to this phanſy, of founding discriminating grace and the doctrine of unconditionate decrees in this difference betwixt the power of *resisting*, and the *ipsa non-resistentia*, the latter given onely to the *Elect*.

Considered in relation to this phanſie.

§. 23. But it will farther be defeated, if we reflect on that place of Scripture, wherein Gods giving the *ipsa non-resistentia* chiefly seems to be mentioned, Phil. II. 13. under the style of *ἐνεργεῖν* *Phil. ii. 13.* γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ ἐνεργεῖν, *working in us to do, or work*, which that it tends not to the support or advantage of this phanſy may be evident by these three considerations.

§. 24. First, by the importance of the phrase, [*working in us to do, as before to will,*] which (as was formerly noted, in passing,) will best be understood by other parallel phrases, as *δοῦναι λατρεύειν*, *Gods giving to serve*, Luke. i. 72. Which is evidently his giving grace, or power, or supernatural abilities to serve, not onely furnishing him with a remote, and fundamentall power, or faculty, but wicshall having a particular immediate influence on the effect, actuating that power, when it is actuated, and so properly causing, or making

him actually to serve, yet so as to leave him power also to neglect, and receive that power in vain, as the Scripture elsewhere saith; Thus Revel. xi. 3. *Now I will give, wee render, I will give power, viz. power to the subsequent act, prophesying there, as in Luke, serving in holynesse.* By which analogy it is evident, that Gods *working in us* to do, or *work*, is not interpretable to any more, then his giving supernaturall power, or sufficient grace to do, or worke, and causing him *actually*, though not *irresistibly* to work, and then here is no pretense whereon to found the foresaid difference, between Gods *giving the power of not resisting*, and the *ipsa non-resistentia*, these two being equivalent in this Text.

§. 25. Secondly, the same appeareth by the Apostles exhortation foregoing in this Text, *to worke and worke out our own salvation with feare and trembling*, for the inforcing whereof this reason is given, *for it is God that worketh, &c.* Here our *own working* is under Apostolical exhortation and precept, wee are commanded to worke, as elsewhere *συνεργειν to cooperate*, and *worke together with God*, which could not have place, if God alone, (and not wee,) *did work* in us the *very working*, whereas interpreting it of Gods *giving us the power of working*, or doing, as well as of *willing*, and withall engaging us to make use of that power, and cooperating with us in the *very act*, and so causing us *actually* to work, yet so as to leave us a power of *resisting*, and frustrating, and *receiving* this power or *grace in vain*, this is a most proper and effectuall inforcement of the exhortation addressed to us, *to work and work out our own salvation.*

§. 26. This

§. 26. This farther and most irrefragably appeares by the *persons*, to whom both the exhortation, and this enforcement thereof is tendred, *viz*: the *brethren* indefinitely, or *beloved*, *verse*. 12. the whole Church of *Professors* at *Philippi* to whom he writes, which being not made up wholly of the elect, sincere, and persevering Christians, but like the net, in Christ's parable, that caught both good and bad, and had no doubt some insincere persons, hypocrites, and temporaryes in it, the affirmation notwithstanding is indiscriminately of all, *God worketh in them to work*, which could not hold, if by this phrase were meant his giving the *ipsa non-resistentia*, and that as an evidence of *discriminating grace*, and an effect of his *Election*, for this is not supposable to have belonged to that whole Church, any more then it then did, or now is believed to do to all Christians.

§. 27. I have enlarged thus far, because I was not willing to omit, but rather to prevent whatsoever I could foresee might probably be objected in this businesse. And so this may suffice to have returned to your first difficulty.

§. 28. The second difficulty you thus propose, *Whereas it is said, and that, (as you conceive,) most truly and agreeably to plain evidence of Scripture, that God withdraweth his grace from such as rejecting it when it is offered to them by the preaching of the Gospel, do thereby frustrate the Counsell of God against themselves, it seemeth hard to conceive how the grace of God should be so withdrawn from them, that so do, but that, so long as they are not deprived of the outward means, the same sufficient grace that was offered to them at the first hearing* *of*

The second difficulty. Concerning Gods withdrawing sufficient grace.

of the Gospel, is offered to them still ; which if it was then sufficient on God's part, to do the work, is also still sufficient, and that in the same degree, and how then can it be said to be withdrawn ? It is true that the conversion of such a person, after so long obstinacy and refusall is more difficult then before, which may arise from the greater indisposition of the person to be wrought upon, but how it can be imputed in the least, to the withdrawing of the divine grace, (to which yet undoubtedly it may and ought to be imputed,) upon the former supposall on the like sufficiency remaining, I must professe my self not able to understand.]

The severall
wayes of
Gods with-
drawing
grace.
The first ra-
ther with-
holding.

consists with
his affording
sufficient.

§. 29. To this I shall not doubt to apply a satisfactory answer, and such as you will acknowledge to be such, by distinguishing of Gods withdrawing his grace. For, 1. it being Gods method to give more grace to those that walk worthy of it, the humble obedient children of grace, when he on our provocations stops that current, this may be called withdrawing. God's smitings are his admonitions, (*heare ye the Rod,*) his admonitions, as any other dispensation of his word are *vehicles of grace*, and when these prevaile not, they are thus withdrawn, i.e. not farther encreased, (*why should yee be smitten any more, &c. Is. 1.*) Yet is this withdrawing consistent with Gods affording sufficient grace, either by instruments of some other kinde, or even of the same kinde, the continuance of that proportion, which was formerly afforded ; as he that gives a competency, and would if he saw it well used, daily make additions to it, though he see cause to with-hold those additions, yet he may continue that competency. But in propriety of speech, (the truth is,) this is rather *with-holding*, then

then *withdrawing*, yet because the not giving what was promised to be given is tantamount to *withdrawing*, I therefore place this in the first ranke, supposing it cleare, that this doth not onely leave sufficient grace; but is it self designed to awaken and quicken those that did not formerly make good use of it, *Lest a worse thing yet befall them.*

§. 30. Secondly, then *withdrawing* being taken The second. in the proper sense, for *taking away* from and diminishing the stock, before afforded, that may yet be but in *part*, not *totall*, and there being a Not totall. latitude in *sufficient grace*, some degrees of that may be taken away, and yet that which remains be sufficient, an image of which is that degree of *Church-censures*, which cutting off from the participation of the Eucharist, or suspending from it, allows the hearing of the word, and partaking in the prayers of the faithfull, And this act of *Gods withdrawing*, again is so far from denying *sufficient grace*, that it is purposely used and designed, as the most probable means to make that *sufficient grace* effectuell, which formerly had not been so.

§. 31. There may yet be a *third*, and yet further degree of *withdrawing*, which at the present, and as to *sufficient grace*, may be said to be *totall*, The third is - totall, but only for the time, and neither simply totall. i.e. such a withdrawing of grace at the present, that it shall truly be said such a man is not now allowed sufficient for his necessities, whether it be that his necessities are grown greater, and so the former competency will not suffice, or be it also, that some of that which he had is *withdrawn*, as when he that for some time had no violent temptations, and was furnished with strength proportionable

tionable to what he had, upon his betraying this strength, and sinning willfully against it, is by God called out to sharper combats, having been foiled with the weaker, and perhaps some part of his former strength *withdrawn* from him also, when he hath most need of succours, and should certainly have had them, had he not thus provoked the withholding them. In this case the aime of this punishment of Gods is yet most wise and mercifull, thus to convince such a man of his guilts, and impotence, (the effect of them,) and so as by turning *Nebuchadnezzar* into the field, thorowly to humble him, to excite ardency of prayers, both for *pardon*, and *grace*, which God in that case failes not to give, and so to restore such a man to a greater stability of his former state.

§. 32. And so still this is neither *finall*, nor simply *totall*, as that signifies *withdrawing all grace*, but onely *totall* for a time in the sence declared, as it signified the withdrawing what was necessary to their present state.

§. 33. And I need not shew you how far this is reconcileable with *sufficient grace*, any farther then thus, that such an one though severely mulcted hath yet time for repentance and grace to make some use of it, which if he failes not in, he hath assurance of *more grace*, and this demonstrated to be so, by his not being cut off in his sins, (Gods *long-suffering leading him to repentance*,) and by the light of Gods word, and articulation of his calls dayly continued to him, which are not void of that *grace*, which is sufficient to work conviction, and hath the promise of *more*, (upon asking,) made to him that is thus qualified for it.

Rom. 8. 4.

§. 34. *Fourthly*

§. 34. Fourthly, there is the *removing the candlestick*, the withdrawing all the outward ordinary means of Grace, the preaching of the Word and Sacraments, which if it be done by the censures of the Church, is called the *delivering up to Satan*, or if it be done by Gods judgements, invasion of barbarians, &c. it is yet to those persons that are thus punished, perfectly proportionable to that of the *Church-censures*. And yet of those it is said expressly by the *Apostle*, that the end of inflicting them is *for edification, that they may be disciplined, taught not to blaspheme*. This supposes continuance of Grace to them that are thus punished, and that sufficient to make use of this punishment to their amendment, nay the punishment, though it be the *withdrawing of one instrument of Grace*, is it self *another*, and therefore purposely chosen and allowed in exchange for the former, because it is looked on as the more probable to produce the Effect.

The fourth total, yet it self designed as a Grace, most effectual of any.

*2 Cor. xiii. 10.
1 Tim. i. 20.*

§. 35. They that see so great a benefit withdrawn from them for their unworthiness, will be thereby excited to reflect on their provocations, and bewail them, and contend by all regular means to regain what they have forfeited, and to repair their defects some other way, and this being the very end to which this punishment is by God designed, it is not imaginable, he doth yet (till *this* method also be despised) withhold that degree of *Grace* from such which is necessary for the producing of the Effect.

§. 36. All the ordinances of God, we know (and such are the *Censures*) yea and all the wise dispensations of his providence, particularly his *punishments* of this life (and therefore this, as the last, beside

Gods punishments instruments of his Grace.

beside excision) are instruments of *Grace* in the hands of his *wisdome*, as well as the preaching of the word is, and therefore in all reason to be resolved to be the *vehicles* of *Grace* also, and so neither is this any objection against Gods giving *sufficient Grace* to those, whom he thus punishes, in case they begin to make use of it. If they do not, but continue still obstinate, 'tis just it should at length be withdrawn from them.

§. 37. But this must be understood onely of those persons to whom the light of the *Gospel* had formerly shined, not to their distant posterity, which never have had any gleames of it, though their Ancestors had the fullest Sunshine. These are to be reckon'd with the *heathen*, with whom you know we undertook not to meddle, treating onely of the *Scripture-Election*, terminated in those to whom the *Scripture* is revealed.

The fifth total and finall withdrawing of all Grace by excision.

§. 38. *Fifthly* there is a *total* and *finall withdrawing* of all *grace*, as well as the means of it, which is visible in the cutting off such an one in his sins, and when this comes, our former supposal of *sufficient grace*, as of the preaching of the word, and God's calls, are utterly at an end, but this breeds no shew of difficulty, that man having enjoyed and mispent his time of *sufficient grace*, and now the *store-houses* are *shut up*.

The sixth before excision.

§. 39. But there is yet possibly a *sixth* state of *with-drawing*, when before either cutting off, or with-drawing Gods *outward calls*, whilst life, and the preaching of the word is continued, the obdurate sinner, that hath long hardened his own heart against God, thereby provokes him *totally* to *with-draw* all inward *Grace* from him, as much as if he were already in hell; This seems to be *Pharaoh's*

Pharaoh's

raah's case after the sixth judgement, and was designed by God to very excellent ends, to make him an example to all those that should be inclined to *harden their hearts against God*; And though we know not that God thus deals with any others, yet it is sure he justly may with all whom he may justly cut off in their sins. And in this case I acknowledge the *non-conversion* of such a man is not onely imputable to the *indisposition of the person to be wrought on*, but also to the *withdrawing of the divine grace*, for then, as I said, the former supposal (of the like sufficiency remaining) ceaseth, and is outdated.

§. 40. What fresh difficulties can arise from this concession, I cannot divine, unless 1. it should be objected, that then, it seems, the word is not alwayes the vehicle of Grace, and then 2. who knows when it is so, when not? And how then is this reconcileable with the doctrine of *sufficient grace* alwayes accompanying the word? And to these the answers are obvious, 1. that it is granted that the Word is not the vehicle of Grace to the *Devils who believe and tremble*, to the damned who have received their sentence, nay nor to those that are thus arrived to the highest degree of obduration in this life, and have, as *Pharaoh*, this exterminating sentence passed upon them. It is sufficient if it be so to them that are in a capacity to make use of it, and have not utterly *hardened* themselves against it, the Scripture-expression being, that the Gospel is *the power of God to salvation to every one that believes it*, and this is enough to establish our pretensions, the doctrine of *sufficient grace*. There is a competent time allowed every man, and 'tis certain, death is the conclusion of it, 'tis possible some space before death.

The word is not accompanied with Grace to the damned, or the highest degree of obduration.

Rom. 1. 16.

§. 41.

§. 41. As for the *second*, if it were on the pre-mitted grounds granted, that sometimes it cannot be known whether or no the preaching of the Word do then bring this Grace with it, yet the one regular consequence would be that we should all be the more carefull to make use of *Grace*, when it is afforded : But when to this is added, that this barren season is always the reward of *obstinate* obduration (and of nothing less then that) As long as we have any *softness* left, that is our assurance that this sad time is not yet come upon us. They that go on in their obdurate course, have reason to expect this fatal period every hour, but they that have *remorse*, and any degree of sincere relenting, may know by this, that this state of spiritual death hath not yet seized them, and that is sufficient to guard this doctrine from all noxious consequences, having provided that none shall hereby think his state *desperate*, that is willing to reform it.

Where any
softness, none
of that.

§. 42. But then it is farther to be remembred, that there appears not in the word of God, any other example of this *totall* spirituall dereliction finally inflicted, *before death*, but onely that of *Pharaoh*, after the time that God is said to have *hardened his heart*; and the reason of this is set down, God *keeps him alive*, after the time due to his excision, that he *might shew in him his power*. And such singular examples ought no farther to be taken into consideration by us at this distance from them, then to warn us, that we keep as far as it is possible from the like provocations, And then there remains not, that I discern, any farther appearance of difficulty in this matter.

Pharaoh the
only example
of it in Scri-
pture.

Rom. ix. 17.

§. 43. As for any others that shall be apt to occur, when men set themselves to consider of these
points,

points, not divining what they are, I may not pretend to speak to them, any farther then thus, that in all probability they may be measured by these, which you have chosen to mention, and by nearer approach to them be likewise found not to be so deep, as at the distance they are conceited to be. This then concludes your trouble ; It remains that according to my promise I now onely annex the *Letters of Prascience*, and hasten to subscribe my self

Your most affectionate
brother and servant

H. HAMMOND,

H

Thi

*The Extracts of three LETTERS
Concerning Gods Praescience reconciled with Liberty and Contingency, referred to, and promised in the first Letter to D. Sanderson, §. 8.*

THE FIRST LETTER.

§. 1. **A**Sto the distinction betwixt *inevitably* and *infallibly*, (of which you desire my sence) it is certain you must understand no more by the *infallibility*, then is vulgarly meant by *Necessitas ex hypothesi*, which is no more then that whatsoever is, cannot not be, or, *omne quod est, eo ipso quod est, necessarium est*. For so whatsoever is *seen*, or (which is all one in an infinite Deity) *foreseen* by God, is thereby supposed to have, in that science of his, an *objective* being; If it were not, or did not come to pass, it should have no such *objective being*, if it have, it is thereby evidenced to be seen by him, who *was, is, and is to come*, and so (being infinite) is equally present to all, and equally sees, and knows all from all eternity. What therefore you conclude (as it is most agreeable to this, so it) is most true, that *God knows all things as they are*, such as come to pass contingently, he knows to come contingently, and from thence I undeniably conclude, therefore they are *contingent*; As for *Socinus's* resolution that he foresees onely what are foreseeable, and that contingents are not such, but onely those that come to pass by his decree, I conceive it as dangerous

*Necessitas
ex hypothesi.*

Objective being.

Socinus's doctrine.

rous as *M. Calvins*, that he *predetermines* all things, ^{*Calvins.*} and it is visibly as false. For it is evident by the prophecies of *Judas* &c. that God long (before) foretells sins, which are as certainly contingent, and not decreed or decreeable by God. If therefore any ^{*Gods fore-sight of sins.*} that writes against the Remonstrants go about to retort their arguments, and conclude from their acknowledgements of *Gods præscience*, what is charged on their adversaries doctrine of *predetermination*, I conceive it is but a boast, that hath no least force in it, *predetermination* having a visible influence and causality on the object, but eternal *vision*, ^{*Difference betwixt Prædetermination and Prævision.*} or *prævision* being so far from imposing necessity on the thing to be, that it supposes it to be already, from the free choice of the Agent, and that being of it is, in order of nature, before its being seen. Gods seeing, or foreseeing hath no more operation or causality of any kind on the object, then my seeing your letter hath caused your letter. You wrote freely, and now I see it, and that being supposed, it is infallibly certain that you have written, and that you cannot not have written. And just so it is in respect of God. Onely I am *finite*, and so is my sight, I see few things, and those onely which are present, but God being infinite sees all *ab infinito*, that are never so long hence future. — At Cambridge they have lately printed *Origen contra Celsum*, and *Philocalia Gr. & Lat.* (which were rarely had and dear) the latter of which hath good Chapters on this subject.

§. 2. This Letter met with some prepossessions, so far advanced, as to cause a Reply of some length, and that necessitated my larger endeavours to remove them, which I shall here add also; His Re-

The second Letter

ply, to which this referres, is none of my goodes, and therefore I may not take that liberty in disposing of that, but you will discern the force of it, in my returnes, which were as followes.

The Second LETTER.

SIR.

*Omniscience
proportiona-
ble to Omni-
potence.*

§. 3. **I** received your Letter, and in it your sence of that difficult point, which I cannot approve of, but on the contrary assure my self, that as *Omnipotence* is not onely the power of doing all things that any or all creatures can do, but more then so, the doing all things that imply not a *contradiction*, (as the same thing at once to be and not to be, the doing of those being as impossible to God, as it is to lye,) so the *Omniscience* of God is the knowing all things which any creature can know, and not onely so, but the knowing all things which implye not a *contradiction* to be known, and then that will be extensible to all things that are past, present, or to come, of what sort soever they are; what is past, or present, or being future is decreed by him, or comes to passe by some necessary cause in nature, which he decrees not to hinder, Gods knowledge of these will not, I suppose, be doubted of. All the question will be of *future contingents*, which before they are done, are possible to be, or not to be, but whensoever they

*Future con-
tingents wish
in Gods reach.*

they come to passe, are as determinately in being, as is any thing else, (the most necessary,) that is allready done. Unlesse then, what by being future is out of my reach, is also by being future, out of Gods reach, there can be no pretense that any such future contingent should not be objicible to Gods all seeing knowledge.

§. 4. And that nothing that ever shall be, or will come to passe, is thus out of Gods reach, must fure be yeilded to *Gods immensity*, which relating to time, as well as place, it will be equally derogatory to it to limit it to the present *time*, in opposition to the future, and to the present, (be it whatsoever finite,) *place*. This therefore I take to be the one thing fit to be considered in this matter, whether Gods *immensity* comprehend not a commensuration to all time, and somewhat beyond that, as much as *infinite* is beyond *finite*.

Proved by
Gods immen-
sity.

§. 5. This I suppose cannot be denied to the Notion which is due to a Deity, and if so, then God was immense from all eternity, and cannot be imagined to advance or arrive to this by any *προκοπή*, *proficiency*, or improvement, by continuing or enduring from the beginning to this time, or to the end of the world, but in every imaginable point of time, even before time was, he was thus *immense*; and if so, his *knowledge* being as *immense* as himself, all that he was from eternity present to, (*i.e.* all things that ever were or shall be,) must needs be objected to his knowledge.

§. 6. - Against this, your prime argument is, *that it is no more derogatory to his omniscience not to know that which is in nature unintelligible, then to his Omnipotence, not to do things impossible.*] This

The second Letter

Socinus's ar-
gument an-
swered.

Of the con-
tradiction.

is expressly Socinus's grand argument, and to it I answer. 1. That the phrase, (*in nature unintelligible*,) may be set to signifie no more then what no naturall, *i.e.* created power can *know*, and then there is no truth in the proposition, unlesse proportionably [*impossible*] signify what no finite naturall created power can *do*: and if both those phrases be meant so, there is nothing gain'd by it, because a Deity may both do and know more, then any creature can. But then *secondly*, the phrase [*in nature unintelligible*] may also signifie that which in the nature of things, whether finite or infinite, created or uncreated, is not possible to be understood; And thus I suppose you meane it, and then the interpretation of the phrase must be, that for such a thing to be objicible to any, though infinite, understanding, implyes a *contradiction*, (for nothing else is simply impossible:) And this being your meaning, I absolutely deny, that for God to be by his immensity present to all time, (and all that he is present to, he may see,) implyes a *contradiction*, or hath any appearance, (to him that considers what infinite is,) of so impliyng. And if you will make tryall and attempt to prove it doth, it must be by proceeding on the known definition of *contradictories*, a repugnance *interminis*, as *idem eodem respectu esse & non esse*, and then you will soon discern the unquestionable truth of my deniall. For Gods seeing all future contingents, will neither imply God to be, and not to be, to see, and not to see, to see certainly, and not to see certainly, nor the future contingent to be, and not to be, or to be necessarily and not to be necessarily, or to be future, and not to be future. For the thing being future, and contingent now,

and

and so continuing till it comes to passe, and when it comes to passe, coming to passe contingently, and so as it might not come to passe also, but when it actually is done, it implying a contradiction, (and so being impossible,) not to be done, and so being necessary *necessitate hypotheticâ*, i.e. *supposing that it is*, all this God sees and knowes by the severall acts of his intellect, answerable to the severall notions of the thing.

§. 7. From all eternity, and so in every point of time, before it comes to passe, God sees it both as *future*, and as *contingent*, and so, as that, which till it is, may be or may not be; and when it comes to passe, *in ipso fieri*, he sees the man that does it, act *freely*, having power to the contrary, and the thing never *necessary*, but as being done, and that onely by that *necessity*, whereof that proposition in logick is to be understood, *Omne quod est, eo quod est, necessariò est*. All which is very obvious to be conceived, and there is not the least contradiction, or shew thereof in it.

§. 8. This one would thinke you readily granted, when you say, *God infallibly knowes all that is past, present, or possible to be*, (for no man demands any more,) yet you deny it again in these words, [*meer contingents which with equall possibility may be, or may not be, have no being in act, and therefore can cast no reflection, or objective being into the mind of God.*] To which I reply, First, that you ought to advert. 1. That what may be, or may not be, may be. 2. What may be, is possible, and 3. You your self confesse that God knowes all that is possible. Secondly that the *having no being in act*, (which seemes to be your stumbling block,) is a phrase proportioned to the thing, and to our

finite understandings, to which the thing is *future* onely, and so hath no being yet: but when God is considered as *infinite*, then whatsoever shall ever be in act, that actuall being of it, is the object of Gods sight, and hath been so from all eternity, and is no more removed from him, then that is removed from me, which is present with me; And if you say, *God sees before, what in after time shall hang in the ballance of humane indetermination*, i. e. what he may do, deliberates, and is free to do, or not to do, but hath not yet done, I demand, why may he not also foresee which end of the ballance doth at length overpoise? (Is not one of these as truly *future*, as the other, when the man is not yet borne?) And so again, which end doth not overpoise, and never will, although he see it might, if the man should choose so, and that the man may so choose, but still that he doth not. This is it, wherein you say the *contradiction* is, and now it is visible there is none, nor the least approach towards any.

A second objection.

§. 9. Here you add, (which is your second main objection,) *that it is a mistake to call that possible, which God foresees shall never be, for if God foresees the contrary, (i. e. that it shall never be,) it is indeed impossible.* But, 1. I pray, is nothing possible to come to passe, but what *actuall* comes to passe? If so, nothing that is, is *contingent*. But if some things be possible to come to passe, which yet do not come to passe, why may not God see they will not come to passe? And if he can, then that is no mistake, which you say is. 2. Do but change the word foresight into (which is the same,) seeing from all eternity, and then it is plain, that God from all eternity may see that thing will never

ver actually be, which yet is free for the agent to do, or not to do, (and God sees that too,) and so is *possible* every way, save onely *ex hypothesi*, on *supposition* that it will never be ; And as the bare *hypotheticall necessity* is no *absolute necessity*, so the bare *hypotheticall impossibility* is no *absolute impossibility*. 3. God sees every thing as it is, and it's being or not being such, is in order of nature antecedent to Gods *seeing* it ; Therefore it infallibly followes, that if it be *possible* to be, though it shall never be; God sees it is *possible* to be, and if God sees it *possible*, it unavoidably followes that it is *possible*.

§. 10. And it is not fit here to interpose, that *though it seem to us possible, in respect of second causes, yet if God foresee the contrary, it is indeed impossible ;*] For what I am by God left free to do, or not to do, that, not onely seemes, but is indeed possible, and so it is, though in event I never do it, and being so in it self, God's seeing it will never be, hath no least influence upon it, so as to make the least change in it, (for that is the work of his *will*, not of his *knowledge*,) and so it cannot from *possible* convert it into *impossible*.

§. 11. When therefore you say, *no cause can effect that which God sees shall never be*, this is onely true in *sensu composito*, that, in case it shall never be, and so God sees it shall never be, no cause shall effect it, but in *sensu diviso* it is most false, for I am truly able to write more lines to you then I shall ever write, or consequently then God foresees I shall write, and even this, that I am thus able, God equally foresees.

§. 12. By this you see how far I am from being convinced, or by any reason forced to grant, that
future

The second Letter

future determinations of free agents are not foreseeable, and what the inconvenience is of affirming they are not, even no less then derogating from Gods Immensity, and Infinity, and judging the perceptions of an infinite Creator by our finite, created measures, his more then untathom'd Ocean by my span, and feigning contradictions, where there are none.

Inconveniences enumerated and answered.
The first, *a*

§. 13. Now to the *Inconveniences* which you enumerate, I shall reply also, as oft as I perceive I have not prevented, or answered them already. The first is, that *the sight can be no more certain then the things are which are seen, and therefore there cannot be a certain knowledge of those things, which in their causes are uncertain,*] I answer that all the *certainty* of the knowledge of any thing depends upon its *being* first, and then of its being *known* to be, and not onely upon the *certainty* of its *causes*; I do now as certainly know that I have written nine pages to you, as I know that the fire burns, therefore that may be *known* certainly, which is not *certain in its causes*. And as that which is present to me is certainly known by me, so are all things to come from all eternity, present to an *immense* Creator, be they contingent, or not. And in this case there is not *more in the effect then in the cause*, for what is contingently come to pass, being done, is certain, and cannot be undone, and God sees it, as it is, therefore he sees it as done, and so certain, yet as done contingently, and so as that which might not have been, the *being*, certain, the *manner* of its coming to act, *uncertain*. The being then being the cause of the seeing, or in nature antecedent to it, and the seeing the effect or consequent of the being, the certainty of the effect is
but

but proportionable to, and *exceedeth not the cause*.

§. 14. The *second Inconvenience* is, that of *say- The second.*
ing that every thing that happens was certain to be,
before it happens] But I say not so, unless by cer-
 tain you mean *ex hypothesi*, certain to be, in case it
 be; for in case it should not be, God should see
 it would not be, and then it should be as *certainly*
 otherwise.

§. 15. The short is, All *Exhortations, Industry,*
Preaching, &c. are founded in the *liberty* of our
 actions, and if they be free till they be actually de-
 termined, and then are past freedome, and become
 necessary, so consequently must *Exhortations, &c.*
 be all usefull, till the thing be done, (and then in-
 deed, as to the doing, or not doing that, they are
 not usefull, but their second season of usefulness
 comes in, in case it were a sin, *Exhortation to Re-*
pentance, &c.) and that is as much, as can be or
 need be pretended to, and this is fully competible
 with Gods seeing certainly from all eternity, what-
 soever shall come to pass in time; His seeing it sup-
 posing it done, though for the manner of its being
 done, that were *contingent*, and if so, then is it
 not certain to be, before it happens, but it is cer-
 tain to be, when it is, and it first *is*, in order of
 nature, before it is *seen*, and its being already seen,
 before it be done, depends onely on the *immensity*
 of Gods presence, and sight, which reacheth out
 to all that ever shall be; so that that which is fu-
 ture to us, he is present to it, and in that sence,
 though he sees it as future, tis yet present to
 him.

§. 16. Your *third inconvenience* is, that, *by this, The third.*
the damnation of such or such men is as fixed and un-
alterable, as though they were reprobated from all
eternity,

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eternity, and it is as ill in respect of me, if I must inevitably be damned by my own free will, as if I had been sentenced to Hell by Gods decree, and in respect of God worse, for he must be deprived of the free exercise of his omnipotence, (because he cannot make that not to be which he foresees will be) and brought under a Stoicall Fatality, and so be an helpless spectatour of what anothers will is pleased to effect.] I answer if by [such and such men] you mean such or such individuall entities, without respect to their qualifications or demeanures, then all your consequence, as it is inconvenient, so it is false, for from Gods seeing *ab aeterno*, that Judas will be reprobated, it follows not, that he sees he will be reprobated, but for his willfull Treason. But if you mean by [such or such men] men so or so qualified, i. e. finally impenitent, then 'tis true, but not inconvenient, that finall impenitents, should from all eternity be reprobated. And speaking of these in this sense, 'tis true, which you add, that it is as ill in respect of the person, i. e. finall impenitents, meaning by [as ill] as sad and penal, nay 'tis more sad, and penal to be reprobated for final impenitence, which I am guilty of by my own free-will, then it would be to be onely by Gods decree involved in it, my willful culpable guilt being some addition to my misery, and (as long as God is just) it being expectable that those punishments will be sharper, which I bring on my self, by the exercise of my free will, then what comes on me by a decree grounded no way in my actions. And so still this is no Inconvenience. But if you mean by [as ill] that which hath as little mixture of Gods goodness towards me, then your consequence is false, for to Gods seeing Judas reprobated,

bated, and his seeing it *ab aeterno*, it is no way consequent, that he gives him no power to escape Damnation, viz. Grace to be able to stand and not fall, or Grace to recover if he will make use of it, but the contrary rather follows; For how can God see him damned for the *betraying Christ*, and not repenting and returning, unless this were done wilfully by him (sins of *weakness* and *ignorance* finding mercy, as in the case of *Saul*, *persecuting the Church*) and unless he were first a *Disciple of Christ*, and so were illuminated, and assisted by Christ, and if he were so, then he had this power and Grace, or might have had it, if he were not wanting to himself, and if so, then this was not so *ill to him* (in this sense, of which now I speak) as to have been irrespectively reprobated, and never vouchsafed this Grace.

§. 17. So when you say *It is worse in respect of God, and prove that because he must be deprived of the free exercise of his omnipotence*] there is no truth in that consequence, or the reason of it. For Gods *omnipotence* consists not in being able to make both parts of a *contradiction* true, that were in the very attempt a departing from veracity, a falseness, a sin, and so the greatest *impotence*, and so most contrary to *omnipotence*. And such is that, which alone your consequence, and the reason of that supposes, making that not to be, which he foresees will be, for by the latter part of that expression you mean that w^{ch} from eternity he sees to be done, and then to be done and not to be done, is *in terminis contradictory*. And this impotence or not being able to cause the same thing at once to be and not to be, is far from all notions of *Stoical fatality*, that I ever heard of (els sure all rationall creatures must be *Stoicks*, for they

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they all resolve that what is, cannot not be). and as far from making God an idle helpless spectator of what anothers will is pleased to effect: for his providence, and assistance, and efficacy belong to other things, not to the making that not to be, when it is, but to the preventing it before it came, giving Grace sufficient, preventing, restraining, exciting, &c. ordering it and disposing of it to his own wise ends, when it is done, and punishing the doer justly, if he repent not, to which he is also ready to give Grace, if he humbly ask, and seek and knock for it: All this is supposed to be done by God, and so God is no helpless spectator, and all this is reconcilable with the effects being wrought by our free will, as long as Gods grace works not irresistibly.

§. 18. Here I remember that of S. Augustin. de Civ. l. 5. c. 10. *Nullo modo cogimur, aut retenta præscentia Dei, tollere voluntatis arbitrium, aut retento voluntatis arbitrio, Deum, quod nefas est, negare præscentia futurorum*, (this is expressly contrary both to the Calvinists pretension on one side, and the Socinians on the other.)

The seventh.

§. 19. Your fourth inconvenience is, that then God never purposed to save all mankind.] If by purposing you mean decreeing, and by saving, actually bestowing heaven upon them, then that consequence is true, but not in the least wise inconvenient, for God never decreed to save final impenitents, and such are many of mankind, after the giving of Christ, but on the contrary, hath sworn such shall not enter into his rest. The saving of mankind which God decreed is the redeeming them, and giving them Christ, and Grace, and making them salvable; and being deficient in nothing toward that

that end to those, that will make use of it. As for the other notion of Salvation, it is no where said that God *purposed* that in the notion of *decreting*, but onely that he so *will'd* as to *desire* it, and to give sufficient means of effecting it, but those means proportioned to rational agents, and so not violent or *irresistible*, or such as should, by being contrary to freedom, exclude rewardableness. So when you say, *Christ could not have an intention to dye for them, who he foresees would be nothing advantaged by it*] if by *dying for them*] you mean so dying, that they should actually be saved, so 'tis true, he intended not to dye for those that are finally impenitent, and so are not advantaged by it, for sure it is no part of his Covenant or intention in dying, to save such: but if by *dying for them* you mean purchasing pardon, upon supposition of repentance, then that he intended thus to dye for them, that make not this advantage of it, (and so he sees make it not) appears evidently by many texts, which tell us of his *redeeming those that deny him, that perish*, &c. and is intimated by the very style you use of their *being nothing advantaged by it*, for if he did not purchase those advantages for them, why is that phrase used?

§. 20. Your fifth Inconvenience is, *that on this* The fifth. *supposition, God could not seriously call upon such, whom his prescience points out for Damnation, to repent, more then I could bid him take heed that he fall not, whom by tumbling down I saw mortally bruised already.*] I answer, 1. that if you mean any more by that phrase [*his prescience points out to Damnation*] then [*he sees ab æterno, that they will not repent, but dye in their sins,*] I reject the phrase, as not belonging to the question, my hypothesis

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pothesis being far from yielding, that præscience doth any other way, but this, or in any other sense, *point out any to damnation*. And therefore changing that obscurer for this other more perspicuous phrase, I say that Gods præscience of mens not making use of his call, is very reconcileable with the *seriousness of his call*, which I infer from Gods own words, and oath, *as I live, saith the Lord, I desire not the death of him that dyes, turn you, turn you, for why will you dye?* what can be more serious then this speech, directed to those that dye, and he sees, obstinately *will dye*. But this differs widely from my *warning him to take heed of falling, whom I see actually fall'n*, because whenever God thus calls not to fall, the man is not fall'n: when he calls him to arise again, being fall'n, he is not irreversibly fall'n, and therefore accordingly he calls him (not, not to fall, but) to rise again. And what God thus doth in time, God *ab aeterno* decreed to do, and his foreseeing it would not produce the desired effect, was in order of nature after the decree of doing it, and therefore is in no reason to have any influence on (so as to change) the decree, and if not so, then the decree standing still in force, it is most necessary that it should be performed, and so that God should in time call thus seriously to repentance.

§. 21. And indeed, for God to *foresee* (as he doth, or els would not punish for it,) that his most *serious* call will be *rejected*, and yet not to suppose his call is most *serious*, is an absolute contradiction, and so cannot possibly be supposed, or imagined.

§. 22. To my argument of *Judas's* sin being
The foreseeing of Judas's sin *foreseen*, and *foretold* by God, from whence I conclude

clude that that is *foreseen* which is not *caused* by God, or to which the man is not *determined* by any act of Gods will) which you say is *very pressing*, you answer by referring to *my judgement*

1. *whether the Prophecies could not have been fulfilled, had Judas never been born: 2. whether by listning to his Master he could not have repented, &c.*

The arguments from thence defended.

To the first I answer, that the prophecy, as it was terminated in him, could not possibly have been fulfilled, had he never been born, and that the *πλήρωσις*, or utmost completion of the prophecy *Psal. 41. 9.* was terminated in him, the holy Ghost by *S. Peter* tells us, *Act. 1.* To the second, that I doubt not but by listning to Christ, he might have repented, and then God foresaw that he might, yet fore-saw he would not do what he might, and so fore-told this; whereas if he would have done otherwise, it is as undoubted, that God should have foreseen that, and might, if he had pleased, have foretold it also, as Christ did not onely his treason, but also *S. Peters denyall*, and repentance also. As for that which you suggest, *that the prophecy of him might be like that of Jonah, conditional*

1, there is little probability for it, when the event hath so much otherwise interpreted it, which if it had not done, I should not have resisted your suggestion, as far as concerned his *perishing*. But then 2. you know my Argument was founded in Gods foreseeing his *sin* (and no his *perishing*) and to that his *conditional foresight*, exemplified in *Jonas to Nineveh*, is not applyable,

§. 23. That which you cite from *Chrysostome*; *Hom. 83. in* who gives for a reason why Christ admitted *Judas* *Mar.* to the Sacrament, that nothing might be omitted that might conduce to his amendment] belongs not to

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your *first*, but *second* question, and so I allowed of it, as you see, and am not prejudiced by it. For to your concluding question I answer expressly, Christ look'd on *Judas's not sinning*, or *repenting*, as *possible*, till by his repudiating all the means of Grace, and his *measure of iniquity fill'd up*, he withdrew his Grace from him, which whether he did before, or not till his death, I have no means of defining. Onely this I resolve, that Christs foreseeing what he would do, had no least influence on the effect, any more then the *effect* hath on the *cause*, or the *sense* on the *object*, Gods foresight being in nature consequent to, and caused by his doing it, not the cause of it. And when you say, that *if it were possible, then the contrary was not certain*, I grant it was not certain, till it was done, and when you infer, *then it could not be foreseen*, I deny the consequence, for those things which are not *certain*, till they are done, may by an *immense Deity* be *ab aeterno* seen to come to passe in time, and so that sight or foresight be as certain, as a foresight of what is most necessary in its causes: and the reason is clear, because of that which is done, it is as certain that it is done, as of that which is *in causis*, it is certain, that it is *in causis*, and being so, it may cast a reflexion on the understanding of him that is present to it, and so is God to *futures*, as well as to the *present*.

§ 24. And when you say in your Postscript, that *it is a contradiction to say that things past or future are present, and therefore all things are not, nay cannot be present to God;*] I answer, 1. that you use not the right definition of a *Contradiction*, in saying thus, for *future* doth not contradict *present*, but *present and not present* is a contradiction, and so
future

future and not future ; 2. although it be granted of any finite thing, that it cannot be both present and future, yet God being *immense*, may and must be present to that which is future, or els he is bounded and limited. Yet this doth not inferr God to see what is future as present (which you say is to be deceived) but to see what is future as future, which though indeed it be future, yet he by his *immensity* may be present to it. And none of the inconveniences, which you add, follow on this; onely let me tell you (on strength of that Proposition, *Quicquid est necessario est id quod est*) that as God cannot change what is *past*, so he cannot change that which is present, so as to make it, when it is present, not present, and then no more can he change that which is *future*, so as to make it not future. All that can be done is, either 1. to make that which is *contingent* (and so may be or may not be) to become *necessary*, by decreeing it; or 2. to come to pass really, though but *contingently*, or els 3. not to come to pass, or finally to leave it still free, yet to foresee what will *freely* be done, as much as what will *necessarily* be done.

§. 25. So that you see the maxime which you mislike, is not so much, that *all things are present to God*, i. e. represented to him *sub ratione presentis*, as this, that God by his *immensity* is present to all things, and his sight being as infinite as his being, this is as easie to be understood, as the other, or as any *infinite* is comprehensible by our *finite* understandings, which you call *duller apprehensions*, for so sure are all ours, when we imploy them upon *infinities*. You see into what a length I am run, indeed much above mine own intentions, but shall not repent of it, if it contribute to the disabusing

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you, and shewing you the way out of this intricacy.

§. 26. This second Letter having some enforcements of the old, and addition of new scruples, returned to it, by the same hand, which I accounted it my duty to answer at Large, by a third letter, (which I suppose will conclude this controversy,) I shall here also subjoin it. It was as followeth.

The Third LETTER.

SIR.

§. 27. **T**Hough yours of—made hast to me, yet I found no leasure to afford it any serious reflections, till this—and therefore being already guilty of two long delays, I shall not now encrease them by proceme, but fall immediately to the view of your reply. And in it, what you first lay down, partly by way of *concession*, partly by way of *apology* for your own Notion, partly by way of opposition to mine, I must confesse I see not what propriety of application it hath to that which was the ground-work of my Paper, *viz.* *that whatsoever hath a being, or ever shall have a being, (which though by being future 'tis out of my reach, yet by being future, is not removed out of Gods reach,) is objicible to Gods all-seeing eye of knowledge,* and this upon the grounds of his *infinite unlimited immensity*, by you and by all-Christians acknowledged,

The ground of our assertion Gods immensity, and the no implicancy of a contradiction. Gods immensity extends to the knowledge of all things possible.

ledged, and the *no contradiction*, (which alone renders it impossible to God,) which it implies, for God thus to reach out immensly, and see all *ab aeterno*, which (and in the manner as it) in time comes to passe.

§. 28. In stead of shewing this *implicancy of a contradiction*, (which alone was to have been done,) you have tendred a reason to prove, [*that* An objection against that answered. *God's knowledge is not properly said to be immense, in regard he knowes all things possible,*] viz: because they conjunctim are not absolutely infinite. But sure this hath no force against my position, which doth not prove Gods immensity of knowledge, by this argument of his *knowing all things possible*, or by any other, but takes that for granted, and needing no prooffe, and from thence inferres and concludes the other, viz: *his knowing all things past, present or future*, and against this concluding 'tis visible your reason is of no kind of force, [*for that these conjunctim are not infinite,*] for *an immense knowledge* may and must see all *finites*; though it self be infinite.

§. 29. So again, when you say *his immensity cannot relate to time, and place, which are both finite*, A second objection. and you cannot see how any *quantitative extension should be subjected in a purely spirituall essence*, and preffs this with *absurdities, and strange consequences*, (as if it were maintained by them, against whom your debates lye,) if you consider again, you will see, there was no cause for it, I am sure in my papers there was none, which when they proposed to your consideration, whether Gods *immensity* comprehend not a *commensuration to all time*, immediately added, and somewhat beyond that, as much as infinite is beyond finite. By comprehending

What is
meant by
commensura-
tion to all
time.

hending a commensuration to all time, if when it had that immediate addition to explain it, it can be misunderstood, I must then farther expresse my self, that I meant, no *quantitative extension*, or indeed any more then this, *that God is, was, and shall be*, from, and to all eternity, and as his essence, so is his Immensity, Omnipotence, Omniscience; he sees and knowes all things, not onely that are or have been, but that ever shall, or will be, *i. e.* shall ever have an actual being, obijcible to knowledge, and even for *possibles*, that yet never come to passe, he sees and knowes both parts. 1. That they are possible to be. 2. That they will never be.

A third ob-
jection.

§. 30. This I have added in relation to those words of yours, on which you seem to lay weight, [*The time to come is now no time, as the things which meerly be possible, are now no things, and therefore to apprehend that God is in such time, or that such things are present with him, is to conceive that that is not.*]

Answered.

§. 31. Here, First, let me tell you, your comparison, or proportion holds not, being laid betwixt the *time to come*, which is really future, and the things *meerly possible*, which shall never be; But passing that, 'tis certain Secondly, that though the *time to come*, according to our finite measures, is now to us no time, *i. e.* is not the *present time*, (which holds equally of the *time past*, which being past is now to us not present,) yet in respect of *Gods immensity* this cannot be said, for that were to encumber him with our *finite rules*, and measure infinity by our span of time, which with me you professe to avert, and abhor.

What is fu-
ture is obijc-
ible to God.

§. 32. So though the things *meerly possible* are now no things, (I shall add, nor ever shall be,) yet even these are objicible to him as they are, *i. e.* as things *meerly possible*; which yet never shall actually be, for he may and doth see that they are *possible*, and also that they shall not come to passe.

So what is
meerly possi-
ble.

§. 33. And when against this you argue, *that this is to conceive that which is not,*] If you mean by it, that which is not *actually*, I grant it, but find no inconvenience in affirming, that God sees or conceives that to be *possible*, which he sees is not, nay shall never be; But if you meane, that if so, *then God conceives contrary to truth*, there is then no shew of truth in that consequence, for his *conceiving* that to be *meerly possible*, which is *meerly possible*, is to see *according*, (and that is not contrary,) *to truth*. Nazianzen's speech that God *ἔστιν αἰεὶ*, *alwayes is*, but neither properly *ἦν* *was*, nor *ἔσται*, *shall be*, and that eternity is neither *χρόνος* *time*, nor *χρόνος μέρος*, *part of time*, is so far from having any unkind aspect on my notions, that it is the very thing that I contend, that we must not go about to fathom eternity by our finite lines of time, but lay all that is done in time, or ever shall be. *γυμνὸν καὶ τετραχειλισμένον*, *naked and bare* before him, and still acknowledge that beyond this, there is an *infinite abyſſe*, which we cannot fathom.

A fourth ob-
jection an-
swered.

Orat. 43.

No proportion
between our
finite and
Gods infinit-
te.

§. 34. On this what you build, and apply equally to that which is *past*, and *future*, [*that which is past vanishing*, say you, *into nothing*, and before it was, being nothing,] might (me thinks) by being reflected on, extricate you out of your labyrinth. For can you doubt that God knowes what

A first ob-
jection answer-
ed.

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God may
know that
which actu-
ally is not.

is now past? I presume you do not, can not; And then why may he not as well know what is future? When the onely objection to that, being [*because it is not, and he must then know that, that is not,*] you have equally resolved, that *that which is past, is not*, as that that is future; and so that your objection, either holds against both, or neither, I pray consider this.

A sixt ob-
jection an-
swered.

§. 35. Next when you insist, *that the acts of his infinite understanding, in relation to the creature, must needs be finite, as the creatures are finite.* I cannot apprehend, how you can reap any the least advantage by it, meaning, as the words import, *that God sees things as they are*, for this you know and acknowledge is *my ground* also, and to this it is consequent, (and so not strange,) that whatsoever he sees *ab aeterno*, he must see, *as it is*, i. e. as it is done in time, whether necessarily, or contingently, but no way consequent, that he can see nothing *ab aeterno*, because it is in time that it comes to passe, for that which comes to passe in time, he that is *eternall*, and *immense*, and *omniscient*, may (seeing it *implies no contradiction*,) see *ab aeterno*, though I who am *finite*, and whose sight is limited, and finite, cannot.

Gods seeing
every thing as
it is.

A seventh
objection an-
swered.

§. 36. When therefore you argue, *that it is no more derogatory to his eternal wisdom, to say that he sees or knowes this or that in time, and not ab aeterno*, then it is to his infinite power, to say that it *workes in a finite manner*,] *Me thinks* the fallacy should be too gross to impose on you, upon a second view: The former member of your comparison expressly denying his *seeing or knowing ab aeterno*, which is the greatest derogation to *immensity*, and *omniscience* and *eternity*, when the latter

latter hath no such negation of his *power of working*, but affirms onely that he *workes in a finite manner*, (which he may do sometimes, when there is no need of interposing his *infinite power*,) but not that he *workes not ab æterno*, which the proportion, if it were observed, would exact, and then that would be as *derogatory to his power* also.

§. 37. The observing of this will I hope cleare to you that which you say is so *strange*, it being but the same fallacy again in another dresse, (which therefore I shall no farther pursue,) or if the reason which you add, from the *temporariness of the creature*, which *ab æterno had no being*, save onely in mere *possibility*,] have still any force with you, I hope it will cease to have so, when 1. you consider that an *objective being* is sufficient to cause knowledge; and that it's being in time is no hindrance to an *immense Deity* to see it *ab æterno*, for if he may see it a day before it comes to passe, why may he not equally *ab æterno*? 2. That *futures*, though contingent, differ from *meer possibilities*, that which is *meerly possible* never coming to an actual being, and so being not *future*, and of such I should erre indeed strangely, if I thought God did *foresee* them as *future*, or see them as having an *actnall being*. It suffices that he sees them as they are, *i. e.* as *meerly possible*, and why that which is possible, though it never be, God may not see *ab æterno* to be possible, I neither see, nor am offered by you any shew of reason. How you come to conceive it said by your adversaries that the *acts of Gods understanding are all necessarily eternall*, (you meane I suppose by your whole discourse *ab æterno*,) I guess not, when he that saith God sees *ab æterno*,

An eight objection answered.

Difference between possible and future.

All Gods acts are not *ab æterno*.

aterno, what now I do, must also grant that he now, *i. e.* in time sees me do it, or else could not believe him *Omniscient*. 'Tis the part of *immensity* to do both, and of *Omniscience* to know all things both future, and present, and the affirming one of these is very far from denying the other.

A ninth objection answered.

Gods knowledge suitable to his power,

§. 38. You say this *is no convincing argument*, *Gods understanding was infinite ab aeterno*, therefore whatever he knows, he knew ab aeterno, more then this, *Gods power, &c. was infinite ab aeterno*, ergo : what he does now, he does ab aeterno.] But 1. Who urged that former argument in that forme ? Not I surely. 2. If I now shall, your parallel bears no proportion with it, unless the antecedent and consequent be better suited then they are ; For in your antecedent you speak of power, in the consequent of *doing*, which belongs to Gods will, not to his power, (for sure God does onely what he wills, not whatsoever he hath power to do, or to will.) But set both to the same, viz. to his power, and then it will follow inevitably thus, Gods power and ability of doing whatsoever he pleased was infinite ab aeterno, ergo. Whatsoever he now does he had power to do ab aeterno ; And this is the argument which alone is suitable to the former, *Gods understanding was infinite ab aeterno*, ergo. *Whatsoever he knows*, (or now sees,) he knew or saw ab aeterno, *i. e.* Whatsoever now is, or ever shall be done. Both these are apparently true, though one of those which you had suited amiss, were false, the other remaining true,

§. 39. Having removed these rubs, which you say thus hinder your consent, I shall hope you will yeild to as much as I pretend, which is not, you see, *that God coexists to things that neither are, nor ever will be, i. e. to things onely possible, but not future*, but that Gods immensity is such, as that he reacheth out and is present, *ab æterno*, to all that is done in time, and so that all that ever shall be, is *ab æterno* objected to his knowledge; Against this nothing that you have said in your five first pages hath any semblance of force, and therefore I hope this now will be granted by you, and then I have it under your hand at the bottom of your fift page, that most of your objections will be easily answered, which therefore I might leave your self to do; but having a little more leasure then ordinary, I will a while accompany you in the view of every of them; and begin with your defence of your *first objection*.

Gods coexistence to all that ever is, not to what never shall be.

§. 40. And there First, when to prove it to imply a *contradiction that a thing that is not*, (as, say you, *all mere possibles are*,) *should be intelligible*, you thus argue, *it's being intelligible implies that it is, so it is, and it is not*, (*which is a contradiction*,) the fallacy is two fold, 1. You confound *futures* that are, (by being such,) supposed to have an *objective* being, though not as yet an *actuell*, with *meer possibles*, which never shall be, and so are not *future*, but onely *possible* to be, and agreeably are seen and known onely to be *possible*, but not to be *future*, and 2. You confound an *objective* being which alone is implied in being *intelligible*, with *present*, or *actuell* being; and now take it out of these ambiguities, and set it as it is, that *God ab æterno did, or now doth see that* which

The enforcement of the former objections answered.

The first enforcement of the first.

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which to day is not, but to morrow shall be, and then what is become of that, [is and is not,] i. e. of the contradiction? or consequently of your whole cause? Nothing being impossible to God, but what implies a contradiction; which therefore again I presse; shew the contradiction, or yeild the cause.

The second.

§. 41. Secondly, when to your saying that *all things past, present, or possible, are known to the divine wisdom*, I returned a parenthesis, [*No man demands any more,*] and you now reply, *that I did not fully apprehend your meaning, which was that God knew all things possible, not as future*, my rejoinder is, that I well discerned the difference betwixt *possible* and *future*, all things being not future, which are possible; Yet because all futures are possible, (though all possibles are not future,) I could not misapprehend your words, which spake of *all things possible*,] in concluding that all futures were comprehended under that style of *all things possible*, for sure futures are in that number, and then if all futures were intelligible to God, and by you granted to be infallibly known by him, this as I said, was all I demanded.

*Possible and
meerly possi-
ble differ.*

There is difference I conceive, betwixt *possible* and *meerly possible*, all futures are *possible*, but what is *meerly possible* excludes futurity. Sometimes you speake of *meer possibilities*, and then I never apprehend you to meane futures, as, when you speake of *all that is possible*, I am obliged to do.

§. 42. Now then if you speake, or speake of *meer possibilities*, and say that God knew all things *meerly possible*, as *meerly possible*, and not as future, you say most truly, but then your example
of

of *A. B's* future marriage is nothing to your purpose, for if it be considered as future, then though it be yet possible to be, or not to be, yet it is not *meerly possible*, for by being supposed *future*, it is consequent that it shall be, whereas what is *meerly possible*, shall never be. When therefore you say, *both are known by God as possible*, (viz: *that he shall marry, and that he shall not,*) *neither as future*, you deceive your self, for though he sees both as *possible*, yet he sees one as *future*, viz: as contingently future, future when it might be otherwise, and the other as *meerly possible*, i. e. not future, sees it, I say, as future, not by consequences, or *per scientiam mediam* onely, in the ordinary notion of that, viz, if this be, that will follow, (for which science there is place sometimes in things *meerly possible*, and not *future*, as in the example of the Oracle concerning the men of *Keilah*, that if *David* trusted them, they would deliver him up, when yet he not trusting himself to them, they did not, could not deliver him,) but by reaching out so far as to see it done, in that other notion of *Scientia media*, whereby God sees what man *will freely do*, and not onely *conditionally* what he *might* or would do.

Scientia media,

§. 43. Your following objections against this, *that what is known as future, is certainly known will be, but A. B's marriage is altogether uncertain,*] is of no more force then the answer of the double necessity, *simplex*, and *ex hypothesi* evacuates, for what is *certainly known will be*, may be also in respect of the agent uncertain, as being free for him to do, or not to do, which notwithstanding when he hath done, it is then certainly
what

what it is, and as so, it is seen by God from all eternity.

§. 44. Thirdly, when I said that the *having no being in act*, is a phrase proportioned to the thing, and to our finite understandings, 'tis visible. 1. That I spake of the phrase, and nothing else. 2. That my meaning is, that to our finite understandings that is not present, or in act, which is still future, but yet God by his *immensity* may reach out, and be present to it, or see it, as wee do that which is before our eyes.

The third

§. 45. And when against my words you argue thus, [*if it be proportionable to the thing, then it is also to Gods understanding which depends thereon,*] 'tis plain again, that you misapprehend mee, for I oppose Gods *infinite*, to our *finite* understandings, and not Gods *understanding* the thing, to the *reality* of it; God understands it, as it is, and so sees that future, and contingent, which is truly so, (as Cicero saith, *Ut praterita ea vera dicimus quorum superiori tempore vera fuerunt instantia, sic futura, quorum consequenti tempore vera erunt instantia, ea vera dicemus,*) but till it actually be, God sees it by his *infinite science*, which by our *finite* we cannot reach.

de Fato.

§. 46. Let it then be granted that Gods *understanding depends on the thing*, what followes thence? No more but this, that future contingents having yet no being in act, and therefore being not visible to our finite faculties, have yet a being objective, as being really, though contingently future, and Gods *knowledge being proportioned to the things*, and depending on them as such, i. e. as future contingents, and not as actually being, these he knowes by his *infinite knowledge*.

§. 47. But

§. 47. But say you, *his understanding can be no more actuall then the thing is from whence he derives that understanding,*] what truth is there in this? I know what is *past*, my knowledge is *actuall*, but the thing *past* is not so; I know if the course of nature be not altered, (or, which as to this matter, is equivalent, I believe,) the Sun will rise to morrow, here my *knowledge* or belief, is *actuall*, but the *object* is *future*, not yet actuall, save onely that it is now actually true, that the Sun will rise then. And then why may not *Gods knowledge* be *actuall* either of what is *past*, or *future*, (and so now actually is not,) and yet he see it as it is, *i. e.* what is *past* as *past*, what *future*, as *future*?

§. 48. Fourthly, when to my question, [*Why, if God sees before, that which in after time hangs in the balance of humane indetermination, he may not also foresee which end of the balance will at length overpoise?*] You answer, *that the foresight of the former is the foresight of possibles, but the foresight of the other is the foresight of a contingent future, and that the one is not as truly future, as the other,*] you cannot but see, you do not render any answer to the question, *i. e.* any reason why he may not see what is *really*, though *contingently future*, as well as that which is *meerly possible*? It is true, one is not as truly *future*, as the other, but what shew is there of reason, that what is lesse future, or not future at all, shall be seen, and that which is *future*, and shall really be, shall yet not be seen by him that is *Omniscient*? can it's no kind of being, not so much as in *futurition*, set the advantage on that side, and make that most intelligible, which hath no being, and that least, which hath?

If it do, yet sure it shall be no ground of resolving that the really future is not at all, even to God *foreseeable*, or that there is any contradiction in this, which if you remember was incumbent on you to prove, by that of *hanging in the balance*, &c. but is not now attempted by you.

The first n-
forcement of
the second.

§. 49. I proceed to your defense of your *second objection*. And first when you grant that many things are possible, which will never be brought to act,] how could you say before, that it was a mistake to call that possible which God foresees shall never be? Is that a mistake which is perfectly true? Or is not Gods foresight agreeable to what is?

§. 50. But say you now, God that sees all things as they are, sees them as possible, not the one side of a contradictory proposition as determinately true, and the other as assuredly false, for so he should see them as they will be hereafter, but not as they are now,] I answer, 1. God that sees them as they are, sees them not onely as possible, but as future, for they are not onely possible, but future, 2. Of contradictory propositions, as, that I shall kill my self to morrow, and I shall not kill my self to morrow,] one is determinately true, I mean not by determinately true, that God hath decreed it shall be, but it is true on the one side, and not on the other; for if I kill my self to morrow, then it is true to day, that I will kill my self to morrow, and if so, then it is false, that I shall not kill my self to morrow. What then is determinately true, God sees as determinately true, and so sees it as it is. 3. If he sees them as they will be hereafter, sure this is sufficient, who would desire any more? Nay this is to see them as they now are, for now they are fu-
ture;

ture, i. e. things that now are not, but shall hereafter be.

§. 51. In your reply to my second answer, it is no way pertinent which you say of a *bare supposition* proving nothing, yet being granted proving any thing that is necessarily deducible from it. For 1. when I speak of a bare *hypothetical necessity*, you speak of a bare *hypothesis* or supposition, which is quite another thing, your bare supposition is a supposing, (though no more then supposing) that to be, which is not, but our bare *hypothetical necessity* is a conditional, as that is opposed to an absolute necessity. How wide are these one from the other? 2. Then if you review that my second answer, to which you make this reply, you shall see how little propriety it hath to it. It was this, *Change the foresight into seeing from all eterniry, and then it is plaine, that God from all eterniry may see that will never actually be, which yet is free for the agent to do or not to do, (and God sees that so,) and so is possible every way, save onely ex hypothesi that it will never be, and as the bare hypotheticall necessity is no absolute necessity, so this bare hypothetical impossibility is no absolute impossibility. To this your reply is, that though a bare supposition prove nothing, yet it being granted, it infallibly proves any thing necessarily conclusible from it.*] You see now how little this is *ad Iphicli boves*, and yet, 3. If it were pertinent, it would not be for your advantage, for supposing, (as I also do,) that God sees the thing as *contingently future*, free for the agent to do or not to do, it must by your rule necessarily follow, that the thing is *contingent*, and so not absolutely necessary, or any other wayes, then that when it is, it cannot not be, which was all

I had to make good in that answer.

The third.

Great difference betwixt rendering and finding certain.

§. 52. In my *third answer* you grant all I aske, onely you interpose, *that to our purpose it is all one whether Gods prescience render the object certain, or presuppose and find it certain*; and, as if this were, upon the meer saying it, presently granted, as a *Maxime* cleare by it's own light, you add no word of proof to it. Which how far from reasonable it is, you will now discover. And 1. to *render*, and to *find*, are as far from all one, as to cause and not to cause, for sure what I *render certain*, I cause to be so, *what I find certain* is caused by another and not by me. And being thus distant in themselves, it is strange they should *to our purpose be all one*. Is it all one to our purpose, whether I commit sin freely, when I had grace to abstain from it, or God cause or work it in me? What two things can be lesse all one then these? and this the *one purpose*, for which the men, with whom you dispute, do insist on this subject, and distinguish betwixt Gods *foresight* and his *decree*. And therefore as you are very solicitous that your opinion should be freed from the imputation of derogating from the *Divine immensity*, and *Omniscience*, so at this time it concernes you to be as carefull, lest you offend against Gods *purity*, and other attributes, when you make it all one for his prescience to *find* and to *render* the object certain, *i. e.* to see all the sins that wee commit, and to cause them. I pray consider this, and it will force you either to acknowledge that God *foresees certainly* what we do freely and contingently, or to deny our sins, (*i. e.* voluntary actions,) to be free, or to deny that Christ foresaw that *Peter* would deny, or *Judas* betray him, both which he foretold to his Disciples.

The great consequence of this difference.

§. 53. I

§. 53. I proceed to your defense of the *objected* inconveniences against my answers to them. And first, it breakes no square, whether [*in themselves,* ^{The defence of the objected inconveniences, answered.}] be inserted, or omitted, 1. because what is in it's *causes* utterly uncertain, is so in it self. ^{The first.} 2. because you yeild to all I said on this head as rationall and convincing, and onely question the truth of my *principle*, which you know I was not again to prove in that place, when I was answering the *objections*, or *inconveniences*.

§. 54. Your second inconvenience I understood ^{The second.} before in the very sence that your instance now sets it, and accordingly I rendered answer to it, and shewed wherein it was that *Exhortations, &c.* were founded, viz. in the *liberty of our actions*, so long, as till they be actually committed, and no longer. And to this you give no answer at all, nor to ought I say on that head, but onely say over in another Scheme the same thing to which I answered.

§. 55. In this your new Scheme you say, that had it been known aforehand, that A. B. would obstinately have continued in his wickedness, it had been vain to have used exhortations, and so for God (supposing his prescience,) it were vain to enjoin them.] Here the word [*vain*] in the obvious notion imports unprofitable, or uselesse, and then, 1. I pray consider, whether it be fit to speak thus ^{Prescience makes most exhortations vain.} of God. It is certain Christ saw Peter would fall, Judas would betray him, yet he told them both of it before, and that telling them was a timely admonition, and equivalent to an exhortation, adding of Judas a terrible threat, or denunciation, that it was better for him, that he had never been borne. Would you think it tolerable for any Christian to say hereupon, it was vain, for Christ to do

all this ? I trow you would not, and therefore will your self think fit to avoid it.

The example
of Pharaoh.

§. 56. Should you have any scruple in this, the story of *Pharaoh*, and the passages, *Rom. IX.* referring to it, would, *à multo majori & fortiori*, supersede or answer it. God had there foretold *Moses*, that he would harden *Pharaoh's heart*, which I hope is much more toward inferring a necessity, then *Christ's foretelling Peter*, or *Judas* of the fall of the one, and treason of the other. And yet God exhorts *Pharaoh* after that, and he that objects against his doing so, *Rom. IX.* that saith *τί ἐτι μέμφεσαι*; *Why doth he yet*, (after that sixth judgement, when God himself hath sent his plagues on his heart, why doth he still, or yet) find fault, is answered, *Nay but O man, who art thou, that disputest against God?*

§. 57. In the former part of that story, when it was not come to that height, yet it is most evident that from the beginning of *Moses's* mission to *Pharaoh*, God had foretold that *Pharaoh*, would harden his own heart, and that (alone) is perfectly parallel to our case, which is of prescience of future contingent acts of mans will, yet are all Gods messages and signes by *Moses* purposely sent to melt, and perswade him to let the people go. Doth any man now want a perspective to discern that these messages of heaven were not vaine ? Or that such acts of Divine wisdom, (*his wayes, that are not like ours,*) are not to be submitted to our tribunall, but adored and revered, and no otherwise approached by us ? But then,

Acts of Gods
wisdom not
submitted to
our censure.

§. 58. Secondly, if by *vain* you meane no more, then that which doth not finally obtain the effect principally designed, so there will be no difficulty in affirming with *S. Paul*, that *Gods grace* and
so

so his exhortations, &c. may be *received in vain*, for so God knowes it is too frequent for us to do, mean while what thorow our default becomes fruitless to us, doth not returne so to God, but serves Gods *subsequent*, (though it resists his,) *antecedent will*, which is also Gods will, *viz* : to punish the obdurate, as well as his antecedent is to save the humble and tractable, and the more frequent the exhortations are, supposing grace annex to enable to make use of them, (as you know we suppose,) the more culpable is the obstinacy against such meanes, and the more culpable, the more justly punished, and so Gods justice vindicated from all aspersion, and mans freedome asserted : And the exhortations, that have contributed to all this, will not be deemed vain, though they attain not the fruit primarily intended, the salvisick effect or designe of them.

Gods antecedent and consequent will.

§. 59. And whereas you compare this to a *Physician prescribing a medicine, which he foresees will do him no good.* I must ask by what meanes it comes to passe that that medicine will do him no good ? By it's own insufficiency or impropriety to the disease, or by the obstinacy of the patient, that he will not take it ? If by the former, I then acknowledge with you that *Physician* were *vain*; but that is no way applyable to God, whose medicaments are sufficient, being *the power of God to salvation to all that believe*. But if it be by the second onely, then the *Physician* is far from *vain*, as doing all that the wit of man can do, or wish toward the recovering of his patient. For he that will not use his recipe's, seemes bent on his own death, and as guilty of it, as he that cuts his own throat, and 'tis no disparagement to the *Physician*, that

The uneffectualness of Gods acts not chargeable on him;

that when he is prescribing remedies for his feaver or consumption, he doth not cure his *obstinacy*, or that he prescribes to him, as to a wise man he would prescribe, (though indeed the event be much other, then it would be in a wise man, but that is not the Physicians fault,) and as little can the vanity be imputed to Gods operations, when by our defaults onely they prove uneffectuall; God himself, *Isa. V.* appealing to us in the like case, *what could he have done more to his vineyard which he had not done, when yet pro uvis labruscas, instead of grapes it brought forth nothing but wild grapes.*

*Force not
compatible to
a rational vi-
neyard.*

§. 60. In that place no doubt it was possible for God to have done somewhat which he did not, *viz.* to have forced the ground to bring forth good grapes, but to a vineyard interpreted there to be the house of *Israel*, to a *rational vineyard*, and to that which was to be left in a state of rewardableness, of doing and not doing, of freedom, the dowry of the will of men and Angels, with which they were created, this was not compatible and therefore 'tis truly said, *God could do no more, than he did, or doth, (whatsoever the event be and be foreseen by him,) and that is as contrary as is possible to the objection of vainnesse.*

The third.

§. 61. For the enforcing the *third inconvenience*, you say it seems hard that *small impenitents should from all eternity be reprobated, unlesse conditionally,*] never considering, what was most conspicuous in my answer, that *final impenitence* it self is that *only condition.* When therefore you say, *It were, as if a person should be sentenced to death for a fact before it be committed,* you fall back into the two mistakes, which my answer, if adverted to, had prevented. 1. You speak of a person simply, and abstract-

abstracted from guilt, when I speak of a *final impenitent*, i. e. a person so very ill qualified, and foully guilty. 2. I suppose his sentence to be founded in his guilt, and his guilt, in order, before his sentence, but both of them in the mind of God, (who seeing his guilt, awards that punishment, adapts his revenge to that fact,) seen as past, before ever that sentence goes out against him.

§. 62. Here you say *A. B.'s, Salvation was ab æterno possible*, (which I grant,) *and thence infer, that God did not ab æterno see his damnation as certain, but onely as possible*. But I deny the consequence, for he may see both his salvation and damnation as possible, and yet see one of them as onely possible, the other being also future, which is somewhat more, then *onely* or *barely possible*. Meane while nothing hinders, but what is, (and God sees,) thus future, *he might by his omnipotent power have prevented*, (which yet, you say, by my reason he could not,) onely then, he had not seen it as future, but as that which would have been, if he had not prevented it.

§. 63. Again you say, *that if God had infallibly foreseen that A. B. living longer would unavoidably have fallen into sin, and therein have persevered till death, you verily believe, in regard of his goodness and love to mankind, not onely in generall, 1 Tim. II. 4. 2 Peter III. 9. But to A. B. himself, Ez. XVIII. 32. that God would take him away in his infancy, as soon as baptized, when he was in the state of grace and salvation.*] In this proceſſe of yours, *willfull falls are not unavoidable.* I wonder whence the word *unavoidably* came. For I that according to your supposition, look on *A. B. as one baptized, and in the state of grace, and salva-*

tion, can never grant that he *unavoidably* falls and finally perseveres in such sin, as brings damnation; I grant he may fall, and that finally, but sure not *unavoidably*, for by that grace he was enabled to stand, and if he fall, he falls *willfully*, but that is not *unavoidably*.

Nor made so
by Gods pre-
science.

§. 64. And what if God sees from all eternity that he will thus fall, doth that render his fall *unavoidable*? No, but Gods foreseeing that he would fall willfully, when he had grace to stand, (which circumstance he foresaw, as well as the fall itself,) must infer the quite contrary, that when he falls he might have stood, and so fell not *unavoidably*.

Gods love to
mankind en-
gages him not
to prevent
them by
death, whose
fall he fore-
sees.

§. 65. But then leaving out that unseasonable word, [*unavoidably*,] which in all reason you might have done, when in relation to the certitude of Gods prescience you had said, [*infallibly foresees*,] there will then be no ground of truth in that proposition, no shew of proof of it from the goodness and *φιλανθρωπία* of God to all, or to any particular, as those texts or any other express it, for from none of those it is rendered probable in any degree, that they which are baptized, and have sufficient grace given them, and promise of abundance, if they make use of it, shall have violent restraints, or be taken out of the world, rather than they shall fall into wilful sin. Consult the places again and you will soon find there is no propriety in them for the proove of this.

If it did, it
is nothing to
the case of
prescience
here.

§. 66. And yet if even this also were true, it would no way incommode our pretensions, for in that case of Gods taking away such a man, in his infancy, it would follow by our doctrine, that God foresaw that from all eternity, and so that he fore-

foresaw not *A. B.* a finall impenitent, which is the destroying and voiding your whole supposition.

§. 67. How then this seeming advantage could reasonably incline you, to profess it your *thought*, that the doctrine of prescience is very much inconsistent with the omnipotence and goodness of God, &c. and that 'tis swallowed without examination, I now leave you candidly to consider, by your reflexions on the strength of that reed you laid this weight on. Judge I pray, might not God, if he would, have created a world of men, taken them up into heaven, and crowned them, (if crowning it could be called,) with everlasting blisse, and so left none of them in the hazards of this world? Yet did not, (it is evident by the fact,) his love of mankind oblige him to this, but men are left to vast dangers, and multitudes fall under them. Must all this now be imputed to Gods ignorance how all things would frame in the world in this other course, which yet it appears he hath chosen? The consequences are too horrid to insist on. Let us instance once for all in *Adam*, 'tis certain he fell, and in him all his posterity, did not God foresee or know this, till the effect told it him? Then how was Christ given *in decreto divino*, before the creation of the world? I hope you will not say he was not so given, when the Scripture is in many places so expresse for it, especially, *Ephes. I. 4.* and when Gods decrees are *ab aeterno*, and so especially this, the foundation of all the rest, of those that concern our salvation, Yet can I as little imagine what else you can say, unlesse you will forsake your hypothesis.

*Adams sin
foreseen by
God, yet not
prevented.*

*Evidence that
it was fore-
seen,*

*The same of
all other
finnes.*

*That presci-
ence derogates
not from om-
nipotence.*

§. 68. For if he decreed Christ before the creation, then he foresaw there would be need of him, if so, then he foresaw *Adams* fall, and then why may he not have foreseen all other mens sins, all contingent future events, of which he is no more the author, and of which there is no more necessity that the free agents should act them, then there was that *Adam* should sin before he was created. I pray consider this, and it will do your whole businesse.

§. 69. But let us examine your reasons, by which you will approve your affirmation, that *prescience ab æterno derogates from omnipotence.* You instance in *King Charles's death*, and you might have done the like in the death of Christ, whereof the sacred writ testifies, that it was *by the determinate counsell and foreknowledge of God.* Now *prescience being admitted*, say you, *it was as certain that King Charles should die, Jan. 30. as now it is that he did die that day, and to that it is consequent, that it could not have been prevented by omnipotence it self.*] Your consequence I deny, *sub hâc formâ*, because he that saw it would be that day, equally saw, both that he might, and that he would not prevent it. By his *omnipotence* it is certain, he might, by his *will and wisdom*, (now revealed,) that he would not prevent it, by his *Omniscience*, that from all eternity he knew he would not, by his very mercy to him, and for other most wise ends, that he would actually deliver him up to the wills of the malicious, *able to destroy the body*, but no more, which again is founded in his foresight of their malice, and must suppose it. All which makes it as infallible, that God might have prevented it, as that he would not, did not, therefore this is far from

from *derogating from his omnipotence*, in this of his not being able to prevent it, the contrary to which is by this our Scheme expressly established.

§. 70. This *προς ὑπόθεσιν* ; for my positive answer, you cannot but know already, all the necessity consequent to præscience is the *necessity ex hypothesis*, it is necessary to be while it is, and because it will be, therefore God foresees it will be, and if men would have done otherwise, God would have foreseen otherwise.

§. 71. When you take it for mine *acknowledgment* then, that *God cannot change that which is future, so as to make it not future*, I answer, that *sensu diviso* it is most false, for whatsoever is future, God can change, and make it not future, and then foresee it not future. But if you meant *Conjunction*, that remaining future, he could not make it not future, 1. That is a great impropriety of speech, and most unreasonable, that he that speaks of *changing*, should mean keeping it still as it is, *unchanged*, and 2. You see the fallacy, that most palpable one, of a *bonè divisis ad male Conjunction*, which I hope will no longer impose upon you. The *ill consequences* you feare and exaggerate, should God be thought not to have been able to have prevented it, I shall not need insist on, detesting the thought, as much as is possible, and having so far secured our Scheme from it, that if God foresees not that he *could prevent any future whatsoever*, I shall not think he foresees any thing.

§. 72. So likewise for his *goodness*, you cannot doubt but I acknowledge that as fully as you, in relation to our salvation : Let us see then how I am obliged to deny this again by admitting his

Gods præscience derogates not from his goodness.
Præsci-

The third Letter

Prescience. Why, say you, if God willingly suffer so many to be damned, whom he might have saved where is his *φιλανθρωπία*? &c. I answer, just where you your self will, and must place it, unlesse you believe many shall not be damned finally. For 'tis most certain, God by his absolute power might have saved all them, that yet are now damned, and the shew of inconvenience is exactly the same, whether God be believed to *foresee all things ab eterno*, or no. For suppose we, that God foresaw not, but saw in time as we do every thing that happens in our presence, and suppose we a wicked man *filling up the measure of his iniquities*, or ready to die in his sins, I demand might not God, if he would, rescue him out of that state, convert him into a *Saint*, and assume him, as he did *Elias* in the sanctified state? Questionlesse he might, yet without all controversy he doth not thus to every wicked man, for if he did, none should be damned; Do you now reconcile this with Gods *φιλανθρωπία*, his words and many vehement asseverations, (as I doubt not but you are well able to do,) and then review your own question, [*If God willingly suffer so many to be damned whom he might have saved, where is his φιλανθρωπία?*] 'Tis not possible you should need more words to disintangle this snarle, and in my former papers I shewd you in this place to what Gods *φιλανθρωπία* belongs, giving sufficient grace, &c. : to which you reply nothing, and therefore I suppose consent to the truth of it, though 'tis sure both that God by his absolute power might do more then he doth, (and therefore I like not your expression, that he *does what omnipotence could performe*, citing, *Isa. v. 4.* In place of it, I should have said, what his *covenant*, promise,

promise, mercy, justice, equity, wisdom, obliged him to do, or what was reconcileable with all these, without interesting his *absolute power*, or *omnipotence* in it,) and that obstinate sinners do actually resist, and frustrate all the methods that are used by him.

§. 73. Of the manner of S. Austin's asserting præscience I need not farther insist, then that by the expresse words of that period I produced, he will have it reconciled with the *free will of man*, which if all would do, there were little more to be required of them. Yet because you have endeavoured to take off the force of S. Austin's words, and from Ludov. Vives's words on Chapter, IX. (*Quod si indignum, &c. Dicamus à providentia voluntateq; Dei cognitionem ejus proficisci, voluntatem statuere quod futurum sit, scientiam quod voluntas statuerit, nosse,*) to draw him to Calvin's sense, I shall read over that IX. Chapter, both Text, and Comment, and give you some passages out of it; In the Text, 1. That they are much more tolerable that bring in Sydereæ Fata, a fatality depending on the stars, then they which take away præscientiam futurorum, foreknowledge of futures: and that it is a most open madness, confiteri Deum & negare præscium futurorum, to confess God, and to deny his præscience. 2. Nos ut confitemur summum & verum Deum, ita voluntatem summamque potestatem & præscientiam ejus confitemur, nec timeamus ne ideo voluntate non faciamus quod voluntate facimus, quia id nos facturos esse præscivit cujus præscientia falli non potest, as we confess the supreme and true God, so we confess his will, and supreme power and præscience, neither do we feare least we should not do voluntarily, what we do

S. Augustine
and Lud. Vives
their
sense of præ-
science.

volun-

The third Letter

voluntarily, because he foresaw it, whose prescience cannot be deceived, making it the heathen feare of Cicero, which now is yours, lest the infallibility of the prescience should impose necessity, and frustrate Lawes, exhortations, &c. 3. *Nos adversus sacrilegos ausus & Deum dicimus omnia scire, antequam fiant* (marke omnia) & *voluntate nos facere, &c.* Contrary to the darings of sacrilegious men, we both affirm that God knowes all things before they are done, and that we do them voluntarily. 4. *Novit incommutabiliter omnia quæ futura sunt, & quæ ipse facturus est*, he knowes unchangeably all things which are to come, and which he will do, not onely the latter, but the former, and all of one as well as the other. 5. *He that foreknew all the causes of things, among them could not be ignorant of our wills*, quas nostrorum operum causas esse præscivit. Which he foresaw to be the causes of our workes. 6. *Qui non est præsciens omnium futurorum non est utique Deus*, he that foresees not things to come, is not God. 7. Of our liberty, *Voluntates nostra tantum valent, quantum Deus eas valere voluit, & præscivit, & ideo quicquid valent, certissime valent, & quod factura sunt ipse, omnino factura sunt, quia valituras atque facturæ esse præscivit cujus præscientia falli non potest*, our wills can do as much as God will'd and foreknew they were able, and therefore whatsoever they can do, they most certainly can do, and what they will do, they altogether will do, because he foresaw they could and would do it, whose prescience cannot be deceived. Next in *Vives's* comments you have, *Non res futura ex scientia Dei manant, sed scientia potius Dei ex illis, quæ tamen futura non sunt Deo, ut est error multorum, sed præsentis. Quæcirca non recte dicitur præ-*

præscire, nisi relatione ad actiones nostras, dicendus est scire, videre, cernere. Quod si indignum videatur, &c. Things future do not flow from Gods science, but rather Gods science from them, which yet are not future to God as the error of many is, but present, wherefore he is not rightly said to foresee unlesse it be in relation to our actions, he must be said to know, to see, to perceive, which if it appeare unworthy, &c. There come in the words by you recited, of Gods science coming from his will, which you say is *Calvinism*, but is not set by *Vives* to interpret *S. Augustin's* science that way, no nor to assert it as his own, but to recite another opinion, that hath lesse impiety in it, then the denying of prescience would have. Thus you see what that Chapter in the Father, or his Commentator gaines you. Mean while I take you at your word that you grant with *S. Augustin* the prescience of God, and if you grant it with him, you must grant it not onely in things which come to passe necessarily, (as all that God decrees do,) but simply in all things, and particularly in those, wherein *voluntatis arbitrium retentum*, freedom of will retained is concerned, for to those you see he thorow out the ix. and x. Chapters applyes it, and if you grant prescience in them, you grant as much as I desire, if not, you deny it, (which yet you again say you do not,) more then *S. Augustin*.

§. 74. What you here add as your conclusion from *S. Augustine* in his *confessions*, lib. II. c. 18. *videri non possunt sed prædici possunt ex præsentibus quæ jam sunt & videntur*, they cannot be seen but they may be foretold from those things that are present, and are now seen, and from *Origen* ἐπεὶ γέγονε τὸδε, τὸδε ἐπείκει, viz : That Gods knowledge of
future

Philos. c. 23.

future contingents is meerly hypotheticall, this being supposed, that will follow, &c.] I shall now proceed to examine, 1. By a view of your two Testimonies, then of your conclusion from them. And first for S. *Augustin's* words, they are not spoken of Gods prescience or predictions, but of ours, and that of things coming from natural causes, *Intueor auroram*, saith he, *oriturum solem pronuncio*, &c. *I behold the morning, I pronounce the Sun will rise.* Look and you will see it manifestly, so then it is nothing to Gods prescience of future contingents, and you can conclude nothing from it.

c. 21.

Origens testimony.

§. 75. And for the Chapter in *Origen's Philocalia*, it cannot be, but you must have noted in it, the weight that he layes on the prediction of *Judas's* treason, the general resolution, that ἐκαστον τῶν ἐσομένων πρὸ πολλῆς ὀδυνῆν ὁ Θεὸς γινώσκμενον, *every thing that is future, God sees it will come to passe*, (and yet ἡ προγνῶσις πάντων αἰτίος προεγνωσμένων, *the foreknower is not cause of all that are foreknown*,) citing from *Susanna*, 42, 43. That God is γνωστῶν γινῶσκς, ὁ εἰδὼς τὰ πάντα πρὶν γενέσεως αὐτῶν, *the knower of secrets, that knows all things before they are*, then he proposes the question, Πῶς προγινῶσκς οὗτος ἐξ αἰῶνος τῆς θεῆς περὶ τῶν ὑφ' ἐκείνης προεγχεσθαι νομιζομένων, τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν σώζεσθαι, *how God from all eternity foreknowing those things that are thought to be done by every man, our free will may be retained.* Which he treats against the heathen that say Gods foreknowledge takes away all praise and dispraise, &c. and maintain it just as you do, as you will see, if you compare your, and their arguing. Now to these his answer is, that God from the beginning of the creation of the world, nothing being without a cause, ἐπιπορεύεται τῶν ὅτι ἐκαστον τῶν ἐσομένων ὁρῶν, *by*

p. 72.

by the progresse of his mind thorow all things that are future, sees them, that if this be, that will follow, &c. and so μέχρι τέλους προγυμνῶν, proceeding to the end of things, he knowes what shall be. Which he doth expresse, to shew that he sees the dependence of all things, not from his own will, who by knowing them, as it followes, causes them not, but in a concatenation of humane acts and choises, as P. 73^o when by temerity one walkes inconsiderately, and meeting with a slippery place falls, which he that sees, is no way the cause of his fall, saith he, adding that *ibid.* God foreseeing ὅποιος ἔσται ἕνατος, how qualified every one will be, sees also the causes that he will be so, mean while his foreseeing is not the cause of their being what they are, but though strange, saith he, yet is true, τὸ ἐσόμενον αἴτιον τῶ τοιούτῳ εἶναι τὴν *ibid.* περὶ αὐτῶν προγνώσιν, the thing future is the cause that such a foreknowledge is had of it, for it doth not because it was known come to passe, but because, (ἐμελλεῖ εἶσεθαι,) it was to come to passe, it was known. Then he comes to a distinction in what *ibid.* sence it is true, that what is foreseen πάντως ἔσται shall altogether be, and states it just as we do all along. From all which, (that I may now follow, you to your inferences,) you can with no reason conclude, that it was his and the rest of the Fathers doctrine, that Gods foreknowledge of future contingents is meerly hypotheticall. You see most evidently from their sayings, every where scattered, (competently by those which I have now set down,) that this was not their doctrine. And this one passage, if it were favourable to your conceit, (as it is not,) yet could in no reason evacuate all others.

§. 76. In your conclusion that which I mislike is not the word, [hypothetical] but [meerly] for

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*Hypothetical.
foreknowledge.*

that signifies God to have no other foreknowledge but that. I doubt not but of all things that are, God foresees, as *Origen's* words were, *that if this be, that will follow*, and so I deny not *hypothetical foreknowledge*. But I cannot confine Gods foreknowledge to this one head, for why may he not also see, (and as easily,) that this, and that will both be? The principall use of *hypothetical foreknowledge*, is in things *meerly possible*, which come not to passe, (as before I applyed the example of *Keilah*, which you now mention.) But what can that have to do with those things, which do actually come to passe, and that meerly by the free will of man, and by no necessity of consequences? Though, (as I said,) even in those, God that sees them as they are, both in their causes, and most casuall, or voluntary mutations, and progression, and all circumstances concomitant, sees one thing following, (though but freely, not necessarily,) out of another, first this, and then that, and because this, or upon this motive, therefore that; Which as it is far from asserting any necessary chain of causes, contrary to the freedom of mans will, which in that very place *Origen* largely establishes, so it is far from a knowledge *meerly hypothetical*, for that is not the knowledge of what is, but what will be, if somewhat else make way for it, which being uncertain, whether it will be or not, there can be no determinate knowledge, that the other will be, which is quite contrary to his instances of *Judas's betraying Christ*, &c. Which were as really and determinately foreseen and foretold, as they were really acted. And therefore I must desire you not to think this favourable to the *Socinian's* opinion of Gods foreknowledge of future contingents being onely or meerly hypothetical, (though
God

God foresee *hypothetically*, yet not *onely* so,) or that this key will fit all places of Scripture, which foretell things to come, because it fits the case of *Keilah*, and *Jer.* 38, 17. and some few others.

§. 77. I have the more largely insisted on this, because it seemed so likely to mislead you, there being some examples of foreknowledge meerly hypothetical, from whence yet to infer that *Gods foreknowledge* indefinitely, is meerly such, *i. e.* that he hath no other, is the same error as from particular premisses, or from one or two examples to make an universal conclusion.

§. 78. On view of your fourth objected inconvenience, you grant all I said in answer to it, *onely*, *The former* say you, *the former difficulty seems to recur, how A. B. may be truly salvable, when if absolute præscience be granted, his damnation was as certain before he was borne, as it will be when he is in Hell.*] I answer, 1. That in answer to objected inconveniences all that can be required of any man is, to shew that that inconvenience doth not follow, not to establish the principal doctrine again, (which before had been done by the no implicity of contradiction, which left it possible for God to foresee future contingents, and then by consideration of his omniscience, which qualifies him to know every thing which is *scibile*, or the knowing of which implyes no contradiction, and then by the testimonies of the *Prophets*, who from Gods præscience foretold such futures,) having therefore done all that was incumbent on me, I had hoped the difficulty would not still have remained, when all I said was granted. But seeing it doth, I answer, 2. That supposing *Gods eternal præscience*, it cannot but as clearly appear, that *A. B.* not onely may be, but is truly salvable,

whilst he is *in Viâ*, as that he is damned, or no longer salvable, when he is in Hell. For supposing *A. B. in viâ*, to be one, for whom in Gods decree Christ dyed, and supposing Gods eternall prescience of all that is, (unquestionably of all that he himself will do, as he sure will all that is under his *decree*.) It must thence necessarily follow, that God foresees him salvable, and supposing that at length he is damned, it doth but follow, that God foresees him damned; These two things then by force of *prescience* are equally cleer, that he is one while salvable, another while damned, and so they are equally certain, and if his having been salvable do not hinder his being damned, then neither will his being damned hinder his having been salvable. He is truly salvable who God foresees will not be saved. How so? because God truly bestows upon him all means necessary to salvation, and that being all that is required to make him *salvable*, this is as truly done, when the effect followes not, as when the meanes are most successfull. And Gods prescience of the successlessness, makes no change, hath no influence either on the meanes, or the man, any more then my seeing a thing done hath causality in the doing it. Now if he be salvable, (though in event he never be saved, but damned,) and Gods *prescience* that he is *salvable*, be as efficacious to conclude him salvable, as his prescience that he is damned, to infer him damned, what a palpable partiality is it to infer from prescience, that his damnation is certain before he is borne, and yet not to infer from the same principle, that his salvability was certain before he was borne? Nothing can more irrefragably prove the weakness of your inference, then that it is so obvious to retort it.

Salvability
of Judas as
conclusible
from Prescience,
as damnation.

§. 79. The short is, that which is *future* onely *contingently*, it is certain that it is foreseen by God, yet till it is, it may be otherwise, and if it be otherwise, God sees it to be otherwise, and what may be otherwise, is not certain to be so, and therefore his damnation is not certain before he is born, which is the direct contradictory to your inference, and that method which will equally infer contradictions, of what force it is to establish truth, I leave you to judge who propounded the difficulty.

§. 80. Here then is the error, because God cannot erre in his foresight, therefore you conclude from supposition of his prescience, that the thing, which you speake of, is certain, when yet it no way appeares to you or me, that God ever foresaw it, but by our supposing that it comes to pass. Hence then comes all the supposed certainty, from supposing it to come to pass, which is the *certitudo ex hypothesis*, a certainty that it is, as long as it is supposed to be, and then Gods prescience hath nothing to do with it, but it would be as certain without supposing Gods prescience, as now it is by supposing it. And now would you have me shew you how *A.B.* is truly salvable whilst you retain your supposition that he is damned? This, if you marke, is your difficulty, for you have no other ground to suppose that God foresees him damned, but because you suppose him damned, and seeing it is, you see what a taske you have set me, even to make two members of a contradiction true together. This I confesse I cannot do, and I grant God cannot, yet thus much I will do for you, I will mind you, that even when *A.B.* is in Hell, the proposition is still true, that *A.B.* when he was on earth was *salvable*, and if it be true when he is in Hell, I appeale to you whether it be

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not true, when God foresees he will be in Hell, doth Gods foreseeing him in hell impede more then his actuall being in it ? If not, then notwithstanding Gods prescience, *A. B.* is salvable, and so now I hope you see both that, and how he is so.

The fifth.

*Gods serious
call to those
who he sees
will die.*

§. 81. In your fifth inconvenience, you still adhere that *you think it scarcely reconcileable with that determinate prescience which I hold, for God seriously to call those whom he foresees ab æterno that they will not repent.* But you take no heed to the place of Scripture, which I demonstrated it by, *turne you, turne you, why will you dye?* and, *as I live, I delight not in the death of him that dyes*, where it is evident, God seriously, (if an oath be a note of seriousness,) calls those who dye and will dye. Why do you not lay this to heart, when it is so cleare, and (you yet give me your leave to say,) unanswerable?

§. 82. I said, *when God calls to a man not to fall, he is not fallen*, and, you say true, *but he is fallen in Gods prescience.*] I now ask you, how you know he is? Your onely possible answer is, that if he be fallen, then by the doctrine of prescience, God must foresee him fallen, and you now by way of supposition, (which 'tis lawfull for disputations sake to make,) take it for granted, *i.e.* suppose he is fallen. And then, (as even now I said,) to your voluntary supposition all is due, and with that I cannot reconcile the contradictory, and so still what is this to *prescience*?

§. 83. Again you conclude, *that God sees, A. B. will never rise again*, how do you know, or imagine God sees it, but because you suppose it true, that he will never rise again? and if it be true, then it is also infallibly true, whether God see it or no. And so still what have you gained, your supposing it true is it to which adheres the supposition of Gods foreseeing,

seeing, and infallibility consequent to that, but that addes no weight to that which was before supposed infallible.

§. 84. Again you aske, *can God seriously call him, who [he sees] will never repent, seriously do that he sees useless, and absolutely ineffectuall?*] I have oft told you, and proved to you, that he may, 'tis certain he called *Pharaoh*, when he had predicted he would not hearken, and he moit seriously doth things to salvitick ends, which do not eventually attain those ends, and he foresees they do not.

§. 85. I said that what *God doth thus in time*, he ab æterno decreed to do, this (as it is apparent by the antecedent, to which the relative [*thus*] belongs,) I spake of *Gods calling men, some not to fall, others to rise again*, and you reply, that it seemes to you utterly improbable that *God should do whatsoever he doth, by an antecedent decree.*] I have no temptation to leave our present taske, which is sufficient for the day, to dispute that question with you in the latitude, as your, (*whatsoever he doth,*) importeth. It will suffice, if God doth *any thing* by an antecedent decree, or decree any thing before he do it, for if *any thing*, then sure his calls and warnings, which are parts of his covenant of grace, and that is *sub decreto*, decreed by him. And then what I said before, is still of full force, *Gods foreseeing mens disobediences to his calls, was in order of nature posteriour and subsequent to his decree of calling and giving them grace*, and being so, cannot move him to change what went before, or presently to disannull it, and till it be disannulled, 'tis certain, and exacted by veracity, that he act according to it, *i. e.* that he call those *seriously*, who yet he foresees resist him. Why you should here farther enlarge, of the greater improbability,

bility, that God should without consideration decree what afterward he perceives would be uselesse, I guesse not, being sure no words of mine gave you temptation to think that I affixt inconsiderate decrees to our God of all wisdome, or counted those calls *uselesse*, which through our obstinacy, (onely) faile of their designed good effect.

§. 86. No more did I give you cause for that harsh-sounding phrase of *Gods necessarily pursuing it, because it was decreed.*] I should rather have suggested to you these words, instead of them, that God is *faithfull*, and just, and veracious, and so performs his part of the covenant of grace with men, howsoever they are, (and he foresees them,) wanting to their own part.

Gods foresight of mans rejecting his calls and the crimoniousness thereof. a proof of the seriousness of them.

§. 87. What you say you understand not in my last papers, I thus explaine; those calls of God which the obdurate reject, are most seriously meant by God to their reformation, else he would not punish them for rejecting them, as he doth by withdrawing them, &c. This God decrees to do *ab aeterno*, which he could not, unlesse he foresaw their rejection of them, and yet neither could he foresee their so criminal rejecting them, unlesse he foresaw the seriousness of them, and if he foresaw that, then it is as certain as any thing, that God foresees that they are serious, and although God do not actually inflict punishment upon bare foresight of sin, yet sure he may decree to punish those whom he foresees to deserve it, and that is all that is necessary to my arguing. Else I might tell you that God that accepts not a temporary faith, will never accept such a man as is answerable to the *stony*, or *thorny ground*, (who in time of tryall would fall away,) though he should be taken away before temptations approach.

§. 88. In

§. 88. In that of *Judas*, you grant that the prophecy, as terminated in him, could not have been fulfilled, had he never been born, but then your quere remains, say you, whether it might not have been fulfilled in another?] I answer, 1. it could not have been fulfilled in another, without some other disciples doing what he did, and 'tis certain no other did so, and therefore what was foretold must have been fulfilled in him, or else, (which may not be believed of a divine Oracle,) had not been fulfilled. But then, 2. Christs words to *John* pointing out *Judas* for the Traitor, *he that dippeth*, &c. was a prediction of God perfectly terminated in *Judas's* person, and could not be fulfilled in any other, and to your new quere is answered also. And that gives you a farther reason, (if what was said before to your second quere were not sufficient,) that our Saviours prediction was not conditional, but categorically enunciative, *verily I say unto you that one of you shall or will betray me*, and he that dippeth, at that time when Christ spake it, deictically, i.e. *Judas*, is that person.

§. 89. In your view of what I said to your second question, you first insist on my answer, that the event proved the denunciation against *Judas* was not like that against *Niniveh* conditional, but I foresaw the small force of that, which I used onely *ἐν ὧσιν*, and therefore added a second, that the prediction of *Judas* was of his sin, as well as punishment, and the prediction of his sin, could not be conditional, nor the prediction of the *Ninivites* punishment any way be applicable to it, leaving therefore the weaker, I adhered onely to this, which when you labour also to evacuate, by interpreting, [*one of you will betray me*,] by [*unlesse he repent*, &c. he will betray

tray me.] You consider not, 1. that Christs death, as it was from all eternity decreed by God, so it was oft predicted by Christ, and his resurrection, and many other things depending on it, and among these still the treachery of one of his disciples is one, and that is not reconcileable with this interpretation. 2. That foreseeing that he *would be so disposed, as unlesse he repented he would betray him*, is the foretelling of a future contingent. 3. That one particular prediction, wherein *Judas* was deictically signified, was private to *S. Iohn*, that *lay in Iesus his bosome*, as appeares, *Ioh. XIII. 24, 25, 26.* And though the words to *Judas* himself, *Mat. xxvi. 15.* may better beare that sence you assigne, yet the words to *Iohn*, which *Judas* heard not, could be no such admonition to *Judas*, and therefore were without question absolute, and so those other to *Peter* verily I say to thee, before the Cock crow twice, thou shalt deny me thrice, when he had professed he would rather die, then deny him, are not easily healed with this *ἄρα οὐκ ἔστιν*, [*unlesse thou repent thou wilt deny me,*] for assuredly *Peter* meant not now to deny Christ, but resolved the contrary, and therefore had nothing to repent of in this behalfe. And when you seeme to demonstrate it could not be absolute, because *Judas* might confessedly have repented, and if he had, then it must have been interpreted conditionally, I answer according to my hypothesis, that if *Judas* had repented, Christ had never foreseen, or declared of him, as he doth, *i.e.* that he should betray him.

§. 90. But, say you, you see not why a conditional prediction may not be applyable as wel to the prevention of sin, as of punishment, I shall shew you why it may not, because the punishment is Gods work, and for the averting of that there is force in the

Ninivites

So that of
Peters deny-
all.

Ninivites repentance, which is the *condition* required on their part, on the performance of which God hath generally promised to suspend his punishments, and therefore the threats are conditional, which in equity will not be inflicted, if the condition be performed. But the *sin* is man's work and to the commission of that no other party contributes but himself, and so neither is the prediction of it a threat, but a down-right *enunciation*, neither is there any *condition* imaginable to be performed on the other party, answerable to the other case, unless God should forcibly interpose to avert it, (and that cannot be imagined to be the meaning, [*except I restrain Judas he will betray me,*] or if it were, it were still an act of Gods *absolute foreknowledge*, that he will do so, if not violently restrained) all probable meanes to his amendment, and particularly the admitting him to the Sacrament being, saith S. *Chrysostom*, already used to him, and yet, saith Christ, *he will betray me*.

Prediction of
sin cannot be
conditionall.

91. Now for defence of your Postscript, and the contradiction which that charged on our hypothesis, I pray marke the Issue of it. If you can prove that it implies a contradiction for God to foresee future contingents, then you certainly prevaile, as on the other side if you succeed not in this attempt, you must resolve your opinion erroneous, because nothing being impossible to God but to lie, and so to make good both parts of a contradiction, if prescience bring not this consequence, it must be possible to God, how inexplicable or unintelligible soever it be to me, who for want of *facultatem analogam*, cannot judge of the actions of an eternal God, and if it be yeilded possible, then the predictions of Scripture will be proofes beyond question of the truth of

The issue of
the whole ques-
tion whether
prescience of
contingents
imply a con-
tradiction.

it.

The lawes of
contradicti-
ons.

it. To this one test then let us come. The contradiction you assigned was, our saying, *that things future are or may be present to God*. I shewed you the definition of contradictories was not competible to these, of which *est* and *non est* is the known example, and present and future are neither present and not present nor future and not future. And again in contradictions both parts must be considered in the same respects, whereas future being enunciated in respect of us; and our finite sight, present is exprest to be in respect of God, whose science is immense, and infinite.

The argu-
ment, holds
equally a-
gainst the
Trinity, and
unity.

§. 92. Now to this you reply, 1. *That present and future, though they are not formal contradictions, yet really and in sence they are, for future is that that is not present, but to come, and present and not present are formally contradictory.* 2. *That my concession that no finite thing can both be present and future is enough for you, for God cannot be present to that which is not present to him.*] I now answer to your first, that there is nothing so false, that I cannot make good by this your arguing. In particular, by this the doctrine of the *Trinity* and *Unity* were equally confuted, for *Trinitas* in the wonted notion is not one, but three, and one, and not one, are formally contradictory. This is the direct image and transcript of your arguing, *mutatis mutandis*, yet I know you deny not the *Tri-unus Deus*, how then can you on no better prooffe deny *prescience*? The *Socinian's* conformably deny both, but you are partial, and deny but one of them. It is never safe to despise the ordinary rules of art, but seldome more dangerous then in this, whereas if Logick were duely revered in it's dictates, and nothing thought contradictory in sence, but what is an affirmation, and negation of

of the same thing, this intricacy would be unfolded, and that which is future to me, be present to God, without the encumbrance or dread of a contradiction.

§. 93. To the *second* I answer, that it cannot suffice to your pretensions, that no finite thing is both present and future, meaning, (as it is plaine I did,) in the *same respect*, present and future *to me*: When yet what is future to me, may be present to one that lives a year hence, and so much more to God who liveth for ever. When therefore in your proof you seeme to suppose me to hold, *that what is future to me, is not present to God*, you did mistake me, for as I said, that God being immense may and must be present to that which is future, or else he is bounded and limited, and so not immense, infinite, so I deemed that, which God is thus present to, to be objectively present to him, and so it was from all eternity, though to us it be not yet present, but future. So that the other part of the definition of contradictoryes, if it had been adverted to, had superseded this part of your answer also, *viz.* that it is the *affirmation and negation of the same thing in the same respects*, as here you see it was not, and so was not usefull to you.

§. 94. But say you, *if all future contingents are and ab æterno were all present to God, then they are all eternall.*] I deny that consequence, what is finite, and in it self yet future, by it's objective presence to God, is not changed into eternall, nay even that which really is, and so is really, (and not onely objectively,) present to him, is yet as far from eternall, as Christ's body, by being united to his infinite divinity is from becoming infinite. This then was but a Sophisme that you will soon see thorow.

What is present to God, is not eternall.

§. 95. And

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§. 95. And so your other part of the same passage of *S. Augustin Confess.* L. II. c. 18, that again you resort to, was in effect formerly answered, by shewing that it belonged onely to what is *future*, and *present to us*, and so to *our sight*, not to *Gods*. I have now gone thorow your papers and wearied you, and almost my self, yet if what is written prove usefull to you, to the depositing that which I cannot but deem an Errour, although I lay no Epithets upon it, it will be far from burthenous to

Your very affectionate

friend and servant

H. HAMMOND.

Postscript.

P O S T S C R I P T.

§. 96. **T**O extricate you finally out of this difficulty, I shall desire you by way of recapitulation, to consider apart these two propositions, the first that Gods science being as immense and infinite, as himself, is not limited to things past or present, or futures, by him decreed, but extends to all that ever shall be, or may be; to what may be, so as to see it may be, though it be not, to what shall be, so as to see it come to passe, as in time it doth come to passe, contingent things, contingently, &c. Of which proposition if there can be any doubt to any man, who stedfastly believes Gods immensity, let the predictions recorded in the Scripture be considered, those especially which are of finnes, which it is as impossible for God to decree or predetermine, as to cause, and yet he foresees and foretells them, witnesse Christs foretelling *Peter*, that he should deny him thrice, when *Peter* himself was so far from foreseeing, or purposing it, that he resolved the contrary. The second proposition, that there are future contingents, that all the finnes (at least) of men are not decreed, and predetermined by God, or caused by any necessity. Of which no man can doubt, which believes the Scripture, and therein the procedure of the judgement to come, the difference in respect of guilt and punishment betwixt voluntary and involuntary actions, (the motions of men and of stones,) and again the exhortations and menaces of God in Scripture, and the great seriousness, exprest, and protestations prefixt to them.

Two propositions.

The first of God immense science.

The proof of it.

The second of contingency and liberty.

The proof of it.

§. 97. If

The conclusion.

§. 97. If taking these propositions apart, any Christian can doubt of the truth of either of them, he sees the shelves he splits upon, and the shipwreck of a great part of the Faith, whither on this, or that side. But if he cannot but assent to these truths severally, and onely wants the skill of reconciling the seeming difficulties which they beget, when he attempts to put them together, (of which sort are all the inconveniences, or objections, produced in this matter,) let him on that occasion consider, how (more then) credible it is, that he doth not understand all things, that are, having but *finite* faculties, and *finite* measures, which are not proportioned to *infinite* powers, or objects; Which makes it most seasonable to supersede all farther enquiries, and to acquiesce in an assurance, that God can reconcile his own contradictions, such I meane, as though by the known rules of Logick they appeare to be really no contradictions, yet by us are conceived to approach nere to such, through prejudice, or thinking (not too little, but rather) too much upon them. In which case to restrain our farther searches is the same necessary mortification, which it is to restrain inordinate appetites, and is a principall peice of duty owing to the Apostles precept of *φρονεῖν εἰς τὸ σωφρονεῖν*, *being wise to sobriety*: God give the world of Christian professors more of it, then is yet discernible among them.

FINIS.



T H E
L A S T V V O R D S
 O F T H E
 Reverend, Pious and Learned
D^r. HAMMOND:
 Being Two P R A Y E R S for the
 Peaceful re-settlement of this Church
 and State.

Prayer I.

O Blessed Lord, who in thine infinite mercy didst vouchsafe to plant a glorious Church among us, and now in thy just judgment hast permitted our sins and follies to root it up, be pleased at last to resume thoughts of peace towards us, that we may do the like to one another. Lord, look down from heaven, the habitation of thy holiness, and behold the ruines of a desolated Church, and compassionate to see her in the dust. Behold her, O Lord, not onely broken, but crumbled, divided into so many sects and factions, that she no longer represents the Ark of the God of *Israel*, where the Covenant and the Manna were conserved, but the Ark of *Noah*, filled with all various sorts of unclean beasts; and to com-

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plete

plete our misery and guilt, the spirit of division hath insinuated it self as well into our affections as our judgments; that badge of Discipleship which thou recommendedst to us, is cast off, and all the contrary wrath and bitterness, anger and clamor, called in to maintain and widen our breaches. O Lord, how long shall we thus violate and defame that Gospel of peace that we profess? how long shall we thus madly defeat our selves, lose that Christianity which we pretend to strive for? O thou which makest men to be of one mind in an house, be pleased so to unite us, that we may be perfectly joyned together in the same mind, and in the same judgment. And now that in Civil affairs there seems some aptness to a composure, O let not our Spiritual differences be more unreconcilable. Lord, let not the roughest winds blow out of the Sanctuary; let not those which should be thy Embassadors for peace still sound a Trumpet for war: but do thou reveal thy self to all our *Eliab's* in that still small voice, which may teach them to eccho thee in the like meek treating with others. Lord, let no unseasonable stiffness of those that are in the right, no perverse obstinacy of those that are in the wrong, hinder the closing of our wounds; but let the one instruct in meekness, and be thou pleased to give the other repentance to the acknowledgment of the Truth. To this end do thou, O Lord, mollifie all exasperated minds, take off all animosities and prejudices, contempt and heart-burnings, and by uniting their hearts prepare for the reconciling their opinions: and that nothing may intercept the clear sight of thy truth, Lord, let all private and secular designs be totally deposited, that gain may no longer be the measure of our Godliness, but that the one great and common concernment of

truth

ruth and peace may be unanimously and vigorously pursued. Lord, the hearts of all men are in thy hands, O be thou pleased to let thy Spirit of peace overshadow the minds of all contending parties; and, if it be thy will, restore this Church to her pristine state, renew her dayes as of old, let her escape out of *Egypt*, be so entire, that not an hood may be left behind: But if thy wisdom see it not yet a season for so full a deliverance, Lord, defer not, we beseech thee, such a degree of it; as may at least secure her a being; if she cannot recover her beauty, yet, O Lord, grant her health, such a soundness of constitution as may preserve her from dissolution. Let thy providence find out some good Samaritans to cure her present wounds: and to whomsoever thou shalt commit that important work, Lord, give them skilful hands and compassionate hearts; direct them to such applications as may most speedily, and yet most soundly, heal the hurt of the daughter of *Sion*; and make them so advert to the interests both of truth and peace, that no lawful condescension may be omitted, nor any unlawful made. And do thou, who art both the wonderful Counsellor and Prince of peace, so guide and prosper all pacifick endeavors, that all our distractions may be composed, and our *Jerusalem* may again become a City at unity in it self; that those happy primitive dayes may at length revert, wherein Vice was the onely heresie; that all our intestine contentions may be converted into a vigorous opposition of our common enemy, our unbrotherly feuds into a Christian zeal against all that exalts it self against the obedience of Christ. Lord, hear us, and ordain peace for us, even for his sake whom thou hast ordained our Peace-maker, Jesus Christ our Lord.

Prayer II.

O Most gracious Lord, who dost not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men, who smitest not till the importunities of our sins enforce thee, and then correctest in measure, we thy unworthy creatures humbly acknowledge that we have abundantly tasted of this patience and lenity of thine. To what an enormous height were our sins arriv'd ere thou beganst to visit them ! and when thou couldst no longer forbear, yet mastering thy power, thou hast not proportion'd thy vengeance to our crimes, but to thy own gracious design of reducing and reclaiming us. Lord, had the first stroke of thy hand been exterminating, our guilts had justified the method ; but thou hast proceeded by such easy and gentle degrees, as witness how much thou desiredst to be interrupted, and shew us, that all that sad weight we have long groaned under, hath been accumulated onely by our own incorrigibleness. 'Tis now, O Lord, these many years that this Nation hath been in the furnace, and yet our dross waists not but increases ; and it is owing onely to thy unspeakable mercy, that we, who would not be purified, are not consumed ; that we remain a Nation, who cease not to be a most sinfull, and provoking nation. O Lord, let not this long-suffering of thine serve onely to upbraid our obstinacy, and enhance our guilt ; but let it at last have the proper effect on us, melt our hearts, and lead us to repentance. And oh, that this may be the day for us thus to discern the things that belong to our peace ! that all who are (yea, and all who are not) cast down this day in an external humiliation, may by the operation

tion of thy mighty Spirit have their souls laid prostrate before thee in a sincere contrition ! O thou who canst out of the very stones raise up children unto *Abraham*, work our stony flinty hearts into such a temper as may be malleable to the impressions of thy grace, that all the sinners in *Sion* may tremble ; that we may not by a perievering obstinacy seal to our selves both temporal and eternal ruine, but instead of our mutinous complaining at the punishments of our sins, search and try our ways, and turn again to the Lord. O be thou pleas'd to grant us this one grand fundamental mercy, that we who so impatiently thirst after a change without us, may render that possible and safe by this better and more necessary change within us ; that our sins may not, as they have so often done, interpose and eclipse that light which now begins to break out upon us. Lord, thy dove seems to approach us with an olive-branch in her mouth, oh let not our filth and noysomness chase her away ; but grant us that true repentance which may atone thee, and that Christian charity which may reconcile us with one another. Lord, let not our breach either with thee or among our selves be incurable, but by making up the first prepare us for the healing of the latter. And because, O Lord, the way to make us one fold is to have one shepherd, be pleas'd to put us all under the conduct of Him to whom that charge belongs ; bow the hearts of this people as of one man, that the onely contention may be who shall be most forward in bringing back our *David*. O let none reflect on their past guilts as an argument to persevere, but repent, and to make their return so sincere as may qualify them not onely for his but thy Mercy. And, Lord, be pleas'd so to guide the hearts of all who shall be intrusted with that great concernment of set-

ling this nation, that they may weigh all their deliberations in the ballance of the Sanctuary, that conscience, not interest, may be the ruling principle, and that they may render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsars, and to God the things that are Gods; that they may become healers of our breaches, and happy repairers of the sad ruines both in Church and State: and grant, O Lord, that as those sins which made them are become Nationall, so the repentance may be Nationall also, & that evidenc'd by the proper fruits of it, by zeal of restoring the rights both of thee and thine Anointed. And doe thou, O Lord, so dispose all hearts, and remove all obstacles, that none may have the will, much lesse the power, to hinder his peaceable restitution. And, Lord, let him bring with him an heart so intirely devoted to thee, that he may wish his own honour onely as a means to advance thine. O let the precepts and example of his Blessed Father never depart from his mind; and as thou wert pleas'd to perfect the one by suffering, so perfect the other by acting thy will; that He may be a blessed instrument of replanting the power instead of the form of Godliness among us, of restoring Christian vertue in a prophane and almost barbarous Nation. And if any wish him for any distant ends, if any desire his shadow as a shelter for their riots and licenciousnesse, O let him come a great but happy defeat to all such, not bring fewel, but cure, to their inordinate appetites; and by his example as a Christian, and his Authority as a King, so invite to good, and restrain from evil, that he may not onely release our temporall, but our spiritual bondage, suppress those foul and scandalous vices which have so long captivated us, and by securing our inward, provide for the perpetuating our outward peace. Lord, establish thou his throne in
righte-

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righteousnesse, make him a signall instrument of thy glory and our happiæsse, and let him reap the fruits of it in comfort here, and in blisse hereafter ; that so his earthly Crown may serve to enhance and enrich his heavenly. Grant this, O King of Kings, for the sake and intercession of our Blessed Mediator, Jesus Christ.

THE END.

L O N D O N,

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